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Abstract
This project examines the puzzle of the ideological contradiction for why the United
States justified giving large amounts of economic aid intended to develop capitalism and private
sector free enterprise for the authoritarian Republic of China (ROC) government’s socialist style
public sector economy on the island of Taiwan during the cold war period 1950-1965. The $1.4
billion in US foreign economic aid to the Chinese Nationalist led ROC government in Taiwan
during this 15-year period was a seemingly disproportionate amount compared to its small size
and type of authoritarian regime compared to other aid recipients. This project appraises the
extent that Washington used the US cold war containment strategy’s foreign economic aid
concepts to justify economic aid to Taiwan. The historiological method applies a political
economy inspired interpretative approach using capitalist economic ideology as the focal point
for appraising how Washington justified US economic aid to Taiwan. The method synthesizes a
blended framework of American diplomatic, ideological, economic, and the foreign aid subfields
of historical inquiry within the broader context of United States-Taiwan cold war relations. The
findings suggest US economic aid did not result in creating a private sector in Taiwan during the
period, but rather soon afterwards. Whether US economic aid resulted in creating a liberal
capitalistic-ideology based economic model in Taiwan can be argued as mostly irrelevant given
the US containment strategy’s necessities to showcase economic success. The main causes
justifying US aid to Taiwan were the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and Washington’s
need to counter new Soviet and Chinese Communist foreign economic aid initiatives during
1952-1956. As a result, Washington justifiably, but disingenuously declared Taiwan a “victory”
for capitalistic ideology versus Communist inspired socialist-style economic expansionism.
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Chapter One: Introduction, Purpose, and Methodology
During World War Two on February 18, 1943, in Washington DC, China’s First Lady—
Madame Chiang Kai-shek (1898-2003)—became the first Chinese citizen and second ever
foreign female dignitary to address both houses of the US Congress at a House Reception. The
purpose of Madame Chiang’s seminal visit to Washington and stirring speech was to thank the
American public and US Congressional leaders for giving large amounts of military and
economic aid to support China’s wartime efforts versus Japan’s military aggression in China.1
Madame Chiang, a self-professed Christian and fluent in English, had previously spent
nearly a decade in the United States during the 1920s as a student in American schools and
universities. In her speech before the US Congress, Madame Chiang spoke of the United States
and China as having had a history of 160 years of “traditional friendship,” shared “many
similarities” as a “basis of friendship,” and that “we have an identity of ideals.”2 After her speech
in Washington, Madame Chiang continued on a three month-long whirlwind public speaking
tour of several American cities rallying public support for more US aid to assist China’s wartime
efforts.3

1

Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2009), 229-230; and Keiji Furuya, Chiang Kai-Shek: His Life and Times (New York: St.
John’s University, 1981), 736-739.
2

Soong Mei-Ling, “Addresses To The House Of Representatives And To The Senate,” February 18, 1943.

Madame Chiang’s three-month long public speaking tour in the United States during 1943 included
several large fund-raising rallies for US aid to China in Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New
York. The White House staff and US State Department, along with her alma mater Wesleyan College in Georgia
and affiliated Methodist Christian groups sponsored and coordinated her visit. See: Memorandum of Conversation,
by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton), February 9, 1943, in Foreign Relations of the United
States (FRUS), Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China, eds. G. Bernard Noble and E. Ralph Perkins, (Washington DC: US
Government Printing Office, 1957), 3-4; and Hannah Pakula, The Last Empress: Madame Chiang Kai-shek and the
Birth of Modern China (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009).
3

2
Madame Chiang’s reference to both nations as having “an identity of ideals” was a
seemingly false characterization and contrary to American political ideals of democracy and
economic ideals of capitalism and private sector free enterprise. At the time of her speech,
China’s government exhibited an authoritarian, illiberal, and undemocratic political system with
a quasi-statist public-sector dominated economy led by her husband, President Chiang Kai-shek
(1887-1975), the well-known Chinese Nationalist Party-political leader and President of the
Republic of China (ROC) government. These contradictions were at the crux of crucial debates
and ideational controversies emerging between the United States and China over their
contrasting national political and economic development models during the World War Two and
cold war periods while the two nations were allies.
Except for a brief but significant decline in support for the Chinese Nationalists during
the immediate post-World War Two period, in 1950 Washington suddenly decided to resume
giving large amounts economic aid to the Chinese Nationalist ROC-led government when it
evacuated to the island of Taiwan after losing the post-World War Two Chinese civil war to the
Chinese Communists in 1949. These contradictions reveal a puzzle about how and why,
beginning in 1950, the United States justified giving the authoritarian ROC government
unprecedented amounts of economic aid intended to develop capitalism and private sector free
enterprise despite Taiwan maintaining a predominately socialist state-led public sector industrial
development model.
Fifteen years later on July 1, 1965, the front page of the New York Times carried an
article entitled “U.S. Economic Aid to Taiwan Ended; ‘Graduation’ Hailed” describing why the
massive 15-year US economic aid program totaling over $1.4 billion to Taiwan during 1951-
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1965 had just ended the day before on June 30, 1965.4 The author juxtaposed the curious puzzle
of Taiwan as a disproportionally large US economic aid recipient within the broader context of
two decades of contentious debates among officials in Washington over the purposes and
justifications for overall US foreign aid programs during 1945-1965. These controversies
manifested themselves in the form of “annual aid battles” within the US executive branch and
Congress’ legislative processes resulting in Washington appropriating $110 billion in total
foreign aid expenditures during this 20-year period. These controversies included a wide variety
of budget justifications and categories of aid, disparate goals and purposes, linkages to foreign
policies to include “containment” of communism, types of aid, amounts for individual regions
and nations, intentional and unintentional consequences, impacts on the domestic economy,
program inefficiency, misuse, and corruption, and mixed results for foreign economic aid
programs.5
The $1.4 billion of US foreign economic aid to Taiwan during the period was a
staggering and seemingly disproportionate amount compared to the size, population, and type of
authoritarian political system compared to most other US aid recipient nations. This amount
represented about three percent of the total US foreign aid budget of $49 billion for the period
despite Taiwan being a small island nation with a population of 8.4 million in 1951 and growing
to 12.6 million in 1964.6 During the 20-year period from 1945 to 1965, Taiwan was the sixth

4
Max Frankel, “U.S. Economic Aid to Taiwan Ended; ‘Graduation’ Hailed,” The New York Times, July 1,
1965, Late City Edition, 1-2.
5
6

Ibid., 2.

John W. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in Asia
(New York: Taylor & Francis, 1997), 230-231, 235-241; U.S. State Department, Agency for International
Development, US A.I.D. Discussion Paper No. 11: Evaluation of the U.S. Economic Aid to Free China, 1951-1965,
(Washington DC: US State Department, April 1966), 22; and “International Transactions and Foreign Commerce,
(Series U 1-186),” in Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition,
(Washington DC: US Department of Commerce, 1977), 18.

4
largest recipient of US foreign economic aid assistance among all 70 recipient developing
countries which included 34 percent of Taiwan’s total gross investment and with over 80 percent
as “nonrepayable grants.”7 During the 15-year period from 1950 to 1965 Taiwan’s receipt of this
$1.4 billion represented between one to five percent of all US foreign global economic assistance
aid, and between 15-25 percent of all economic assistance in the “Far East Region.”8 During the
ten year period from 1950 to 1959 alone, Taiwan was the third largest of 14 recipient nations in
the “Far East and Pacific” region for US government foreign grants and credits.9
This research project appraises the extent that Washington used the cold war strategy of
containment’s economic development and aid concepts as an ideological rationale justifying
large budgets for US foreign economic aid to the Chinese Nationalist-led ROC government on
the island of Taiwan during 1950-1965. Archival primary sources indicate there were a variety of
reasons that evolved within the US government’s executive branch and the Congress used to
justify economic aid to Taiwan during the period. Applying a historiographical political
economy derived interpretative approach addresses a puzzle in US-Taiwan relations to explain
why Washington’s commitment to exporting economic ideological principles of capitalist free
enterprise and private sector-based growth was seemingly undermined by giving US economic
aid to Taiwan—a repressive authoritarian state with a socialist inspired, central government-led
planned public sector economy.

7

Garver, The Sino-American Alliance,” 235; Neil H. Jacoby, U.S. Aid to Taiwan, (New York: Praeger,
1966), 38, 53; and Neil H. Jacoby, “Foreign Aid as a Problem of Resource Management: The Case of Free China,”
California Management Review (Fall 1966): 4-6.
Garver, The Sino-American Alliance, 230-231, 235-241.; Jacoby, “Foreign Aid as a Problem of Resource
Management: The Case of Free China,” 4-6; and US A.I.D. Discussion Paper No. 11, 1, 22.
8

9

“International Transactions and Foreign Commerce, (Series U 1-186),” 18.
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During the cold war, the US government exported foreign aid to expand global capitalism
and modernize the economies of developing allied nations. Washington’s foreign policy goals
included replicating and linking like-minded nations with models and systems of economic
interdependence based on American and Western capitalist notions of free trade, fiscal and
monetary policies, private sector development, and limited state intervention. The term
“economic ideology” refers to the advocacy and perceptions by key political leaders for types of
economic philosophies, functions, and systems for a nation’s overall modernization of trade,
finance, and socio-economic development structure.10
As such, this dissertation applies a political economy-based capitalist economic ideology
method as the historiographical interpretative focal point for a single case study explaining the
seemingly ideological contradictions of the United States giving large amounts of economic aid
intended to develop capitalism for the authoritarian Nationalist Chinese ROC-led government’s
socialist-style economy on Taiwan.11 The research purpose is to appraise the degree that
Washington justified aid to Taiwan based on a capitalist economic rational compared to other US
cold war security and political goals that may have been the basis for rationalizing economic aid
to Taiwan.
The predominant scholarship explaining US-Taiwan relations during the early cold war
focuses primarily on linking Taiwan to the ways and means of Washington’s containment
strategy’s broader military security and political-ideological objectives against Soviet and
Chinese Communist expansionism. This dissertation links Taiwan to the economic security

10
Chen-Kuo Hsu, “Ideological Reflections and the Inception of Economic Development in Taiwan,” in The
Role of the State in Taiwan’s Development, ed. Joel D. Aberbach, David Dollar, and Kenneth L. Sokoloff (Armonk,
NY: East Gate, 1994), 307-308.

A fundamental definition of the term “political economy” is found in Roger Scruton, The Palgrave
Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thought, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
11
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objectives of containment which included establishing capitalist global trading and financial
rule-sets, integrating like-minded nations, and promoting capitalist economic development
globally to counter communist authoritarian models of development. However, the US
government portrayed Taiwan as aspiring to be a role model of free enterprise capitalism despite
it being the opposite—with its state-run command economy controlled by the authoritarian and
undemocratic regime of Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek.
Therefore, this inquiry appraises the degree that the US government used its cold war
containment strategy’s capitalist economic components as a rationale justifying large amounts of
economic aid to develop Taiwan’s seemingly ideological opposite form as an authoritarian state
with its planned and “non-capitalistic” economy that lacked private sector free enterprise
characteristics. This project’s interpretative method uses capitalist economic ideology as the
focal point derived from a blended framework of American diplomatic, ideological, economic,
and the foreign aid subfields of historical inquiry for US-Taiwan relations and the overall US
strategy of containment versus the Soviet Union and Communist China.
This inquiry also links political, diplomatic, and economic aspects of early US cold war
history and foreign relations through a single case study of Taiwan. The evolution of the bilateral
economic and related ideological components are fundamental historical foundations for
contemporary foreign relationships between the United States and Taiwan. Several scholars in
the field of cold war historiography such as David C. Engerman have noted that explaining the
historical evolution of the interrelationships of economics, ideology, and foreign policy between
the United States and nations like Taiwan during the era are important and often “understudied”

7
areas of inquiry compared to predominant orthodox scholarship emphasizing bilateral military
and political issues.12
This topic relates to an important aspect of American economic history involving official
US government strategies, policies, funding, and implementation of economic assistance and aid,
capitalist development techniques, and modernization for the developing “Free World” during
the cold war period. This research contributes to the historiography of American economic
statecraft during the cold war established by historians linking economics to interpreting causes
influencing US foreign policy and diplomacy as it evolved during the period.13 For example,
Alan P. Dobson, the British diplomatic historian and political scientist, in US Economic
Statecraft for Survival, 1933-1991: Of Sanctions, Embargoes and Economic Warfare (2002)
applies a framework of interpretation explaining domestic, international, and ideational causes of
change and evolution in the instruments, symbolism, and communication for US foreign policies
for “economic statecraft” during the cold war.14
Other scholars have established how American economic foreign aid and modernization
concepts supplemented the economic ends, ways, and means that were part of the overall
ideological competition that pitted the US and allied capitalistic economic systems of
David C. Engerman, “The Romance of Economic Development and New Histories of the Cold War,”
Diplomatic History, 28, no.1 (January 2004): 23-54. Other historians linking economics to foreign affairs include
Thomas H. Bender, “Historians, the Nation, and Plentitude of Narratives,” in Rethinking American History in a
Global Age, ed. Thomas Bender (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 1-19; Akira Iriye,
“Internationalizing International History,” in Bender, Rethinking American History in a Global Age, 54-57; and
Charles Bright and Michael Geyer, “Where in the World is America? The History of the United States in the Global
Age,” in Bender, Rethinking American History in a Global Age, 84-87.
12

See: Engerman, “The Romance of Economic Development and New Histories of the Cold War,” 23-54;
Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the cold war, 1945-1980 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1985); Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 19451954 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); and Diane B. Kunz, Butter and Guns: America’s Cold War Economic
Diplomacy (New York: Free Press, 1997).
13

14

Alan P. Dobson, US Economic Statecraft for Survival, 1933-1991: Of Sanctions, Embargoes and
Economic Warfare. (Abingdon, Oxon: Taylor & Francis Group, 2002), 1-9.
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development against the competing communist inspired socialist economic systems of
modernization purported by the Soviet Union and Communist China in the developing world.
For example, Nigel Gould-Davies offers a political science-based framework and interpretation
of how various nations’ ideologies, values, and belief systems impacted their foreign policies
during the cold war.15
Similarly, Odd Arde Westad describes how ideology is a useful interpretative framework
or “paradigm” for explaining causation in foreign policy and international history during the cold
war. Michael E. Latham offers a historiological explanation and interpretation of how social
science theories of economic modernization influenced US foreign policy during the cold war.16
As a result, these scholarly interpretative approaches influence this dissertation’s method
explaining how ideological aspects of economic competition influenced the United States to
favor the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan as a unique and primary target of economic
development in Asia as part of the cold war confrontation versus the Soviet Union and
Communist China over competing economic modernization systems of development.
Most normative scholarship for diplomatic history of US-Taiwan relations during the
cold war such as Robert M. Blum in Drawing the Line: The Origin of the American Containment
Policy in East Asia (1982) and Jay Taylor’s The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the
Struggle for Modern China (2009) apply valuable interpretative approaches focusing mainly on
US political-military policy towards Taiwan as an instrument of Washington’s containment

See: Nigel Gould-Davies, “Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics During the Cold
War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 1, no. 1 (January 1999): 90–109.
15

See: Odd Arne Westad, “The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) Paradigms,”
Diplomatic History 24, no. 4 (2000): 551–565; Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology American Social
Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); and
Michael E. Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the
Cold War to the Present (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).
16
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policy versus Communist China and the Soviet Union in East Asia.17 This form of scholarship
explains US diplomatic policy towards Taiwan in the context of the broader debates in
Washington over relations and tensions with the Chinese Communists who prevailed over the
Chinese Nationalists to end the Chinese civil war period of 1945-1949, and later during the cold
war period.
In 1949, the Chinese Nationalists evacuated their ROC government together with over
two million Chinese citizens to the island of Taiwan, while the Chinese Communists founded the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) on mainland China. This valuable type of explanatory, yet
dominating frameworks for historiological interpretation are anchored in the context of overall
US-PRC (China) relations. As such, they rely on analyzing primary sources to interpret and
explain Washington’s foreign policy choices towards Taiwan based on identifying a range of
causal factors that influenced decision-making by key and influential American leaders in the
executive and legislative branches of the US government.18
Another leading historian, David M. Finkelstein, the prominent American scholar of US
cold war history and Taiwan, in Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma, 1949-1950 (1993) provides an
exemplar interpretative framework for analyzing the early process within the US executive
branch during the Truman administration for how Washington’s foreign policy towards Taiwan
evolved during 1949-1950. Finkelstein’s historical narrative, based on extensive research of
primary sources in US government archives, specifically analyzed the institutional and
bureaucratic processes, interagency tensions, and executive-legislative branch disputes that

17
Robert M. Blum, Drawing the Line: The Origin of the American Containment Policy in East Asia (New
York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982), 3-23, 36, 75-151; Taylor, The Generalissimo, 194-338, 411-546.
18

See: Garver, The Sino-American Alliance; and Hsiao-ting Lin, Accidental State: Chiang Kai-Shek, The
United States, and the Making of Taiwan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 57-81, 119-140, 141169.
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formed Washington’s foreign policy choices towards Taiwan during this critical two-year
period.19 A related framework developed by Thomas J. Christensen, the noted scholar of China
and East Asia studies and a former leading policy official in the US State Department, in Useful
Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958
(1996) applies a political science derived theories to apply a “domestic politics mobilization
model” to explain US foreign policy towards China and Taiwan during 1947-1958.20
Other prominent diplomatic historians apply a “donor-recipient” framework for
interpreting US-Taiwan relations during the early cold war period to identify positive or negative
outcomes within Washington’s broader policies of global containment, the international balance
of power between the United States and the Soviet Union, and US-PRC confrontations
throughout East Asia. For example, John Garver’s The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist
China and American Cold War Strategy in Asia (1997) identifies the major ideological,
economic, security, and political components comprising the US-Taiwan relationship and
evaluated the degree of positive effects benefitting the United States as the “donor.”21
Correspondingly, other scholars apply a comparable framework but focus on the negative
aspects of the how Washington’s support to the Chinese Nationalists was detrimental for US
foreign policy in general due to Taiwan being ruled by an authoritarian, repressive, and corrupt
statist regime. In general, these historians applied these frameworks by analyzing

David M. Finkelstein, Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma, 1949-1950 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1993), xi; and Finkelstein, “From Abandonment to Salvation: The Evolution of United States Policy Toward
Taiwan, 1949-1950” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1990).
19

20
Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American
Conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
21

Garver describes the United States as benefitting from giving security, military, and economic aid to
Taiwan because it resulted in serving as a “model of Non-Communist development” during the cold war; in Garver,
The Sino-American Alliance, 7, 230.

11
chronologically the domestic, international, and ideational causes that influence the choices of
key leaders and their objectives as policies evolved in US-Taiwan economic relations within the
executive and legislative branches during the period.
Consequently, this study applies an economic ideology-based framework of interpretation
to develop a comprehensive chronological explanatory narrative appraising the causes for
Washington’s evolving goals, conditions, and contradictions of its economic aid policies towards
Taiwan situated within the broader US cold war strategy of containment. This method also
synthesizes frameworks derived from the sub-field of economic history of foreign aid studies.
Many scholars in this field focus on case studies to appraise the effectiveness of foreign
economic aid, or “development aid,” based on intended objectives and results.22
For example, Neil Jacoby’s seminal U.S. Aid to Taiwan: A Study of Foreign Aid, SelfHelp, and Development (1966) applied an economic history methodology through the single case
study of Taiwan that assessed the objectives set by the US Congress and the executive branch for
US foreign economic aid to Taiwan, the successes and failures, and identified lessons learned for
other foreign economic aid programs.23 While Jacoby applied economic analytics to the case
study as well as evaluating the effectiveness of Taiwan meeting Washington’s intended
economic aid objectives, his study’s purpose was not to identify the ideological underpinnings or
the specific rationale for why key American leaders chose Taiwan to be a pseudo model for
capitalist economic modernization.

22

Artemy M. Kalinovsky argues in his review of five recent scholarly books by economic historians in the
field of cold war era foreign aid studies that the “historiography of international development has clearly entered a
new boom period” in Artemy M. Kalinovsky “Sorting Out the Recent Historiography of Development Assistance:
Consolidation and New Directions in the Field,” Journal of Contemporary History 56, no. 1 (January 2021): 227–
239.
23

Neil H. Jacoby, U.S. Aid to Taiwan: A Study of Foreign Aid, Self-Help, and Development (New York:
Praeger, 1966), 29-37.
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Methods and frameworks of interpretation for foreign economic aid and development
during the period are also found in the social science field of rhetoric studies in communication.
For example, Kimber Charles Pearce in Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid
(2001) applies an analytical rhetorical studies framework examining the influence of economic
historian and key presidential advisor Dr. Walt W. Rostow’s macroeconomic concepts of
modernization theory on American economic diplomacy for US foreign aid during the
administrations of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson from 1952 to 1968.24 Using an
interpretative framework centered on his theories of rhetoric influence, Pearce explains how
Rostow’s persuasively articulated economic modernization theories, advocacy, and influence
resulted in convincing the US Congress and executive branch to favor giving American
economic developmental aid to foreign nations such as Taiwan during the period.
Rostow, the era’s noted influential economic historian and professor at the Center for
International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), developed many of the
ideological, intellectual, and theoretical underpinnings for reforming and enhancing
Washington’s cold war macroeconomic strategies and policies justifying the export of US
economic development assistance and aid during the period. During the 1940’s and 1950’s
Rostow gained national prominence while serving in high level US government positions and as
an advisor influencing American international economic policies during the Truman
administration. Rostow then served as an economic and foreign policy advisor to President
Dwight D. Eisenhower while concurrently a professor of economic history at MIT during 19501961. He then served as Counselor of the US Department of State and Director of Policy

24

See: Kimber Charles Pearce, Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid (East Lansing, MI:
Michigan State University Press, 2001).
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Planning 1961-1966 during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. All told, Rostow was a
key economic aid policy advisor during four consecutive US presidential administrations from
Presidents Truman to Johnson.25
Rostow’s economic modernization theories were inspired by his scholarly hypotheses
connecting narrative historiography to macroeconomics arguing that the causal factors for
economic growth in societies resulted from individual choices, collective individual desires of
society, and elite political choices acting as a complex organism resulting in “biological”
economic evolution and “organic” growth of capitalist leaning nation-states.26 Rostow was also
motivated by his desire to provide an alternative economic development theory that rationalized
extending US foreign economic aid in concert with his modernization theories for developing
nations in order to counter Soviet inspired initiatives based on their interpretation of Marxist
ideological theories of development and the need for central planning and state-run business
enterprises at the expense of the private sector.
Among Rostow’s many notable publications that purported his economic modernization
theories as a rationale for shaping and expanding US foreign economic aid was his Eisenhower,
Kennedy, and Foreign Aid (1985).27 In this book Rostow explains how his ideas of economic
modernization were turned into “action” at the policy level for US foreign economic aid while he
served as a senior economic policy advisor to three American presidents during the 1950s and

25

See: W.W. Rostow, Concept and Controversy: Sixty Years of Taking Ideas to Market, (Austin, TX:
University of Texas Press, 2003), 205-227.
26
See: W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1960); “A Historian’s Perspective on Modern Economic Theory,” The American
Economic Review 42, no. 2 (May 1952): 16-29; and “The Stages of Economic Growth,” The Economic History
Review 12, no. 1 (1959) 1-16.
27

1985).

See: W.W. Rostow, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Foreign Aid (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press,

14
1960’s. Rostow’s framework of interpretation centered on primary sources of records of key
American leaders in the US executive and legislative branches to synthesize a narrative history
of the evolution of Washington’s policy debates and decision making for US foreign economic
aid issues based on internal and external drivers that he identified were important while he
served in the US government. Consequently, Rostow’s personal account and related study is a
foundation for evaluating the degree that his influence might have been linked to justifying
Washington’s foreign economic aid policies towards Taiwan during the period.
Scholarship in the field of Chinese economic history is also useful for identifying key
variables and drivers of continuity and change in Taiwan’s evolution from its early modern
socialist-style public sector dominant economic model of development during the period to its
eventual transition to integrating capitalist-style private sector free enterprise that occurred after
the period. Tai-chun Kuo and Ramon H. Meyers’ Taiwan’s Economic Transformation:
Leadership, Property Rights and Institutional Change 1949-1965 (2012) and Chien-kuo Pang’s
“The State and Economic Transformation: The Taiwan Case” (1988) are exemplary and
representative scholarly study applying an empirical historiographical political economy
framework based on authoritative Chinese Nationalist Party and ROC government archived
primary sources to explain the factors that facilitated Taiwan’s transition from a statist planned
economy to that of a “mixed” public-private sector one.28
Similarly, Zhang Wei-Bin in Taiwan’s Modernization Americanization and Modernizing
Confucian Manifestations (2003), Li Kuo-ting’s Economic Transformation of Taiwan, ROC
(1988), and Joel D. Aberbach, David Dollar, and Kenneth L. Sokoloff’s The Role of the State in
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Taiwan’s Development (1994) provide valuable scholarly inquiries focusing more exclusively
and in detail on appraising the influence of the Chinese Nationalist political party’s unique
hybrid socialist-style economic ideology and the role that the Nationalist-led ROC government’s
internal political and bureaucratic institutions played in Taiwan’s economic development during
the period.29 However, in general such studies either downplay or focus less on the role that
American-style capitalist economic ideology and Washington’s internal debates over justifying
and later imposing stricter conditions for US economic aid that also played a primary role in
transforming Taiwan’s economy.
Scholarship in the fields of political science and international relations provide numerous
studies and various applications of theories, methods, and frameworks of interpretation for USTaiwan relations during the period. In general, these political science methods apply numerous
derivations of abstract theories containing varying ranges of utility for identifying the relative
causation from internal domestic and external international variables within political systems and
the impact on key policy decisions by American leaders in the executive and legislative branches
of the US government. Interpretative methods in the related sub-field of scholarly research for
“foreign assistance” or “development aid” found primarily in the broader area of political science
field of international relations can be adapted to this dissertation’s topic of appraising the degree
that capitalist economic ideology served as a determinant or cause for US government economic
aid to Taiwan during the period.
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As such, these useful interpretative frameworks, analytical approaches, and key variable
concepts for causation can be applied, synthesized, and adapted to shape a historiological
narrative account that help explain Washington’s rationale for giving economic aid to Taiwan
during the period. For example, Steven Hook’s seminal book National Interest and Foreign Aid
(1995) applies frameworks for inquiry organized upon “donor-centered” or “recipient-centered”
approaches, while factoring in decisions for aid based upon evaluating the internal decisionmaking models applied to determining the relative influence of key state political leaders and
institutional bureaucracies.30 Hook’s later scholarship expanded upon statist centered approaches
to adapt and merge social theories and domestic political concepts of “power and interests,”
resembling a unique constructivist approach of inquiry evaluating the role of ideas, principles,
and beliefs in causing change in state foreign aid allocations.31
Another political science framework applied to the related topic of US military aid to
Taiwan during the period is offered by Taiwan studies expert and Stanford University scholar
Hsiao-ting Lin, who along with Hsiang-ke Chao, identified the drivers and causes justifying US
military aid to Taiwan during 1945-1951.32 Their framework of interpretation applies and merges
“rent-seeking” and “bounded rationality” economic assumptions as model for a US donor-centric
approach that identifies causes for US leaders deciding to give military aid to Taiwan.33 Their
method is derived from the prominent American political scientist and Harvard University
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professor Graham T. Allison’s “Rational Actor,” Organizational Process,” and “Governmental
Politics” models of bureaucratic politics decision-making theories of political science analysis of
drivers influencing government leadership policy formation.34
Likewise, James Lee’s dissertation, “The Wages of Containment: Foreign Aid, American
Grand Strategy, and the Origins of the Developmental State” (2018) applies a political sciencebased approach in the related fields of comparative politics and international relations to identify
causes and linkages to US foreign economic aid for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan within the
broader elements of Washington’s cold war containment strategy. Lee’s analytical method takes
a “donor-centered” approach of inquiry to explain how US economic aid for Taiwan was part of
Washington’s broader foreign policy interests and goals using “two types of strategic aid policy”
to “defend” and “expand” a “sphere of influence” in Northeast Asia versus the threat of
communism. Lee’s hybrid historiological narrative and political science theory approach also
applied an overall analytical framework for three types of actors which included the client
(United States), the ally (Taiwan), and the adversary (Communism).35
Several scholars in various academic disciplines have examined the narrower, yet vital
topic of American executive-legislative branch interactions and processes for US foreign policy
towards China and Taiwan during the cold war. For example, Adam S.R. Bartley, a political
scientist, lecturer, and specialist in Chinese foreign relations, authored Perception of China and
White House Decision-Making, 1941-1963: Spears of Promise, Shields of Truth (2019) which
analyzes the internal US government processes in the making of Washington’s foreign policy
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towards China and Taiwan covering four consecutive presidential administrations during this
twenty two-year period.36 Bartley offers a chronological narrative that combines frameworks
from diplomatic history, political science, and “cognitive psychology” to explain causes and
outcomes based on the structure and process of elite American decision-making for US foreign
policy towards China.37
Furthermore, Bartley identifies and compares the world views, personal and cognitive
traits, and leadership and management styles for the four US presidents and their advisors during
the period. He also assesses the influence and degree professionalism among key officials within
the institutional agencies of the executive branch and the wider US government. He specifically
focuses on the bureaucratic influence emanating from within the US State Department and the
Department of Defense for shaping Washington’s foreign policy towards China and Taiwan.
Bartley’s method attempts to fill gaps in orthodox rational, organizational, and bureaucratic
process and leadership decision-making models by American presidents for foreign policy using
a longer periodization timeframe and extending the model to appraising the role of key
presidential advisors.38
John T. Rourke established a framework for interpreting the relationship between the US
Congress and the presidency over foreign policy in Congress and the Presidency in U.S. Foreign
Policymaking: A Study of Interaction and Influence, 1945-1982 (1985).39 Rourke’s method uses
a chronological periodization covering the process of congressional interactions aligned with
36
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successive presidential administrations for Washington’s foreign policy making during the cold
war. Rourke analyzes the role of key congressional leaders for their influence in shaping
Washington’s overall foreign policies and related foreign aid strategies in key regions such as
East Asia during the period. Rourke also identifies congressional “values” as a “means” to
influence US foreign policy both independently and vis-à-vis the executive branch.40
Similarly, Robert S. Ross examines the range of domestic factors in US-China foreign
relations in his book After the Cold War: Domestic Factors and U.S.-China Relations (1998).41
Ross situated the influence of American internal domestic variables that influenced
Washington’s foreign policy towards China (PRC) in the post-Cold war period. Nevertheless it is
a useful framework for interpreting domestic influences on U.S. foreign policy for the “two”
China’s—the PRC and Taiwan (ROC), during the cold war in the which Washington officially
recognized diplomatically the latter (1928-1978) until switching diplomatic recognition to the
former (PRC) in 1979. Overall, Ross presented a useful interpretative framework that synthesizes
the international security context with American domestic factors of politics, economics, and
“societal conditions” for explaining the evolution of modern foreign relations between the United
States and China.
Likewise, Rebecca Hersman’s Friends and Foes: How Congress and the President
Really Make Foreign Policy (2000), offers a contemporary national security practitioner’s
perspective with a descriptive framework of interpretation that identified causal variables for US
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foreign policy resulting from a myriad of executive-legislative process interactions.42 These
variables include considerations and issues of contention between the two branches over budget,
“checks and balances,” degree of public support from among various constituencies, legal issues,
degree of trust, influence of key political leaders, “mixed signals” towards allies and adversaries,
impacts on the domestic and foreign perceptions of US global influence, presence of a “unifying
threat,” and the impact on foreign policies as a result of the “formal and informal” processes of
interaction between the two branches.43
Similarly, Xie Tao, in his article “Congress and China Policy: An Analysis of China
Bills,” (2008) offers another useful political science based analytical model of quantitative
regression data analysis for interpreting US congressional voting results involving a range of
American foreign policy issues towards China, including economic issues.44 Tao’s research
focuses exclusively on the internal “partisan dynamics” within the US Congress influencing the
intended objectives shaping legislation impacting Washington’s foreign relations towards China
and Taiwan during the 1973-2005 period.
Tao analyzes important domestic factors impacting foreign policy towards China such as
the degree of congressional bipartisanship or division, influence of voters and public opinion,
degree of ideological influences such as anti-communism; whether a Republican or Democratic
party dominated either the House, Senate, or presidency, and the specific policy issues of
contention in Congress.45 Related scholarship includes Xiaochuan Xie’s dissertation,
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“Congressional Voting and Foreign Policy: Domestic Factors in Sino-U.S. Relations, 19491990” (1993) which evaluates the voting records for legislation involving US foreign policy
towards China and Taiwan in both houses of congress based on correlating voting results to the
“ideology, party, constituency, regionalism and personal social and political background” for
individual members during this 40-year period.46
Consequently, this dissertation also appraises the degree that the US Congress justified
cold war capitalist economic ideology as a rationale influencing executive branch policies for US
economic aid to Taiwan during the period. Generally, policy decisions about goals and spending
levels for US foreign economic aid result from symbiotic processes between both branches of
government. As such, this study identifies specific congressional legislation authorizing
economic aid to Taiwan that can be linked to corresponding presidential administration foreign
policies. The overriding framework of ideological economic interpretation also includes
assessing domestic political, cultural, or commercial influences on both the executive and
legislative branches of the US government. This part of research involves appraising evidence
for cold war related economic ideational themes reflected in American public opinion, private
sector business groups, religious organizations, pro-Taiwan “China lobby” groups, academe, and
the media that may have influenced presidential administrations and the Congress to authorize
economic aid to Taiwan.47
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In summary, research frameworks and methods from the fields of economic, foreign aid,
and political history, shaped by units of analysis from political science (executive and legislative
branches, leadership dynamics, as well as cold war era international system level issues)
influence this study’s interpretative method. By pursuing the topic’s inquiry this way, a unique
historiographical method of interpretation is developed by applying a cold war inspired
“economic-ideological” framework. This framework is then applied to synthesize evidence of
domestic and international causal variables to establish a comprehensive narrative explaining
why the US government justified giving extensive economic aid to Taiwan during the period.
This historiographical method and approach differ from other disciplines because it relies
mostly on primary source evidence in US government executive and legislative branch archives
without imposing theoretical, artificial, or abstract constraints in interpreting the likely degree of
causation tied to certain variables for Washington’s justification of economic aid to Taiwan.
This framework of interpretation and focal point of the method appraises the degree that US cold
war economic ideology influenced policy choices advocated by key executive branch and
congressional leaders for US economic aid to Taiwan during the four presidential administrations
encompassing the primary period of inquiry during 1950-1965.
As previously explained, this dissertation approaches the question of appraising the
degree that economic ideology influenced US economic aid to Taiwan through evidentiary
analysis of the concepts, purposes, and implementation of Washington’s official cold war
strategies developed by the executive branch.48 As a result, this inquiry’s interpretative
framework assesses how US economic aid to Taiwan may have been justified along with and
compared to other political, military, psychological, and foreign policy instruments of US cold
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war containment strategies versus the Soviet Union and Communist China. Another important
focus is on identifying key influential advisors within the US executive branch that advocated for
economic aid to Taiwan based on cold war economic modernization development concepts.
Therefore, this dissertation is unique for its interpretative method that applies an
ideological economic framework as the main framework for appraising and forming a
comprehensive synthesis that explains the degree that Washington justified developing
capitalism and private sector free enterprise as intended purposes for US economic aid to an
authoritarian and undemocratic Taiwan. The research differs from most normative
historiographical scholarship in Sino-American foreign relations that focuses primarily on
explaining US military aid for Taiwan within Washington’s cold war policy of containment
versus Soviet and Chinese Communist expansionism.49
This study’s research tracing the evolution of the degree that capitalist-style economic
ideology concepts may have been used to justify US economic aid to Taiwan uses a
chronological periodization framework encompassing three evolutionary stages aligned with five
sequential US presidential administrations during 1943-1965. However, the main inquiry
specifically focuses on the period 1950-1965 because that was when US economic aid to Taiwan
was formally budgeted and programmed, rather than on an annual or ad hoc basis as it had been
prior to 1950. Chapter One introduces the topic, frames the key question, and provides
contextual background for previous multidisciplinary scholarship for US foreign policies towards
China, Taiwan, and the economic components of Washington’s early cold war containment
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strategy. Chapter One explains the economic-ideological historiographic interpretative method in
relation to other academic disciplines and previous scholarship in the fields of cold war studies
of US-Taiwan relations, US-China relations, and associated diplomatic, political, economic, and
ideological issues during the period.
Chapter One also introduces this historiological inquiry’s main purpose of explaining the
puzzle of Washington’s seemingly contradictory “donor” policy as a prelude to subsequent
chapters that explore how and why the US government justified giving economic aid to Taiwan
intended to develop its private sector, despite it being an aid recipient with an authoritarian
regime and statist public sector dominated economy. This main theme of inquiry is appraised in
the subsequent chapters that juxtaposes and compares Taiwan as a recipient of US economic aid
for the purpose of developing a free market capitalistic private sector economy despite it having
a statist run authoritarian economic development ideology of a “Planned Free Economy.”50 This
introductory chapter’s economic ideology based interpretative approach is then applied to the
subsequent three main substantive chapters appraising a total of five Presidential administrations
during three distinct chronological periods between 1943 and 1965.
Following the first chapter’s introduction, purpose, and methodology, Chapter Two
evaluates the six-year period during 1943-1949 encompassing both the later years of the
Roosevelt administration during 1943-1945 and the early Truman administration during 19451949. While Chapter Two’s chronological period of investigation precedes this study’s primary
focus of inquiry into the 1950-1965 period, its purpose is to appraise the degree that
Washington’s controversial debates over foreign aid to China and Taiwan in the immediate and
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tumultuous Post-World War Two period may have influenced subsequent justification for formal
US economic aid to Taiwan beginning in 1950 at the onset of the early cold war. The next two
substantive chapters, covering the later Truman administration during 1949-1952 and President
Eisenhower’s first term during 1953-1956 in Chapter Three, and then Eisenhower’s second term
combined with the two Kennedy and Johnson one-term administrations in Chapter Four spanning
1957-1965, are situated chronologically while emphasizing three main areas of historical inquiry.
The purposes of applying these three foci of inquiry are to appraise and determine
whether there is sufficient evidence establishing the degree that capitalist style economic
ideology evolved as a component of US cold war foreign policy, and then was subsequently
linked and used to justify US economic aid to Taiwan. The first focus area identifies and
interprets evidence from US executive branch primary sources to appraise ideational causation
for US economic aid to Taiwan attributed to evolving concepts of the US containment strategy’s
economic aid and development for foreign nations. The main primary archival sources for
investigation include presidential speeches, memoranda, and declassified US diplomatic, foreign
aid, and economic policy related materials produced from within the executive branch to include
the National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, and the State Department. The key
questions addressed here focus on identifying the ideological related economic components of
the United States’ broader cold war economic sub-strategies of containment and the degree that
these were linked to Washington’s justification of US economic aid to Taiwan.
The second research focus area identifies and appraises legislative branch archives to
establish the degree that Congress justified US economic aid to Taiwan based on American style
capitalist preferred economic ideological concepts. These primary sources include foreign aid
bills, hearings, and testimonies of record involving economic aid to Taiwan and related issues
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from various committees in both houses of Congress. This part of inquiry appraises speeches and
memoranda by Pro-Taiwan leaning members of the US Congress, as well as key congressional
committee hearings and records from the both the House and Senate Foreign Affairs
Committees, House Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy, House Subcommittee on
International Economic Policy and Trade, and the Joint Economic Committee. This focus area
then summarizes analysis interpreting the extent that economic ideology was justified by both
the US executive and legislative branches for economic aid to Taiwan. The third research focus
area includes interpreting the likely degree that economic ideology justified economic aid to
Taiwan in comparison to other domestic or international causal variables.
While Chapter Two precedes the scope of this study’s main chronological bounded
period of 1950-1965, its purpose in examining the later three years of the Roosevelt
administration that coincided with the World War Two period during 1943-1945, is to appraise
American and Chinese Nationalist government archives for the degree that economic related
ideological and policy conflicts over the intended use of ad hoc US economic aid may have
emerged between the two nations prior to the Truman administration. Chapter Two’s focus on
the critical 1943-1945 World War Two period is important because that was when Washington
gave massive amounts of military and economic aid to China, then led by the Chinese Nationalist
Party-dominated ROC government, as a wartime ally against Japanese military aggression in
East Asia.
A key focus of this chapter is to establish whether Washington was aware of emerging
Chinese Nationalist statist and authoritarian style economic plans and policies that were
antithetical to American notions of capitalist style economic ideology and development. Such
evidence would include China’s emerging post-war economic plans that favored the public or
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state sector at the expense of the private sector. The purpose of this chapter is also to establish
the degree of knowledge those senior American officials had about the Chinese government’s
emerging intentions to implement plans for controlling virtually all of China’s post-war
industrial and trade sectors, as well as how these plans impacted Washington’s policies of
providing ad hoc annual economic aid to the Chinese Nationalists on mainland China.
Similarly, Chapter Two’s appraisal of President Truman’s first term and early second
term during 1945-1949 is also purposely outside of the main chronological period of inquiry
1950-1965. However, this part serves a similar purpose of inquiry to evaluate and appraise the
degree that economic statecraft and ideological concepts justified US economic aid to the
Chinese Nationalists on mainland China and Taiwan during the late and post-World War Two
and early cold war periods. This chapter appraises how the events of the renewed Chinese civil
war period between the Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists may have impacted US
economic aid policies towards Taiwan, or “Formosa” as it was also referred to at the time.
Chapter Two also examines the public and private controversies surrounding Washington’s
growing awareness of the corrupt Chinese Nationalists’ growing authoritarian political and
economic designs for the island of Taiwan. It explores explanations for why the United States
was set to abandon and limit economic aid to Taiwan during 1948-1949, but then suddenly
reversed course and intentionally curtailed it with a specific end date in 1950.
Other key primary source documents examined in this chapter include the controversial
1949 China White Paper, which was intentionally declassified and released to publicly expose
hundreds of formerly classified secret US State Department cables covering US policy
deliberations over China and Taiwan. In addition, the chapter examines the impact on US
economic aid policy towards Taiwan resulting from high level debates and wrenching policy
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machinations within the US National Security Council over the NSC 37 The Position of the
United States With Respect to Formosa policy series documents, as well as the related impacts of
the “suppressed” 1947 Wedemeyer Report leading to numerous subsequent congressional
inquiries on the topic.
Chapter Two’s main purpose is to identify and appraise evidence for explaining the key
historic puzzle overshadowing and seemingly undermining the ideological legitimacy for how
and why the United States justified economic aid to promote private sector-based capitalism in
Taiwan. By 1949, a corrupt authoritarian Chinese Nationalist regime was firmly ensconced on
the island of Taiwan and was enforcing martial law while leading an inept ROC government that
ran a bankrupt public sector-based economy. The chapter appraises a series of authoritative ROC
government archived documents about the Chinese Nationalists plans and policies to implement
state control over all national economic matters and restrict private sector capitalist activities.
Other evidence examined include US State Department archives consisting of diplomatic cables
during 1944-1947 between various senior US embassy officials in China with the US Secretary
of State to determine the degree that American officials were aware of these emerging
Nationalist Chinese statist government policies and ideological authoritarian-like national
economic reconstruction measures.
Chapter Three, covering the last three years of President Truman’s second term during
1949-1952 and President Eisenhower’s first term during 1953-1956, investigates why a
seemingly seminal historical transition in US economic aid policy towards Taiwan occurred due
to internal and external causal variables associated with the onset of this early cold war period.
While the preceding Chapter Two appraises why Washington was set to abandon aid to Taiwan
by mid-1949, Chapter Three examines official US government archives to explain why that after
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highly contentious debates within and between the US executive and legislative branches over
the existential threats posed by Soviet and Chinese Communist expansionism and the outbreak of
the Korean War in 1950, that Washington reversed course and supported Taiwan with extensive
amounts of economic aid and defense security assistance.
The key focus of inquiry here is to appraise the evidence in US government archives
revealing the degree that capitalist economic ideology may have justified or influenced US aid to
Taiwan compared to other reasons cited in normative scholarship for this early cold war subperiod. The chapter also appraises several key primary sources such as President Truman’s 1949
Point Four program, the Mutual Security Act of 1951, and the declassified and foundational US
cold war containment strategy articulated in the 1950 National Security Council Paper NSC-68:
United States Objectives and Programs for National Security.
Chapter Three also appraises the first term of the Republican administration of President
Eisenhower during 1953-1956 because this was the most significant period for Washington
expanding and institutionalizing the economic aid components derived from the earlier Truman
administration’s fledgling US cold war containment strategy. This chapter appraises the degree
that maturing rationales for foreign economic aid and emerging capitalist modernization theories
of development were linked to Washington’s broader cold war security, military, ideological,
psychological sub-strategies that may have resulted in justifying consistent annual US economic
aid to Taiwan. It also appraises the degree that senior US government officials favored economic
foreign aid to nations such as Taiwan due to their perceptions of global competition from
alternative economic modernization models exported by the Soviet Union and Communist
China. This chapter includes examining the emerging changes in Washington’s overall foreign
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aid policy objectives during the later period of Eisenhower’s first term when the US Congress
criticized and sought reform of US foreign economic aid to nations such as Taiwan.
Chapter Four examines why Congressional aid reforms during President Eisenhower’s
second term during 1957-1961 signaled the eventual end of US economic aid to Taiwan. This
chapter also intentionally includes and combines appraising both single Democratic
administrations of President Kennedy, 1961-1963 and the first three years of President Johnson,
1963-1965 because of their similar overlapping policy continuities, relatively short time span,
and lesser importance and salience as US economic aid to Taiwan gradually wound down and
ended. A key purpose of this chapter is to explore how in response to congressional criticism and
initiatives in reforming foreign aid programs, that US economic aid to Taiwan was rationalized,
adjusted, and eventually phased out by these three presidents. During this period, the foreign
economic modernization and development ideas and concepts of the previously mentioned Dr.
Rostow, a senior advisor to both presidents, gained widespread acceptance throughout the US
government. This part of the chapter’s inquiry seeks to determine how Rostow’s concepts may
have impacted US foreign policies for ending economic aid to Taiwan.
Chapter Five summarizes the project’s conclusions and findings of the research,
interpretation, and key themes appraising the degree that capitalist economic ideology was
justified by Washington in relation to other causes and variables for US economic aid to Taiwan.
This chapter also analyzes authoritative economic statistics and characteristics for Taiwan’s
economic development during 1950-1965, particularly by comparing public sector versus private
sector growth. Chapter Five concludes by summarizing the reasons for why US economic aid
ended to Taiwan in 1965, the genesis of which that had begun in the later years of the
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Eisenhower Administration despite the overall economic component of the US cold war strategy
remaining relatively unchanged during and after the period.
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Chapter Two: Prelude, Warnings, and Aid Controversies, 1943-1949
During the American formal involvement in the World War Two period 1941-1945 there
is insufficient evidence to conclude that the US government used capitalistic economic
ideological concepts as a rational justifying giving economic aid to the Chinese Nationalist
dominated Republic of China (ROC) government on the Chinese mainland. During this period,
US government officials justified executive branch policies and congressional legislation for
economic and military aid to the ROC government for the purpose of opposing Japan’s military
aggression while it occupied large parts of mainland China and the island of Taiwan.
However, there is significant evidence from US diplomatic archives during 1943-1945
indicating that senior American business leaders and US Department of State officials in China
and Washington had become increasingly aware and concerned that the Chinese Nationalists had
diverted or planned to use US economic aid to expand its ROC government run statist business
monopolies at the expense of the private sector on the Chinese mainland. There were also
significant warning signs that the Chinese Nationalist-led ROC government’s political system
had become increasingly corrupt, illiberal, and authoritarian. There were further warning signs
that the ROC government intended to use US economic aid to implement the revered Chinese
Nationalist Party founder Sun Yat-sen’s socialist-leaning and statist inspired political and
economic ideologies contained in his “Three Peoples’ Principles” that guided China’s then early
modern socio-economic development.
Although Washington’s Lend-Lease program with China during 1941-1943 is outside the
main scope and period of this research project’s appraisal of the extent that economic ideological
causes justified US economic aid to Taiwan during 1950-1965, it is nonetheless important to first
establish that the World War Two era was when the United States’ first major early progeniture
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sustained military and economic aid programs for China began. This important precedent and
legacy of US economic aid to the Chinese Nationalists on mainland China during World War
Two would set the stage, after the Nationalists lost the Chinese civil war and fled to the island of
Taiwan in 1949, for influencing Washington to initiate large programs of sustained and massive
economic aid the Nationalists on Taiwan during the cold war period 1950-1965.
In early 1941 under President Roosevelt’s administration, Washington initiated and
expanded formal military and economic aid programs to Chinese President [Generalissimo]
Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party-dominated ROC government.51 The main reasons
underpinning Washington’s aid programs to China can be attributed to the two nations sharing
similar political, economic, and security interests for countering Japan’s military aggression that
began during 1931 in China’s Manchuria region, and then subsequently soon expanded to other
areas of mainland China as an “undeclared war” in 1937.52
Following the “Act of Congress of March 11, 1941,” President Roosevelt announced the
“Master Lend-Lease Agreement with China” on May 6, 1941, while justifying this aid program
for China by declaring “the defense of the Republic of China against aggression is vital to the
defense of the United States of America.”53 This agreement, which included the clause that the
United States: “has extended and is continuing to extend to the Republic of China aid in resisting
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aggression,”54 is of historical significance to this study when interpreted as a prelude establishing
a precedent for positively influencing Washington’s future granting of US economic aid to
Taiwan during the cold war period. It also represented Washington’s symbolic and preemptive
means to support a tacit US ally by Roosevelt announcing the agreement seven months prior to
his declaration of war versus Japan on December 8, 1941, following its surprise attack on US
military facilities and personnel at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii and formal entry into World War Two a
few days later.
Although the agreement was not formally signed between the two nations until over a
year later on June 2, 1942, by early 1941 Washington had already begun under the auspices of
other similar earlier programs to send significant amounts of military related Lend-Lease aid to
help the Chinese Nationalists resist Japanese military aggression on mainland China.55 The
agreement also included other US economic and financial aid to further stabilize China’s
currency and extend commodity credits so the Chinese Nationalists could purchase urgently
needed wartime “American industrial and agriculture products and services.”56 By the end of
1943, the agreement resulted in the United States giving China over $201 million in combined
US military and economic aid.57 After 1944, Washington not only extended American financed
Lend-Lease programs for China, but also gave additional economic aid through unilateral US
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“grants, credits, and surplus property sales,” and via multilateral means through the ExportImport Bank and the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration through 1946.58
During this period, another key feature and catalyst for Washington giving more US
economic aid to the Chinese Nationalist-led ROC government in China (and later when it
evacuated to Taiwan in 1949) resulted from the close ties and affinities between several key
Chinese Nationalist leaders and US government officials. Just as importantly, these ties were
strengthened by the widespread Chinese Nationalist affinities and established relationships with
broader cross-sections of American commercial, educational, and faith-based groups and other
key individuals that had occurred over several previous decades. The most influential Chinese
Nationalist figure during this era was Chiang Kai-shek’s wife and First Lady of the ROC from
1950-1975—Soong Mei-ling, or “Madame Chiang Kai-shek” (1898-2003) as she was well
known publicly throughout her life.
Before she married Chiang Kai-shek in 1927, Madame Chiang, who spoke fluent
English, had previously attended various post-secondary schools in the United States from 1908
until graduating from Wellesley College in Massachusetts in 1917 with a degree in English
literature. Although she returned to China soon thereafter, during her previous nine years living
in the United States, Madame Chiang was active in American Methodist church circles and
remained a self-professed and ardent supporter of the Christian faith throughout her life in
mainland China, Taiwan, and upon her return to reside in the United States from 1975 until her
death in 2003.59
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As previously mentioned in Chapter One, during the Roosevelt administration on
February 18, 1943, against the backdrop of Japan’s World War Two era military aggression in
China, Madame Chiang had the distinction of being the first Chinese citizen and second ever
foreign female luminary to speak in Washington before both houses of the US Congress in a
House Reception. The main themes in her rousing and impassionate speech were to express
China’s appreciation for US Lend Lease aid and appeal for more US economic and military aid
in support of Nationalist China’s wartime efforts versus Japan. Madame Chiang’s remarks
illustrated the contrasts between American and Chinese Nationalist political and economic
ideology when she stated: “America is not only the cauldron of democracy, but the incubator of
democratic principles,” and vaguely defended China’s nascent statist economic system by
stating: “Nor will she demean herself and all she holds dear to the practice of the market
place.”60 She also noted that the United States and China had had a history of 160 years of
“traditional friendship,” shared “many similarities” as a “basis of friendship,” and that “we have
an identity of ideals.”61
Madame Chiang’s reference to “an identity of ideals” was immediately followed by a
narrative that seemed to deflect criticism of China’s then poor societal conditions and
authoritarian undemocratic political system when she explained that “the Chinese people are
willing and eager to cooperate with you in the realization of these ideals, because we want to see
to it that they do not echo as empty phrases, but become realities…”62 Next, Madame Chiang
added to her ideological grounded rationale justifying more US economic and military aid for
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China to the US Senate by stating: “I feel it is necessary for us not only to have ideals and
proclaim that we have them, it is necessary that we act to implement them. And so to you,
gentlemen of the Senate, and to you ladies and gentleman in the galleries, I say that without the
active help of all of us, our leaders cannot implement these ideals.”63
Finally, Madame Chiang referred to the “teachings drawn from our late leader, Dr. Sun
Yat-sen, have given our people the fortitude to carry on.” Chiang’s last reference to the
“teachings” of the late Dr. Sun, founder of the Chinese Nationalist political party and the most
revered and influential early modern Chinese leader, were at the crux of a crucial ideational
controversy between the United States and China over the reality of their contrasting national
political and economic development systems.
These ideational contrasts would soon magnify themselves into evolving contradictions
and attendant controversies in Washington over the intended purposes of US economic aid given
to the Chinese Nationalist-led ROC government in mainland China, and later after 1949, when it
relocated to the island of Taiwan. The ideological contradictions that later emerged emanated
from the purposes of US economic aid that were intended to develop free market capitalism,
private enterprise, and democracy for Taiwan’s authoritarian, undemocratic, and quasi-socialist
statist economy dominated by the single-party repressive rule of the Chinese Nationalists.
Moreover, the tensions surrounding Washington’s justifying more US economic aid to Taiwan
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resulted from the Chinese Nationalists’ adoption, implementation, and perpetuation of Sun Yatsen’s new quasi-socialist guiding national political and economic development ideology and
founding principles for reconstructing China and Taiwan, then emerging from the tumultuous
events of World War Two and the Chinese civil wars in the mid-twentieth century.
The ideological origins underpinning the contrasts between American and Chinese
Nationalist political and economic systems can be attributed to the statist-centric economic
practices and concepts expressed in documents inherent to the “Nationalist” (transliterated as
“Kuomintang,” and abbreviated as “KMT” from its translation from Chinese to English as the
“National People’s Party”) ruling political party, the founding principles of the modern Republic
of China (ROC) in 1912, and the 1947 ROC Constitution. The genesis of Taiwan’s autocratic
illiberal regime and its statist government dominated economic ideology resulted from the
influence of Chinese Nationalist party founder Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), who was China’s
most influential early modern twentieth century’s Western educated political revolutionary and
reform movement figure.
Although Sun died in 1925, the imprint of his proto-authoritarian ideological political
philosophies as the first leader of the Chinese Nationalist party, was carried forward by his
successor Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975), the well-known Nationalist Party leader on mainland
China until 1949, when he and over three million Chinese Nationalists retreated to the island of
Taiwan after losing the post-World War Two Chinese civil war to the Chinese Communists.
Except for a brief interlude in 1949, Chiang was the ROC President from 1928 to 1975. President
Chiang, who had adopted the title “Generalissimo” while leading military style campaigns
during China’s earlier civil war period in the 1920s-1930s, was the key political leader of the
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Chinese Nationalist Party that dominated the ROC government on mainland China during 19121949 and then thereafter on the island of Taiwan after 1949.
During 1905-1925, Sun Yat-sen had gradually formed the Chinese Nationalists’ hybrid
ideological socio-economic development and political governance philosophy known variously
as the “Three Principles of the People,” “Principles of People’s Livelihood,” and the “Three
Great Principles;” or San Min Chu I.64 The three overarching components of Sun’s doctrinal
philosophy have been interpreted and translated in Western and Chinese authoritative sources as
“nationalism,” or minzu zhuyi; “the rights of the people,” or minquan; and “livelihood of the
people,” or minsheng.65 These three principles have also been described and attributed as
equating more accurately to the three modern political varieties and constructs of nationalism,
democracy, and socialism, respectively.66 In China during the 1920’s, Sun’s leadership and
influence steered the fledgling KMT (or “Nationalist”) party to adopt and implement many of
Russian Marxist revolutionary V.I. Lenin’s political party organizational, ideological, and
propaganda structures and methods.67
Although the Chinese Nationalists adopted many Leninist-style political party structural
features, except for the period during 1924-1932, generally neither Sun nor subsequent
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Nationalist political leaders fully adopted Marxist or Communist ideological principles or
doctrinal precepts of class struggle justifying political or economic policies.68 Instead, the
Nationalists would copy and adapt many authoritarian features of a Leninist style political party
organization with an integrated cadre system of supervision over the state and society through
the concept of “democratic centralism.”69 Sun and many of his fellow Nationalist party leaders
viewed the Leninist party-state system as a successful model of political party organization,
control, and power in the Soviet Union during the 1920s that could be adapted to strengthen the
power of the Nationalist party for governing China. However, the demise of Sun’s political
influence following his death in 1925, the Chinese civil war period during the 1930s and 1940s,
and the events of World War Two precluded significant Nationalist party reform with dominant
Leninist party-state characteristics until after 1949 when the Chinese Nationalist-led ROC
government evacuated to the island of Taiwan.
Sun’s articulation of his concepts for a hybrid economic ideology and a new form of
statist political economy for China in his Three Principles were first adopted and implemented by
the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan during the late 1940s. Variations of Sun’s Three Principles
were firmly cemented by the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan throughout the 1950s until the
early 1960s when more liberal economic reform towards capitalism emerged. These
developments were apparent and rather well known to US diplomats and government experts
responsible for handling China policy issues, as well as to American scholars, religious groups,
and business communities during the period. The origins of Sun’s economic philosophy have
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been attributed to his views that China had been economically exploited by the West resulting
from unfair trade imbalances that had endured since the mid-eighteenth century due to China’s
poor governance and its comparatively poor state of industrial capitalist development compared
to the West and Japan.70
While Sun’s economic concepts emphasized the need for rejuvenating China’s economy
as a means to counter “imperialism” and implement some vague, yet undefined form of
democracy, he called for a new economic philosophy of central government intervention and
guidance intended to spur an industrial revolution in China and thus modernize China.71
Although Sun did not live long enough to further refine and develop his Marxist-Leninist
inspired economic ideology in greater detail, he nevertheless established the intellectual
philosophies that inspired the Chinese Nationalists to develop an embryonic hybrid socioeconomic development system for making “capitalism create socialism” in China.72
In the weeks preceding Madame Chiang’s famous speech to the US Congress on
February 13 in which she referred to the “teachings” of Sun Yat-sen, her subsequent visits to
Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and her celebrated public address at Madison Square Garden in
New York City on March 2, the US State Department was rather pessimistic that the Chinese
Nationalists would be successful in eventually implementing a true political democracy with a
capitalist economic system of free enterprise and private sector development in China.73 On
February 3, 1943, Charles E. Gauss, the US Ambassador to China sent a diplomatic cable to
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Cordell Hull, the US Secretary of State, in which he warned and expressed significant doubt that
China would:
…become a republic along the democratic lines laid down in general terms in the Three
People’s Principles (San Min Chu Yi) of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the Kuomintang leadership at
present shows little promise of putting those principles into effect. The Kuomintang, in
fact, gives every evidence of intention to perpetuate its present one-party control of the
country. Consequently, the prospect is that, unless liberalizing elements gain the
ascendency in the government, either internal unity will be destroyed…or Fascist-like
domination will continue to the detriment of aspirations for the development in China of
a democratic political and economic system.74

Correspondingly during 1943, several other US diplomatic exchanges of classified cables
between Ambassador Gauss in China and Secretary of State Hull in Washington specifically
highlighted indications that future post-war Chinese Nationalist government policies would favor
state-run public sector businesses while discouraging foreign and domestic private enterprises. In
a diplomatic cable on January 7, 1944, Ambassador Gauss cited evidence from discussions with
numerous Chinese Nationalist officials that by late 1943, Chiang Kai-shek, President of the
ROC, favored “Government monopolies.”75
Moreover, Dr. Wong Wen-hao, the ROC Minister of Economic Affairs, had “privately
expressed the view that Government development and control of certain industries would be
necessary but might extend only to certain phases,” while also noting that the Chinese
Nationalist policy for foreign investment in ROC government run “joint enterprises” was limited
to “49 percent participation.”76 This evidence, combined with a series of subsequent related
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Chinese Nationalist official diplomatic exchanges with the US State Department during the next
two years, indicated that Washington became increasingly aware and concerned of the ROC’s
intentions to continue to divert US economic aid to maintain and expand government majority
controlled state owned business enterprises.
Similarly in late 1943, J. Bartlett Richards, the US Commercial Attaché in China noted
that “there seemed to be a considerable weight of opinion in China in favor of government
ownership, at least in the heavy industries,” and that “foreign capitalists investing in China
would be willing to accept investment by the Chinese Government, through the NRC, [National
Resources Commission] in their companies.”77 In early 1944, Ambassador Gauss cabled
Secretary Hull to inform him that there was proposed legislation pending in the ROC Legislative
Yuan that would increase Chinese government control over foreign banking in China through its
Ministries of Finance and Economics such that “American banks would not find it desirable to
open branches in China under such restrictions,” and that he was: “…firmly of opinion China is
not in position to undertake a closed or heavily restricted economy at this stage of her
development. Her best future lies in liberal attitude toward foreign interests. I believe we should
put China on notice as to our desires regarding future commercial relations by presenting draft
commercial treaty drawn on liberal lines.”78
During the spring of 1944 the nature of renewed high level Chinese Nationalist
diplomatic efforts to secure more US economic aid for the purposes of rejuvenating and
expanding China’s shipbuilding and steel industries suggested it was intended for the Chinese
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government public (or state run) sectors rather than the private sectors. On March 4, 1944, one
Chinese delegation went to the US State Department in Washington for an office call with John
Carter Vincent, the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs to study shipbuilding in the United
States “with particular reference to the possibility of American aid to China in solving its postwar shipping problems.”79 On March 15, 1944, ambassador Gauss sent Washington a cable
summarizing discussions at another meeting with high level Chinese officials with U.S. Steel
Export Company representative J. Arthur Keane in the US Embassy in Chungking, China
covering the subject of American private capital investment and participation in China’s steel
industry.80
On one hand, Gauss reported that during the discussions at this meeting that the Chinese
Minister of Economic Affairs and Minister of Communications “showed great interest in the
possibility of participation of American private capital in Chinese industry and were quite
prepared to accept participation on a 50-50 basis.” However, on the other hand, Gauss reported
that it was in the experienced American steel executive Keane’s skeptical opinion that when the
Chinese presented options for U.S. Steel’s investment in a Chinese steel mill, the China Bridge
Company, and an offer to run China’s railways “with 50% American capital,” that Keane “found
considerable jealousy among officials with whom he came into contact” and that it was his view
that “private Chinese capital will have no future in the iron and steel industry, which will be a
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monopoly of the Chinese Government in partnership with foreign capital.”81 Gauss further
opined that:
The proposal that all the Chinese railways be owned and operated by a private company
with American participation, coming from the Minister of Communications, is especially
interesting, as it has always been indicated that railways would be a Government
monopoly, in accordance with the plan of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. It does not seem probable that
President Chiang or the Chinese Government would assent to such a project.82

Two weeks later, on March 31, 1944, Gauss sent a follow-up cable to Washington after
he had debriefed Keane further in person at the US embassy in Chungking and reported that
Keane opined that “post-war China will be so poor that it will be impractical for his organization
to operate” there “selling its products to consumers, either government or private.”83 This cable
also noted Keane’s opinion that the only way U.S. Steel could conduct business in China was “as
a partner of Chinese Government-controlled organizations” and that when Keane met with
Chinese President Chiang Kai-shek to discuss investing in Chinese private enterprises, Chiang
reportedly dismissed “the whole subject of foreign investment in private Chinese industry as a
domestic concern of China.”84
Keane further relayed that during his discussions with officials from the China
Automotive Company, in which the Chinese government Ministry of Communications had a
majority controlling interest, that if a large American automobile company such as General
Motors would build a plant in China that “effective control of which would be in the hands of the
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China Automotive Company.”85 Finally, Keane commented that “the views of most Chinese
political and industrial leaders on the participation of private foreign capital in post-war Chinese
industrial development are unrealistic” and that “these leaders appear to be concerned chiefly
with promoting their own selfish interests…”86
It was also noteworthy that just the previous day on March 30th, Ambassador Gauss had
sent Washington another cable entitled “Proposed Regulations Governing the Post-War
Investment of Foreign Capital in China” in which Gauss responded to Secretary of State Hull’s
earlier request a week before for more information and details of these “secret” Chinese
government regulations.87 Gauss indicated that the US embassy in China had used a
“confidential source” to acquire the document and “crudely” translate it, while not only
expressing his opinion doubting that an official copy of this classified Chinese government
document would be “forthcoming” to Washington, but that he would formally request it from the
Chinese Foreign Minister and inform him that “there is attentive foreign interest in the plans of
the Party and Government regarding post-war investment of foreign capital in China.”88 Gauss’s
March 30th cable to Washington also included an enclosure that he received from J. Bartlett
Richards, the US Commercial Attaché, that was the earlier referred to crude translation of the
proposed Chinese regulations from the confidential source summarizing the Chinese Nationalist

85

Ibid., 1050.

86

Ibid., 1050-1051.

87

The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State, March 30, 1944, in FRUS, Diplomatic
Papers, 1944, China, Volume VI, 1046.
88

Ibid., 1046.

47
Party’s intentions for “industrial reconstruction” and the “treatment of foreign investments in
China.”89
This enclosure containing a “poor” translation of the Nationalist Chinese proposed new
regulations was significant for American diplomatic officials because it represented authoritative
evidence of an imminent “declaration of official policy” portending expansion of Chinese state
government control over future foreign investment that would be required to be directed into
China’s state run business enterprises and other major industrial sectors.90 Of further significance
was that this document originated from the Nationalist (or Kuomintang) Party’s Central
Executive Committee during September 1943 and was intended to be sent over to the Nationalist
dominated ROC government’s Executive Yuan for review by it and relevant ministries before
submitting it to the Legislative Yuan for the necessary legislation “to implement its
provisions.”91 The document also illustrated how the authoritarian Chinese Nationalist Party, the
only officially recognized and allowed political party in China, could dominate and control the
ROC government’s economic policy for China.
While the translation of the document’s contents revealed that it was intended to
liberalize the Chinese government’s “policy on foreign investments,” American officials
nevertheless concluded to the contrary that instead, it proposed to “regulate foreign investments,
as well as investments of private Chinese capital rather strictly,” as well as “that foreign
investments will be directed into fields of enterprise regarded as urgent in the national
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reconstruction program.”92 Further, American officials opined that it was unclear what was
meant by the document’s references to the Chinese government “limiting the term of foreign
investments” as well as that “foreign capital would not be permitted to engage in operations that
might unsettle China’s balance of trade.”93 The US Commercial Attaché Richards’ concluding
comments about the document also included remarks by an unidentified American businessman
who stated that: “some of the provisions would be very disturbing to American investors” and
that American companies investing in China “would be well advised to choose representatives
who are adaptable and competent at following political trends.”94
American embassy officials also cited other evidence of pending Chinese government
statist control mechanisms and laws that reflected “ultranationalist sentiment” by stating:
Article A-XI indicates that agreements between Chinese and American investors for
joint participation will be subject to examination by the Government, while Article A-XII
suggests that direct investments by foreigners will be supervised and directed by the
Government. Article C-I provides for the establishment of a Government body to
formulate a program for the use of foreign capital, direct such capital into desired
channels, examine applications for the investment of foreign capital and inspect the
records of all enterprises using foreign capital.95

During the summer of 1944, US embassy officials reported to Washington about similar
Chinese Nationalist government statist intentions towards regulating China’s banking sector and
its pending future policies governing foreign and domestic banking activities. Ambassador Gauss
reported that he and US Commercial Attaché Richards had analyzed a copy of a memorandum
prepared by the Chinese ROC government’s National Foreign Trade Council, which was
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reportedly also under review by its Supreme National Defense Council, covering pending
legislation related to the topic of foreign banks in China.96 While these American officials opined
that it was difficult to predict the ultimate Chinese government resolution of legislation
governing foreign banking in China, they nonetheless concluded that there was significant
anecdotal opinions from leading Chinese and American business interlocuters that new laws
would be “used to squeeze out all private commercial banks, leaving a monopoly of banking to
the Government banks” and that China’s Central Bank “will be reluctant to relinquish control of
foreign exchange.”97
US embassy officials also concluded that while there was still “complete uncertainty,”
they further suggested that there was an overriding probability that the Chinese Nationalist
government intended to make it “quite impossible for foreign banks to operate in China” and
“prohibit acceptance by foreign banks of any kind of deposits, except deposits from their own
nationals” due to the significant influence from “an extreme nationalist group in the Legislative
Yuan.”98 Two months later in August, US embassy officials again raised the issue of the Chinese
government’s intentions to nationalize China’s banking sector with the US Secretary of State.
In a cable entitled “Position of Foreign Banks in China” Gauss reported that as a result of
recent first-hand conversations with China’s Chairman of the Financial Technical Commission,
that the Chinese government intended to revise banking laws with a new policy that would treat
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“branches of foreign banks in China in exactly the same manner as branches of Chinese banks
are treated abroad” and “would be prohibited from accepting deposits from others that their own
nationals.”99 The tone of Gauss’ cable also reflected Washington’s growing sense of concern and
urgency over indications of the pending statist legislation of China’s banking sector. He cited a
previous US embassy cable from 28 July that reiterated similar concerns previously expressed by
senior officials from American trade organizations such as the National Foreign Trade Council
and the China-America Council of Commerce and Industry to US State Department officials
requesting diplomatic efforts for the purpose of “having the Chinese Government reconsider
present and proposed legislation of a restrictive and discriminatory nature.”100
In addition to the banking sector, there were other similar examples in China’s
telecommunications sector that US diplomats reported about pending Chinese government
intentions of statist control and nationalization of private American businesses operating in
China during this period. One prominent example occurred in the form of a telephone
conversation between James B. Fullam, the president of the International Telephone and
Telegraph Company (ITT) and Mr. Edwin F. Stanton, the Special Assistant to Joseph C. Grew,
the US State Department’s Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, during which Fullam
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expressed his pessimism that “the Chinese requirements governing the operation of American
and other foreign business enterprises in China were likely to be of a restrictive nature.”101
During Fullam’s conversation with Grew, which related to the overarching “question of
state ownership of utilities and commercial policy vis-à-vis foreign business enterprises” in
China, Fullam was specifically concerned about a possible Chinese government takeover of the
Shanghai Telephone Company which was then an ITT subsidiary operating in China.102 The
nature of Fullam’s conversation was that he was forewarning Grew that this issue “involved
Chinese policy with respect to utilities and terms and conditions the Chinese might decide to
impose on foreign utility companies assisting the Chinese in various reconstruction projects,”
and can be viewed as a credible source due to his high level position as president of ITT with
close access to and conversations with high level Chinese government officials about these
issues.103
By July 1944, Ambassador Gauss reported to Washington that there were similar
concerns over additional Chinese statist economic tendencies expressed by foreign and Chinese
private sector business leaders about the insurance and reinsurance service sectors in China who
viewed “with misgivings the trend toward monopolistic organizations by the Chinese
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Government.”104 These concerns stemmed from the actions of H.H. Kung, the Chinese Finance
Minister, who was forming a new Chinese state entity called the Central Trust Company of
China under the Chinese government-run Central Bank of China which would serve as an
“official reinsurance pool” that US embassy officials expected it to compete with and pressure
private sector Chinese and foreign insurance companies to either be absorbed by it or go out of
business.105 The cable also reveals that Chinese and foreign insurance private sector business
leaders expressed their main concerns over this pending “pool” as a means for China’s four main
government banks to gain market share and lower interest rates, as well as restrict credits and
foreign exchange vis-à-vis the private sector in this service industry.106
A month later during August 1944, Ambassador Gauss informed the US Secretary of
State of the US embassy in China’s efforts in querying Chinese government officials about
pending legislation that would “prohibit foreign companies” from participating in the life,
sickness, fire, marine, and other transportation insurance sectors in China, thus effectively
reserving these sectors for the major subsidiaries of the Chinese government owned Central
Bank of China.107 Gauss specifically referenced that these efforts were the result of
Washington’s earlier forwarding of a memorandum entitled “Life Insurance in China” that had
been prepared by Mansfield Freeman, President of the United States Life Insurance Company on
behalf of “American companies interested in the insurance business in China.”108 While Gauss
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reported in the cable that attempts by US embassy officials had not had much success in
uncovering details of the proposed statist leaning legislation governing future insurance services
in China, he nonetheless opined that “it is believed possible that certain younger Chinese
officials with ultra-nationalistic views regarding the post-war position for foreign enterprises in
China have put forth a proposal along the lines indicated.”109
The broader significance of the content and economic related issues in these diplomatic
cables reveal that US officials in China maintained a focus on collecting, analyzing, and
reporting on issues involving emerging tendencies of the Chinese Nationalist government to
implement increasing degrees of state-led and authoritarian means of economic control over
China’s major economic industries at the expense of the private sector. The salience and
explanation for this focus was largely due to several leading American private sector business
leaders lobbying the US State Department to protect and expand their business dealings in China
while US and Chinese government officials were negotiating a major new bilateral overarching
economic and commercial trade treaty during the summer of 1944. In this context, the cables
during this period reveal that US diplomatic officials were particularly concerned with
“unwarranted restrictions on American business and illiberal internal economic and business
policies” of the Chinese government which represented the crux of contention between the
United States and China during negotiations for the new bilateral treaty.110
As bilateral negotiations over the treaty became more contentious due to US officials
gaining more evidence of emerging Chinese Nationalist government policies of statist-economic
control by the summer of 1944, Ambassador Gauss recommended that the US Secretary of State
109
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intervene and speak directly with Chinese Finance Minister Kung during his upcoming state
cabinet level visit to Washington during July and August so that he (Kung):
…could be made clearly to understand that the extremely nationalistic trend of Chinese
policies in respect to American and foreign business interest in China will in the end
define [defeat?] its own purpose if restrictions on foreign enterprises are such that foreign
capital will seek other fields,” and that “American assistance, governmental or private,
will not be forthcoming if the Chinese Government persists in its illiberal policies,…but
present Fascist tendencies including tendencies toward state economic controls cast
discouraging shadows on prospect of fulfilling desire,” and that there would “be little
point in concluding a commercial treaty with China unless the Chinese
Government…shares our desire for collaboration within a framework of liberal internal
and international business economic policies.111
During Minister Kung’s official state visit to Washington in late July, he also made an
important appeal for foreign investment in China in his speech to several American business
leaders on July 27, 1944, in New York City at which he reportedly stated: “post-war China,
visualized as an open market abundant in industrial opportunity, will welcome participation of
American industrial interests.”112 However, a week later on August 7, high level US State
Department officials in Washington, in response to Ambassador Gauss’s rather alarming
previous secret telegram sent from the US embassy in Chungking China on July 28 about
pending Chinese Nationalist statist economic policies, recommended even higher level direct
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meetings with Kung while he was in Washington by either President Truman or Assistant
Secretary of State Dean Acheson.113
These State Department officials further recommended that Kung’s visit should be taken
advantage of to “express to him our misgivings caused by present indications that the Chinese
Government may be inclined to pursue extremely nationalistic policies in respect to American
and other foreign business interests in China” because Kung was assessed to be under the
pressure and influence of statist leaning political reactionary elements in China as well as a close
confidant with “direct access to the Generalissimo [President Chiang].”114
By September 1944, John Carter Vincent, the US State Department Chief of the Division
of Chinese Affairs, sent a memorandum directly to US Secretary of State Cordell Hull in which
Vincent’s tone and words implied increasing concern that Hull “had not yet had the opportunity
for an extended conversation with Dr. H.H. Kung” on “matters of commercial policy.”115 In this
memorandum Vincent not only summarized and re-attached as an enclosure Ambassador Gauss’
prior warnings in his cable from July 28th to Hull over pending Chinese statist government
legislation, but also stated that:
…pressure upon Kung offers the best hope of avoiding unwarranted Chinese restrictions
on foreign business; that specific provisions against restrictive and illiberal economic
113
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policies should be incorporated in our proposed new commercial treaty with China which
is now being drafted,…the prospects of American economic assistance, government or
private, will be seriously impaired if the Chinese Government persists in its present
illiberal policies and tendencies toward state controls, et cetera;…Americans find the
regulations unnecessarily restrictive and lacking in clarity. There is also a seeming
Chinese conception that the principal task of Government is to regulate and control the
flow of American capital to China rather than to encourage that flow.116

A week later on September 14, Gauss sent Secretary Hull a lengthy cable that described
the deteriorating and chaotic economic conditions in China while also presenting a sobering
assessment of the Chinese Nationalist government’s internal lack of coordination, contradictory
policies, dysfunction, lack of unity, and paralysis in managing, facilitating, and reforming current
and future state-centric socio-economic development planning for the Chinese economy.117
Gauss reported that the US embassy’s meetings with several high level Chinese
government officials revealed that not only had China’s Ministry of Economic Affairs failed to
coordinate with the Ministry of Communications for integrating “industrialization plans with the
transportation program” and the Central Planning Board had neither yet set up a board of foreign
economic advisors nor was it being “seriously considered;” but that “nothing definite appears to
have been done with the proposal to organize an overall agency charged with investigating the
problems of financing postwar economic reconstruction.”118 Gauss further summarized that the
majority of senior Chinese government officials interviewed had also opined that “little thought
has been given to the question of inviting an American economic mission to come to China,”
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because according to one senior official that: “it is too early to think of inviting an American
mission because the war against Japan will probably not be over until the end of 1945.”119
However, Gauss also elicited from other senior Chinese Nationalist officials that draft
planning was being done across multiple ROC government ministries to create an integrated
“single master plan before the end of December 1944” in the form of a “five-year economic
development program.”120 Gauss reported that Dr. Ho, Deputy Secretary-General of the Central
Planning Board (CPC) stated that the “broad objectives of the program include the building up of
a national defense structure and improvement of the people’s livelihood,” while Mr. Peng,
Deputy Secretary-General of the CPC stated that “the various plans now being studied by the
Board cover communications, transportation, industry, mining, power, public health, water
conservancy and irrigation, and agriculture including forestry, fisheries, and animal
husbandry.”121
While Ho also noted that it had “yet been determined what industries are to be classed as
basic industries which will largely be state-owned and operated,” Peng admitted that “as a
general rule, those industries requiring much capital and which will not bring immediate
financial return or those which might give rise to monopolies, will probably be state-owned and
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operated.”122 Peng further confided that the Chinese Government “may decide to establish and
operate large plants engaged in manufacture of iron and steel, machinery and heavy chemicals,
and also large mining and public utility enterprises.”123
By early October 1944, Washington pressed US embassy officials in China to collect
more information not only on specific details about emerging Chinese ROC government plans
for large scale postwar economic reconstruction and development, but also the “functions and
composition” as well as the likelihood of whether the Chinese government would propose an
official “American Economic Mission” to China that would assist in bilateral government
cooperation for these matters.124 Washington’s desire for more specific information on Chinese
government economic plans was also influenced by other related parallel US State Department
outreach initiatives with Chinese officials for postwar economic planning that included efforts by
Whiting Willauer, Chief of the China Branch Areas of the Foreign Economic Administration,
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and John D. Sumner, who was an Advisor on Economic Affairs (Foreign Service Auxiliary) of
the Division of Chinese Affairs.
In a memorandum dated October 14, 1944, Sumner summarized his firsthand
conversations with Chinese ROC officials about their future economic development plans as well
as other US State Department staff analysis that “China’s economic development should be built
from the ground up” and that China “should be encouraged to begin its development by the
construction of the smallest-sized producing units which are practical.”125 Sumner’s observations
implied that key American officials were emphasizing more of a capitalist style “bottom-up”
private sector model for China’s economic development versus a Chinese ROC government
preferred authoritative “top-down” statist public sector approach.
During October and November 1944, senior US State Department officials in
Washington and China maintained constant pressure on Chinese ROC government officials to
extract more detailed information about China’s “laws and regulations and their application to
American nationals and firms,” as well as plans of pending Chinese legislation or revisions of
“ambiguous and onerous” laws that “will have a direct bearing upon the operation of American
commercial enterprises in China under the new legal conditions prevailing between the United
States and China.”126 However, during this period US embassy officials in China reported back
to Washington in a rather exacerbated tone that Chinese government officials apparently “lost
interest” in giving more detailed information on China’s “integrated master plan for economic
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development,” as well as noting that Chinese President Chiang Kai-shek “will probably not
complete his examination of plan until end February” [1945].127
Washington’s concern over China’s future economic development plans was also
demonstrated by the dispatch of John Sumner, the aforementioned Advisor on Economic Affairs
attached to the US embassy in Chungking, China, who was there during the fall of 1944 to
investigate “Chinese plans for post-war reconstruction with particular reference to
industrialization” and would “endeavor to obtain from the Chinese their plans for
industrialization, analyze those plans, assess their practicability, and relate them to other phases
of Chinese economic life, for example, agriculture, trade and finance.”128
During Sumner’s mission in China, US Acting Secretary of State Stettinius sent a
telegram to the US embassy in China on November 3rd which provided further evidence of
Washington’s growing concern over China’s pending statist economic plans and restrictions on
capitalist private sector development in light of expected US economic aid during the post-war
period by stating:
American business groups are evidencing a growing and critical interest in Chinese plans
for reconstruction. It is clear that China looks chiefly to the United States for assistance at
the end of the war in carrying out reconstruction…Chinese plans will, it is hoped, be in
harmony with our general post-war economic objectives, including an increase in the
interchange of goods and services under non-discriminatory conditions…129
By mid-November 1944, Sumner’s efforts in China were partially successful in
extracting more details of Chinese ROC government’s emerging plans for China’s post-war
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economic reconstruction after a meeting with Dr. Franklin Ho, the Deputy Secretary-General of
the Central Planning Board in Chungking. During this meeting, Ho revealed to Sumner that the
Chinese ROC government was in the process of completing its “integrated master five-year plan
for economic development” that would devote 30 percent of domestic and expected foreign
investment and aid to major new industries such as mining, chemicals, and public utilities
beginning in 1945.130 Furthermore, Sumner reported that the Chinese government would likely
divert funds and “not only engage directly in especially important projects, but may discourage
additional investment in a particular industry” at its discretion.131 While Sumner reported that the
Chinese government was considering requesting American economic advisors to “study the
overall plan,” he reported that on the issue of the role of domestic and foreign private enterprises
that the government was likely to exert “a very significant degree” of control and supervision of
the private business sector.132
Yet, just three days later, in an apparent reaction to American diplomatic pressure over
pending Chinese ROC government plans to increase its involvement in public sector state-run
business development, George Atcheson, the US Chargé in China reported to the US Secretary
of State in a confidential telegram that the Chinese Nationalists seemed to partially accommodate
Washington’s concerns by declaring that they would limit the ROC government’s involvement in
business monopolies, while directing foreign aid and investment to the private sector.133
Atcheson’s cable described that Ho had presided over a meeting among senior Chinese officials
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of the Supreme National Defense Council previously on November 6th, in which the ROC
government would announce that it had developed provisions that would limit Chinese
“government monopolization” to such industries as “arsenals, public [works?], mint, posts and
telecommunications, important railways and important hydro-electric projects,” while apparently
conceding that “all other industries and public utilities will be open to private domestic and
foreign investment, without requirement of Chinese participation in foreign enterprises.”134
However, Atcheson contrasted these provisions with other vaguely worded clauses that
preserved Chinese ROC government rights to intervene in China’s economy by stating that the
“Chinese Government may elect to engage in industries regarded by it as essential, such as
petroleum and steel production…When engaging in such industries, Government may accept
foreign capital in partnership,” and that private businesses “deemed essential by Chinese
Government, may be required to obtain franchise containing provisions respecting duration,
charges, et cetera.”135
Just four days later, a seemingly alarmed Washington reacted rather swiftly and
forcefully to Atcheson’s telegram out of apparent concern over China’s emerging policies for its
post-war development plans that were “at variance with principles set forth in the Atlantic
Charter and in the Mutual Aid Agreement between the United States and China, and with the
liberal trade policies to which this Government is endeavoring to obtain general adherence.”136
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This reaction, as recorded in Acting Secretary of State Stettinius’s telegram reply sent to
Atcheson, represented an early proto-official enunciation by Washington over fundamental and
principled ideological economic differences between the United States and China involving
statist public versus private sector capitalism as evidenced by the forceful tone and the degree
that Stettinius implored Atcheson to inform Chinese government officials of:
…the importance which this Government attaches to the principles of enjoyment by all
states of access on equal terms to trade, and of collaboration in the economic field, which
are enunciated in the Charter. You should likewise recall to them the provisions of
Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement…which looks toward the elimination of all
forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce and the reduction of tariff
and other trade barriers. A statement of post-war policies calling for increased tariff
protection, with provision for adjustment on a bilateral rather than a most-favored-nation
basis, could scarcely be reconciled with the foregoing principles,…which would be
prejudicial to international cooperation or reduction of trade barriers should not be
adopted…Adoption of such a statement would make more difficult the task of this
Government in its efforts, at home and abroad, to secure general adherence to liberal
trade policies,…You should express the hope of this Government that no public
statement will be made which by committing Chinese Government in advance will make
more difficult negotiation of the treaty.137
By December 1944, US State Department officials’ concern about the Chinese
government’s intended restrictive policies towards private sector foreign investment impacting
American business interests was evident in another high-level meeting between Sumner and Dr.
Sun Fo, the President of the Chinese government’s Legislative Yuan in Chungking, China. US
State Department cables reveal that Sumner requested this meeting to elicit and clarify more
details about China’s aforementioned “Statement of General Principles Governing Postwar
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Economic Policy” that had been approved by China’s Supreme National Defense Council
concurrently with another similar statement endorsing these same Principles that had been issued
by Chinese delegates at the International Business Conference in Rye, New York the previous
month in November.138 According to Sumner’s cable, Fo expressed seemingly contradictory
positions over the Chinese ROC government’s future intentions towards private sector foreign
and domestic investment policies by stating that “the Generalissimo [President Chiang Kai-shek]
takes a position in favor of private enterprise, rather than government monopolization, in the
conduct of foreign trade,” because of the main reason being “the fear that Government agencies
would tend to pre-empt more projects than they would be able promptly to carry forward.”139
Sumner also pointed out and repeatedly asked Fo to clarify the vagueness and ill-defined
terms by which the Chinese Principles referred to “a policy of reserving such industries for
development exclusively by the state” as: “heavy industries,” “industries necessary to national
defense,” “important railways,” and “large hydro-electric works.”140 Sumner also expressed
concern over the lack of clarity of what the Chinese meant by the word “important” because as
he posed to Fo: “would it not militate against desired private investment in such projects.”141 In
response, Sumner recorded that in one of Fo’s more revealing comments hinting at the Chinese
government’s future intentions of statist control policies, he commented that the term

138
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Advisor on Economic Affairs of the Embassy in China (Sumner),
December 4, 1944, in FRUS, Diplomatic Papers, 1944, China, Volume VI, Document 808, 1090-1092.
139

Ibid., 1090.

140

Ibid., 1091.

141

Ibid., 1091.

65
“importance,” according to the Chinese policy interpretation: “would be judged from political
and other points of view not strictly economic in character.”142
Another related example portending Chinese ROC government statist control tendencies
was exemplified by Fo stating that “both private and state owned enterprises may negotiate for
foreign financing through or with the approval of the competent Government authorities.”143
Finally, when Sumner told Fo that the American interpretation of the “three industrial
categories” in China’s Principles were to those “reserved exclusively to the state, those reserved
to private enterprise, and a middle group open to both public and private enterprise,” Fo “denied”
this interpretation and countered that the Chinese government “recognizes only two categories:
those industries reserved to the state, and all other industries.”144
By late 1944 these and other documents revealed an emerging pattern of American
embassy officials in China repeatedly receiving conflicting and contradictory reports via their
senior level Chinese ROC government interlocutors about the ultimate policy decisions and
intentions contained in the numerous “draft” Principles governing the degree of Chinese state
intervention and oversight of China’s post-war public and private sector business development.
For example, on December 8, 1944, American Chargé Atcheson reported to the Secretary State
another summary account of the pending Principles that was rather favorable to the Chinese
government allowing “both state and private” sector types of businesses to flourish in post-war
China, with state sector businesses on a “strictly equal basis” and “not be given special
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privileges” compared to the private sector.145 Atcheson also reported rather optimistically of
evolving Chinese government intentions that as of that date the “number and kinds of state
enterprises should be limited and clearly defined rather than extensive and general,” that “all
other enterprises not strictly within the category of state enterprises [shall] be open to private
undertaking, ownership and operation,” but most notably and suspect was that a “complete break
was made with past theories of rigid spheres of interest for state and private capital.”146
However, these Chinese ROC government’s emerging policies also included a caveat that
“large enterprises not strictly within the category of state concerns, may still be undertaken by
the Government or may be operated jointly by the state and private interests.”147 The latter
statement propitiously implied a “third” category for future business involving statist control of
the Chinese economy by offering a hybrid form of public-private business system as indicated in
a subsequent statement: “operated jointly by state and private interests should be organized in
form of public corporations or companies” and included the major broad industrial categories of
“petroleum production, iron [and] steel production, air lines, et cetera.”148
This memorandum also revealed that the Chinese government intended statist control
over the private sector with the statement: “All privately owned and operated industrial
enterprises should conform to the terms of the general economic plan,” and that “All approved
enterprises, whether state or private-owned, or both, may negotiate for finance from foreign
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sources through or with approval of competent Government authorities.”149 Most tellingly
however, is that on the same day, Atcheson followed up on this memorandum with a telegram to
the Secretary of State informing him that likely as a result of the American embassy’s persistent
inquires with other senior Chinese ROC government officials that they had offered conflicting
accounts of whether the draft Principles had been finalized or approved by President Chiang Kaishek.150
By late December, Sumner secured his highest yet level of interaction with a Chinese
ROC government official for the purpose of finding out specific details of China’s statement of
Principles governing post-war economic policy by meeting with Mr. Kan Nai-kuang, Deputy
Secretary General of the Supreme National Defense Council, and whom American embassy
officials believed had “taken an important part” in preparing it.151 Sumner’s official
memorandum describing Kan’s accounts of the emerging draft contents of the Principles
revealed convincing evidence of the Chinese government’s intentions towards implementing a
quasi-authoritarian state managed hybrid capitalist-socialist economic system for China.
Sumner reported that Kan expressed his views that the Principles were: “a policy of
‘planned liberalism’, intended to avoid both the wastes of laissez-faire capitalism and the

Ibid., 1093. These terms included: “location, plant capacity, kinds and quality of products, issues of
debentures and shares must be reported and approved, et cetera,” Ibid.
149

150

The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State, December 8, 1944, in FRUS, Diplomatic
Papers, 1944, China, Volume VI, Document 810, 1093. These conflicting accounts included Atcheson reporting that
Dr. K.C. Wu, the Chinese government Political Vice Foreign Minister had “disclaimed knowledge of statement on
postwar commercial policies,” and “unofficially that no statement had been drawn up…and that official response to
our approach would be made soon;” with Atcheson stating at the end of the telegram: “It may be that our action has
caused Council to recall statement for further study and possible redrafting,” Ibid.
151

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Advisor on Economic Affairs of the Embassy in China (Sumner),
December 27, 1944, in FRUS, Diplomatic Papers, 1944, China, Volume VI, Document 815, 1096-1097.

68
extreme authoritarianism of Soviet Russia.”152 Kan also revealed to Sumner that the official
Chinese statement of Principles “would be issued in a few days” and would cover the four key
economic areas of:
(1) Definition of the area reserved for state monopoly, (2) Reservation by the state of the
right to enter other important industries that attempt to advance to define precisely the
industry involved, (3) Clarification of the position of private enterprise, and (4)
Clarification of the position of foreign investment.153
Sumner’s memorandum also revealed that when he asked Kan about how the Principles
related to the “overall plan” that China’s Central Planning Board was developing to govern the
post-war Chinese economy, Kan vaguely described that the “plan” was a “guide,” thus revealing
another contradiction that Sumner identified because Kan did not “explain how the plan could be
regarded on one hand as only a guide, and on the other hand as a major instrument in controlling
the future industrial development of China.”154 Sumner also queried Kan about his opinion of Dr.
Sun Fo’s previous statements to Sumner in early December about the Chinese government’s
“granting of special charters for particular undertakings that may be carried out by private
enterprise.” Sumner asked Kan whether such a statement implied that “in the case of public
utilities” that special charters would be a “means of regulating industry,” to which Kan replied:
“to the contrary, special charters were envisaged as a means of conferring additional rights, as an
inducement to private investment, rather than as a means of regulating the operation of private
enterprise.”155
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Hence, there is significant authoritative evidence in official US diplomatic archives
indicating that during the later World War Two period 1943-1945, the Nationalist Chinese
preferred additional US economic aid to support China’s emerging statist government run
monopolist business policies that ran counter to American style capitalist private sector
economic development models and practices. Most scholarly interpretations and appraisals of
Sun’s economic ideology generally conclude that he was in favor of China receiving foreign
capital investment and aid to implement autocratic national government control over labor,
finance, land reform, and price controls, as well as to develop large state (or government)
dominated and controlled industrial enterprises, public utilities, and infrastructure at the expense
of the private sector.156 Moreover, during this period, the evidence from diplomatic cables
between various senior US embassy officials in China with the US Secretary of State reveal that
US officials were aware of these emerging Nationalist Chinese statist government policies
towards its “economic enterprises” and ideological authoritarian-like national economic
reconstruction measures that were expected to continue after the post-World War Two period.157
Like the later years of the Roosevelt administration during the World War Two period,
the Truman administration in the early post-war period 1945-1949 also exhibited little evidence
that capitalistic economic ideological concepts were used as a key rational for the US
government giving economic aid to the Chinese Nationalist-led ROC government on the Chinese
mainland. During the early to mid-periods of President Truman’s administration, coinciding with
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the overlapping Chinese Civil War period 1945-1949, Washington’s overall support for US
economic aid to the Chinese Nationalists continued but then rapidly declined due to negative
perceptions of the ROC government’s increasing authoritarianism, corruption, ineptitude, and
tendencies for using US aid to implement statist economic ideologically driven policies and
programs on mainland China and the island of Taiwan.
This decline in Washington’s support for more economic aid to Taiwan was also due to
US executive branch and congressional post-war domestic fiscal budgetary concerns and lack of
a convincing rationale for aid due to a loss in confidence in the ROC government and its military
forces’ ability to prevail over the Chinese Communists during the later stages of the 1948-1949
Chinese civil war period.158 These serious concerns led to extensive controversies and debates
within the Truman administration’s State Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the US Congress
over US economic aid to Taiwan during 1945-1949.
However, in a last desperate and seemingly futile yet symbolic attempt to save the
Chinese Nationalists from being defeated on mainland China by the growing military threat
posed by the Chinese Communists, the US Congress passed the China Aid Act of 1948. The
purpose for the US Congress passing this major, but brief economic aid package intended to last
18 months until early 1950, was to support the Chinese Nationalists, then still located in
mainland China, to help them counter Chinese Communist military aggression with “emergency”
economic aid legislation totaling $338 million.159
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Soon after the end of World War Two in late 1945, President Truman articulated the US
government’s first post-World War Two foreign policy statement on US-China relations entitled
United States Policy Toward China.160 President Truman’s statement articulated that the United
States “recognized the present National Government of the Republic of China as the only legal
government in China. It is the proper instrument to achieve the objective of a unified China,”
while also noting that the Nationalist controlled ROC government of China was a “one-party
government” that required “modification of the one-party political tutelage established as an
interim arrangement in the progress of the nation toward democracy by the father of the Chinese
Republic, Doctor Sun Yat-sen.”161
Truman also stated that Washington’s other policy goals included a “strong, united and
democratic China,” and that general conditions of further US economic aid would be based on
China’s progress towards a more inclusive government (implying integrating the Chinese
Communists into the Nationalist government) and that the United States would assist the
Nationalists in:
…every reasonable way to rehabilitate the country, improve the agrarian and industrial
economy, and establish a military organization capable of discharging China's national
and international responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order. In furtherance
of such assistance, it would be prepared to give favorable consideration to Chinese
requests for credits and loans under reasonable conditions for projects which would
contribute toward the development of a healthy economy throughout China and healthy
trade relations between China and the United States.162
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A year later in late 1946, President Truman updated the US government’s foreign policy
position on China and economic aid to the Chinese Nationalists and ROC government, then still
occupying both mainland China and Taiwan, with another updated yet similarly worded
authoritative statement.163 While acknowledging in this second statement that the United States
had “undertaken some emergency measures of economic assistance to prevent the collapse of
China’s economy,” Truman justified additional US economic aid based upon when “conditions
in China improve” and “other projects” that would “encourage economic reconstruction and
reform in China and which, in so doing, would promote a general revival of commercial relations
between American and Chinese businessmen.”164
In addressing China’s ongoing societal instability due to the devasted Chinese economy
and ongoing civil war between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists, Truman reiterated that
the United States was “prepared to assist the Chinese economically and in other ways,” that
“Political unity could not be built on economic chaos,” and that:
This Government had already authorized certain minor credits to the Chinese
Government in an effort to meet emergency rehabilitation needs…A total of
approximately $66,000,000 was involved in six specific projects, chiefly for the purchase
of raw cotton, and for ships and railroad repair material. But these emergency measures
were inadequate. Following the important forward step made by the Chinese in the
agreements as reported by General Marshall, the Export-Import Bank earmarked a total
of $500,000,000 for possible additional credits on a project by project basis to Chinese
Government agencies and private enterprises.165
A closer examination of the contents in President Truman’s two authoritative statements,
suggests that over the course of a year during China’s initial post-World War Two resumption of
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its internal domestic Chinese civil war that there were slight, yet significant differences in tone
and specified conditions tied to further potential US economic aid for China. Compared to the
rather specific conditions in the 1945 version, the 1946 presidential statement indicates that
Washington was willing to justify more US economic aid to China based upon rather less
specific and more vague concepts of cessation of “some” level of hostilities in the Chinese civil
war and “reform in China” linked to improving bilateral Sino-American trade.
Overall, the US executive branch and the Congress, with its Republican majority during
the late 1940s, justified US economic aid to the Chinese Nationalists based mainly on a variety
of reasons that included: legacy sentimental reasons of US-Nationalist Chinese allied relations
during World War Two, aspirations for increasing Sino-America bilateral trade, assisting the
Chinese Nationalists against the Chinese Communists, and linkage to the Marshall Plan and
European Recovery Plan for economic aid that bolstered allied European economies to thwart
Soviet Union inspired Communist expansionist activities.166
As previously mentioned, during World War Two the United States provided extensive
military and economic aid to its allied Chinese Nationalist dominated ROC government by
justifying it for opposing Japanese militarism on mainland China. In the early post-World War
Two period during 1945-1947, the US government provided the Nationalists with only marginal
military and economic aid up until they began retreating south and evacuating to the island of
Taiwan just off the southeastern Chinese mainland coast following a series of defeats from
Chinese Communist forces during 1947-1948. To counter this Chinese Communist aggression
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and support its tacit and former ally—the Chinese Nationalists, the United States began resuming
significant amounts of “emergency” economic aid totaling $338 million during the Truman
Administration in 1948 with the US Congress passing the China Aid Act of 1948.167 While the
China Aid Act was set to expire in April 1949, support among ardent supporters of Chiang Kaishek and the Chinese Nationalists in the US Congress emerged to extend the Act’s economic aid
provisions through February 1950.168
This evidence also reveals a key puzzle overshadowing and seemingly undermining the
rationale and legitimacy for how and why Washington justified post-World War Two US
economic aid to develop capitalism for the authoritarian regime of Nationalist China on an ad
hoc annual basis during 1945-1949, then thereafter significantly expanding into a major
programmed systemic way during the cold war period 1950-1965. This puzzle stems from the
apparent ideological contradiction undermining the legitimacy justifying US economic aid’s
intended purpose for promoting Western-style American capitalism and free enterprise principles
for an authoritarian Chinese Nationalist regime that implemented an autocratic state-centric
government dominated socio-economic development model on the island nation of Taiwan.
As previously described, the Chinese Nationalist’s authoritarian and state-centric political
and socio-economic polices were implemented under its hybrid Leninist party-state governing
model and system, first on mainland China, then transitioning to Taiwan at the end of World War
Two in 1945, and finally gaining permanence on the island after 1949. Chinese Nationalist leader
Chiang Kai-shek adopted former leader Sun Yat-sen’s influential and guiding ideologies
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contained in his Three People’s Principles to justify and implement Chiang’s similar version of
an anti-democratic and anti-capitalist state-centric authoritarian political governing and
economic development model for Taiwan.
Varying degrees of Sun’s “Three Principles of the People” guided the governance and
political-economy of the ROC from when it was first established in 1912 to when his ideology
was enshrined into the 1947 Constitution of the ROC. Subsequently, Sun’s ideology significantly
influenced the Chinese ROC government’s statist economic interventionist policies from when it
relocated to the island of Taiwan in 1949. The ROC’s 1947 Constitution, which remains in effect
to the present day (as revised), still contains Sun’s ideological precepts and Taiwan’s state
constitutional authorities over the nation’s economic matters in Articles 107 and Articles 142151 under “Chapter XIII: Fundamental National Policies, Section 3. National Economy.”169 As a
result, these constitutional provisions gave the ROC government sweeping authority to intervene
in Taiwan’s economy by creating and managing large “public” (government) business
monopolies and having the power for the “restriction of private capital to attain a well-balanced
sufficiency in national wealth and people’s livelihood.”170
The precursors to this eventual Chinese Nationalist centralization and government
domination of Taiwan’s economy occurred during 1945-1947 under the authority of Chen Yi,
who was the first Nationalist governor-general of Taiwan after the island was returned to China
following Japan’s defeat in World War Two. In 1945, Chen, who was accompanied by American
military and diplomatic officials, was the senior Chinese Nationalist representative in Taiwan
who signed Japan’s terms of surrender under the authority of Supreme Commander for the Allied
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Powers’ General Order Number 1 which included returning the island back to China following
Japan’s occupation and colonialization of the island during 1895-1945.171
Under Chen’s brief two-year administration of Taiwan, he often invoked Sun Yat-sen’s
“Three Principles of the People” doctrine and its “restriction of private capital” principle in
official documents and speeches justifying the Nationalists’ expropriation of the most significant
former Japanese public and private business enterprises and placing them under government
control.172 This resulted in the Chinese Nationalist-led ROC government creating a state socialist
economy that controlled large business monopolies comprising over 90 percent of the
economy.173
Beginning in the late 1940’s, not only were all of Taiwan’s land and mineral deposits put
directly under the legal jurisdiction of the Chinese Nationalist ROC government, but private land
property rights, wealth, and businesses of ordinary citizens were subject to broad government
restrictions. Specific examples include Article 107, which states that “the Central Government
shall have the power of legislation and administration” of “State-operated economic enterprises;”
with Article 144 stating: “Public utilities and other enterprises of a monopolistic nature shall, in
principle, be under public operation. In cases permitted by law, they may be operated by private
citizens;” while Article 145 states: “With respect to private wealth and privately operated
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enterprises, the State shall restrict them by law if they are deemed detrimental to a balanced
development of national wealth and people's livelihood.”174
As a result of these quasi-socialist inspired legal provisions for Taiwan’s statist
dominated national economic management and public ownership of land, capital, and business,
Washington was faced with a dilemma of aiding and supporting the Chinese Nationalist ROC
government as an erstwhile authoritarian ally whose national development strategy and polices
were ideologically antithetical to fundamental capitalist economic modernization principles for
the private sector.
During 1944-1947, another series of official ROC government documents reveal the
Chinese Nationalists’ plans and policies to implement state control over all national economic
matters and restrict private sector capitalist activities. For example, in 1945, the ROC
government issued the “Economic Construction Program,” “The Establishment of Postwar
Economic Institutions,” and “The Five-Year Draft Plan for Material Construction” in which the
overall statist policies represented by these documents can be interpreted as the Nationalists
attempting to establish government control over all economic matters in China and Taiwan at the
expense of the capitalist private sector.175 Overall, the Nationalists justified a government run
economy by the principles in its economic development ideology expressed initially as a
“Planned Economy” but evolving soon thereafter into a “Planned Free Economy.”176
Although both terms implied national statist control over Taiwan’s economy, the former
can be interpreted as strict centralized control while the latter term’s insertion of the word “Free”
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appears rather disingenuous to give the appearance of allowing forms of capitalist free enterprise
for the purpose of influencing Washington to justify giving further US economic aid. For
example, shortly thereafter in January 1946, the ROC government adopted the Resolution on
Program for Peaceful National Reconstruction Adopted by the Political Consultative Conference
which stated: ““A plan of economic reconstruction should be formulated in accordance with the
teachings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s “Industrial Planning,”…Any enterprise which partakes of the
nature of a monopoly or which cannot be undertaken by private initiative should be classified as
a state enterprise;…” and “The development of “official capitalism” should be forestalled.””177
These publicly released Chinese Nationalist ROC government documents made it clear that the
regime had renewed efforts to implement its version of a statist-centric socialist dominated
public sector command economy.178
Furthermore during 1946-1947, Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975), the prominent Chinese
Nationalist leader succeeding Sun Yat-sen and who led the ROC government on mainland China
during 1928-1949 and on Taiwan thereafter during 1950-1975, had authorized an approved
English edition of his original 1943 book in Chinese entitled China’s Destiny and Chinese
Economic Theory for publication and distribution in the West.179 Chiang’s overall narrative in
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the book’s Chinese Economic Theory section was criticized for whether or not he actually wrote
it himself, lacking academic credibility in the economic sciences field, and for being a Chinese
Nationalist politically influenced interpretation of China’s economic past and foreshadowing the
pending dominant Chinese government control over China and Taiwan’s major economic
sectors.180
Chiang’s overall narrative in the book also justified the Chinese Nationalist led ROC
government’s control over China’s economy at the expense of the private sector based on
China’s then dire economic conditions and the need to oppose the Chinese Communists during
this ongoing Chinese civil war period. Chiang’s justification for Nationalist state economic
control of China’s economy also included his portrayal of the differences between ancient
Chinese and Western economic “theories,” “Restricting the People’s Wants,” and an updated
reinterpretation of Sun’s statist-centric economic doctrine in his Three Principles of the People,
to include Sun’s “Industrial Plan.”181
Chiang’s main contentions in Chinese Economic Theory that advocated for and supported
an economic ideology of Chinese ROC government statist hegemony over China’s economy
originated from his narrative’s interpretations of traditional or ancient Chinese economic
conditions. The historical Chinese conditions that Chiang described as comprising Chinese
economic theory included both ancient Chinese Confucian and Legalistic authoritarian schools
of political thought whereby Chiang emphasized the Legalists’ school’s “rule by law” justifying
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the central government’s “control of man’s desires” and concluded that “the basis of Chinese
economic theory is man’s rational nature—not his wants.”182 Chiang presented his interpretation
of “economic principles and theories that are traditionally Chinese” as his means of
reconstructing “China’s own economic principles” that provided a historical justification
underpinning a Chinese Nationalist version of a third alternative hybrid economic ideology that
both contrasted with, yet blended elements of his descriptions of the two predominant schools of
“Orthodox Western” and Marxist economic theories.183
Most tellingly however is how Chiang compared his Chinese economic theories to
normative Western economic principles when he related that “…the scope of Chinese economics
is much broader than that of Western economics,” and defined Chinese economic theory as “the
study of managing men and adjusting things” and “the study of national planning and the
people’s livelihood.”184 Chiang further contrasted his Chinese economic theory from Western
capitalist concepts of private enterprise and free market forces by stating:
From the Chinese standpoint, therefore, Western economics is merely the study of
private enterprise or of market transactions, whereas Chinese economic theory is not
confined to private enterprise or market transactions, but is a combination of the people’s
livelihood and national defense…Western economic theory is based on wants, especially
personal wants, but if this theory is carried out in practice, the techniques of production
and national defense would not serve the people's livelihood-on the contrary, they would
enslave men and even destroy man's nature. Chinese economic theory is different, in that
it takes the people's livelihood as its objective.185
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In the aftermath of the publication of Chiang’s first Chinese edition of China’s Destiny in
1943 and 1944 in China, but also more significantly with two additional English versions that
became available in the United States in 1947, controversies emerged among American political
and academic circles over the motivations, contents, authoritarian Chinese Nationalist political
and economic ideologies, and timing of the book’s release. In early 1947 the first prominent
Chinese Nationalist authorized and revised edition, entitled China’s Destiny was released in the
United States. However, another unauthorized version by Philip Jaffee, the editor of the USbased pro-Communist publication Amerasia, published his unofficial translated edition of
China’s Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory: With Notes and Commentary by Philip Jaffe in
English and was also widely available in the United States.186
Jaffe was a naturalized American citizen of Russian descent and a self-avowed
Communist sympathizer and political activist in the United States. He was also a well-known
critic of the Chinese Nationalists during the era. Jaffe’s version of China’s Destiny offered a
rather prejudiced commentary that identified and characterized the glaring political and
economic ideological contradictions in the Chinese Nationalists’ professed values compared to
China’s actual socio-economic conditions as expressed in Chiang’s own words. These
contradictions were characterized as a dichotomy of two divergent economic ideologies—that of
Chiang’s “feudal and antidemocratic political and economic philosophy” contrasted with the
liberal capitalist free market economic ideology of the United States—Nationalist China’s then
still prominent ally and donor of economic aid. Jaffe also claimed in his version of Chiang’s
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book that the Chinese Nationalist’s “attempt to impose an oppressive political and economic
philosophy upon its citizens by force” resulted in exacerbating China’s socio-economic
instability during this post-World War Two Chinese civil war period.187
Furthermore, Jaffe stepped up his criticism of Chiang’s anti-democratic concepts that he
wrote in Chinese Economic Theory by noting the “social and economic concepts that it develops
can, in fact, best be described as Fascist theory applied to a semifeudal agrarian economy.
Individuals and individual “wants” are treated with “benevolent” contempt. The whole emphasis
is on the subordination of the individual to a paternalistic and authoritarian government “which
manages the people's affairs.”188 Despite Jaffe’s apparent biased, exaggerated, and negative
criticism of Chiang’s book, it was abundantly clear that the Chinese Nationalist led ROC
government under the leadership of Chiang clearly intended to implement a statist economic
ideology that would result in most economic sectors and private enterprise being subordinated
under centralized state control. Such measure would also have been congruent and aligned with
the Chinese Nationalists’ similar authoritarian Leninist-inspired political system.
During 1947-1950, at least three leading American university historians and scholars of
Chinese studies took notice of these two books and wrote articles and book reviews in prominent
publications that attracted the attention of American political, business, academic, and religious
circles concerned about their respective interests in the ongoing events in China and American
foreign policy towards the Chinese Nationalists during this period. In early 1947, John K.
Fairbank, one of the era’s most respected sinologists at Harvard University who had previously

187

Chiang, China’s Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory: With Notes and Commentary by Philip Jaffe,

188

Chiang, China’s Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory: With Notes and Commentary by Philip Jaffe,

297.
308.

83
served in the US Office of War Information in Chinese Nationalist controlled areas of China
during World War Two, published his reviews of the two books in a lengthy New York Times
article entitled “Introducing a Skeleton From the Kuomintang Closet.”189
In addition to his extensive academic credentials in modern Chinese studies, Fairbank’s
experience and familiarity with Chinese Nationalist government and its internal political and
economic affairs was also significantly strengthened by his service in variously described
attributed official roles in the US Office of War Information as the Director of the American
Publications Service, Interdepartmental Committee for the Acquisition of Foreign Publications,
Division of Cultural Relations in the US Department of State, and Special Assistant to the US
Embassy in Chungking [Chongqing] China during the War.190 In his article, Fairbank combined
his criticism of the Chinese Nationalist government’s repression, corruption, and illiberalism
with Chiang’s ideological concepts of authoritarianism expressed in his China’s Destiny.
Fairbank also highlighted the importance of the book for increasing American
understanding of events in China by stating that as ““the bible of the Kuomintang, “China’s
Destiny” should be required reading in the United States. It expresses the social views to which
our material aid has for so long lent moral support…It is also a danger to American
democracy.””191 Fairbank also claimed that the Nationalist Chinese published copies of Chiang’s
companion treatise Chinese Economic Theory were “carefully restricted to official circles, seeks
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to derive from China’s ancient philosophers a sanction for state control of economic life. Against
Western free enterprise, it calls for an anti-Marxist Confucian totalitarianism. These doctrines are
developed chapter by chapter.”192
Fairbank further contrasted the “American belief in free enterprise” with Chiang’s
negative characterization of “Western economic theory” as unsuitable for China by noting how
Chiang’s concepts had merged Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles with “national defense as the dual
objective of state control of economic life” so that the Chinese Nationalist government “should
not only plan the people’s livelihood but also control and restrict their wants…”193 Thus,
Fairbank’s damning account of Chiang’s statist economic ideology would have been perceived
by American elites and those interested in Chinese affairs among the general public as a highly
credible and reliable account of the Chinese Nationalist ROC government’s intentions for
institutionalizing a system of authoritarian economic management in China. Such a negative
depiction of a Chinese economic ideology that was antithetical to the general Western economic
ideology of capitalism and free enterprise, was particularly auspicious given its publication in the
widely read New York Times concurrently during the highly controversial debates over the
efficacy of US economic aid to China within the Congress during the 1946-1948 period.
A few months later in 1947, other noted American sinologists such as Nathaniel Peffer at
Columbia University and K.S. Latourette at Yale University published rather shorter reviews,
and like Fairbank, were also rather critical of Chiang’s China’s Destiny and Chinese Economic
Theory. Peffer’s credibility in Chinese affairs at that time stemmed from his having lived in
China for 25 years while serving as a Far Eastern correspondent for the New York Tribune and
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his 20 years of distinguished teaching and publishing influential books and articles about China
and the “Far East” while at Columbia University during 1937-1958.194
Peffer, who at the time of his review’s publication had been sent to China by the US State
Department as a visiting professor during 1946-1947, offered a perspective that dismissed
Chiang’s book as a “message” in the context of “the spirit of contemporary politics rather than
Chinese political thought” and “a succession of generalities meaning little or much according to
taste.”195 Peffer illustrated Chiang’s claim that the modern genesis of China’s extreme instability
originated from the West by comparing the book to a religious sermon, in that “Like all sermons
it begins with denunciation of sin, the sin in this case being Western, in so far as the West is
guilty of all China's suffering, and Chinese only in so far as China has allowed itself to be allured
by the false appeal of the West.”196
Reaching similar conclusions as Fairbank, Peffer noted that China’s Destiny had been
made a compulsory reading in China’s schools and concluded that Chiang’s future intentions for
China was to make it “a country under a benevolently paternal authoritarianism, the authority
being the Kuomintang.”197 In comparison to Fairbank and Peffer, noted Asian historian and
Baptist theologian Kenneth S. Latourette’s less critical review of Chiang’s book likely resulted
from his teaching and scholarship while holding dual appointments of Professor of Missions at
the Divinity School and of Asian history and Professor of Oriental history at Yale University, as
well as his experiences as a Baptist missionary in China during 1910-1912 and decades of
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subsequent faith-based interactions with China after serving on the American Baptist Foreign
Mission Board for over 20 years.198 Latourette noted the book’s two versions and the antiChinese Nationalist bias of Jaffee’s book version, while also highlighting Chiang’s commitment
to Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles and economic ideology.
Three years later in 1950, another book review of China’s Destiny authored by Earl
Swisher, the noted sinologist, professor, and Director of Asian Studies at the University of
Colorado, appeared in the influential and widely published Far Eastern Quarterly.199 Swisher’s
previous career included teaching history in China at the Lingnan University [Canton Christian
College] during 1924-1928 where he interviewed Sun Yat-sen and knew Chiang Kai-shek.
Swisher had previously conducted research of Qing Dynasty archives in Peking, China during
1937-1938, and had recently returned from China where he lived during the renewed 1947-1948
Chinese civil war period just prior to writing his review of Chiang’s two book editions in late
1949.200 Swisher noted in his review that Chiang’s China’s Destiny was “used extensively in all
schools and colleges” while it “supplemented and partially replaced” Sun’s Three Principles “as
the bible of Kuomintang China.”201
Swisher also claimed auspiciously that “an unofficial English version was reported to
exist in the State Department,” while characterizing China’s Destiny as a blueprint for a new
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type of “Chinese nationalism, nineteenth-century nationalism, after the pattern of Italy,
Germany, and Japan,” and “reveals the close parallel of Chiang’s effort with that of the Meiji
reformers of Japan.”202 The significance of these book reviews of Chiang’s China’s Destiny and
Chinese Economic Theory by three of the era’s leading American scholars of China appearing
widely in print is that they were all critical of the portending Chinese Nationalists’ intentions to
govern China using illiberal and undemocratic authoritarian means.
These book reviews were also perceived by Chiang’s supporters in the US government
and among private commercial sectors as having had a negative impact shaping American elite
and public opinion towards being unfavorable for continued support of US economic aid to
China. Another related controversy over the alleged US government “suppression” of the
contents and dissemination of China’s Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory reached high
levels in the US Congress resulting from Jaffe’s published edition and claims in his section of the
book entitled “The Secret of “China’s Destiny” that:
It is interesting to consider why two such important books have been kept from the
American people. For example, in January 1946, at the height of a Congressional
controversy over China, the request of six Congressmen to see the State Department's
translation of China’s Destiny was refused by the Secretary of State on the ground that it
was a “top secret” document and that it was not a propitious moment at which to make
this document public.203

Concurrently in early 1947 during the process of revising the ROC Constitution and
inaugurating a new constitutional government set for December 25, 1947, the ROC government
initiated a major fundamental reorganization of its State Council and overall political system
with the release of its Political Program of the National Government of China to achieve the

18.

202

Swisher, “Review of Chiang Kai-Shek, China's Destiny,” 92-93.

203

Chiang, China’s Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory: With Notes and Commentary by Philip Jaffe,

88
gradual goal of “establishing constitutional government and promoting democracy.”204 This
reorganization included creating the leadership positions of a President of the ROC, filled by
Chiang Kai-shek; a President of the new Executive Yuan system, (or chief legislative branch of
government), headed by Chang Chun; and a Minister of Economic Affairs, headed by Li
Huang.205
Article Six of the Political Program solidified authoritarian power for the ROC President
position in that he had express authority to make “any nomination to the presidency of the
Executive Yuan” thus giving the ROC’s chief executive control over who would head this newly
revised ROC legislature.206 Furthermore, the ROC government also implied its statist control
over foreign direct investment by stating in Article Eleven that: “Foreign loans henceforth to be
contracted shall all be earmarked for purposes of stabilizing and improving the people’s
livelihood and of production and reconstruction.”207
In his inaugural speech on April 23, 1947, Chang Chun, the new President of the
Executive Yuan, (or Premier of the ROC government) noted that the main priority of the ROC
government was to “resolve the serious financial and economic problems of the moment” under
the “guiding principles [of] the fundamentals of nation reconstruction which were laid down by
Dr. Sun Yat-sen, father of the republic.”208 However, while outlining the new ROC national
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economic policies, Chang revealed a contradiction in public versus private sector economic
principles by expressing its statist-centric intentions on one hand with: “the Government has
already promulgated a set of emergency economic measures. These will continue to be
enforced…the Government will have to carry out step by step the economic program already
formulated;” while on the other hand expressing private sector encouragement with: “no effort
should be spared to encourage privately operated economic enterprises in order to divert idle
capital to productive channels.”209
It is unclear in the speech as to what Chang’s motivations were for expressing support for
both public and private sector economic activity. However, Chang’s speech, together with
Article Eleven of the Political Program regarding ROC government primacy over foreign loans,
suggested that given the close ties between the US and ROC governments that Chang’s real
intentions were to feign and publicly declare support for the Chinese private sector in the
expectation that this would placate Washington’s criticism of the ROC’s anti-capitalist economic
policies, thus attracting further US congressional support for resuming US economic aid.
Overall, these documents, together with the ROC government’s “Emergency Economic
Performance Act” and the “Economic Reform Act” in early 1947, revealed that the Nationalist
Chinese leaders attempted to justify their responses to China’s severe economic distress during
this civil war period by adopting and modifying Sun’s Three Principles of the People to form a
unique statist government dominated economy on Taiwan based on a hybrid economic ideology
that combined various elements of both socialism and capitalism.210 In addition, by the fall of

209

Inaugural Radio Speech by the President of the Executive Yuan (Chang), The China White Paper, 743.

Samuel P.S. Ho, “Economics, Economic Bureaucracy, and Taiwan's Economic Development,” Pacific
Affairs 60, no. 2 (Summer, 1987): 246; and Hsu, “Ideological Reflections and the Inception of Economic
Development in Taiwan,” 312-314.
210

90
1947, US State Department officials in China reported that the Chinese Nationalists had issued a
major manifesto linking the ideology of Sun Yat-sen’s national revolution and state-directed
“economic reconstruction projects as directly concern the people’s livelihood. In this, as in other
types of reconstruction, we should first exert our own utmost. Our party wishes to set this as a
goal in our present endeavors…to effect comprehensive political and economic reforms.”211
Concurrently with the growing awareness and controversies surrounding Chiang Kaishek’s Sunist-inspired Chinese Nationalist statist economic ideology during 1946-1947, senior
ROC government officials upped the ante in pressing the US State Department for more
economic aid. Back in Washington during late December 1946, Wellington Koo, the Chinese
Nationalist Ambassador to the United States in Washington, had presented a note verbale to the
out-going US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes with a proposed draft of an official agreement
between China and the United States requesting Washington provide additional US economic aid
and other relief supplies to China because the aid that China was then receiving from the United
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) would soon expire in 1947.212
Ambassador Koo justified his request based upon China’s “pressing need for postwar
relief and her inability to pay for the necessary supplies on account of the lack of adequate
reserve in foreign exchange,…” and that the “present UNRRA Program for China (signed in
1944) provides for only about one-fourth of her estimated total needs for postwar relief and

211

This manifesto was issued by the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Kuomintang Central Executive
Committee and published in the Nationalist Government’s Central News Bulletin, September 13, 1947, in The
Ambassador in China (Stuart) to Secretary Marshall, September 17, 1947, The China White Paper, Document 142,
826-827.
212

The Chinese Ambassador (Koo) to the Secretary of State [Agreement Between the United States and
China Regarding Relief Assistance to China Signed October 27,1947], December 26, 1946, in FRUS, 1947, The Far
East: China, Volume VII, eds. Ralph E. Goodwin et al, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1972),
1293-1294.

91
rehabilitation program,…”213 Koo also stated that the “Chinese Government should feel deeply
grateful if the most favorable consideration would be accorded to its request for an appropriate
share” as part of what President Truman was then “undertaking to recommend to Congress for an
appropriation for purposes of post-UNRRA relief to be extended to friendly countries which
have been devasted by the war and will still be in need of aid after the termination of the
UNRRA operations.”214
While Koo noted that the “one-fourth” of what China still needed was based on its
original 1944 requirements totaling a staggering amount of 10 million tons of supplies, costing
$2 billion, he also implied an amount for US economic aid by stating that China’s “urgent
deficiencies” were estimated to amount to $200 million needed over the period May 1947 to
April 1948.215 Without mentioning a monetary figure, the new Secretary of State Dean Acheson
replied to Koo two months later on February 27, 1947 expressing confidence that the Truman
administration and the US Congress would consider the “needs of China” in its deliberations.216
However, internal State Department records indicate that after lengthy analysis among senior
economic policy and aid officials there during January and February that a much lower sum of
$40 million could be reasonably justified based on prudent deficit finance and exchange rate
calculations by the Truman administration as comprising any new amount of US economic aid to
Taiwan during the next fiscal year extending into 1948.217
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Officials in the US State Department were also influenced and sensitive to US
Congressional support for economic aid to the Chinese Nationalist regime in China. One of the
most notable and influential members of Congress who supported the Chinese Nationalists was
US Representative Walter H. Judd of Minnesota, who State Department officials identified as an
integral member of the “pro-China lobby” (or pro-China bloc) in Congress.218 Congressman Judd
had previously served twice as a Christian medical missionary in China for nearly 10 years
during 1926-1931 and 1934-1938, and was a well-known and influential Republican politician
who tirelessly advocated in Congress for economic relief aid to Nationalist China during the
1940s and 1950s.219 During House Foreign Relations [Affairs] Congressional hearings on postUNRRA aid as part of the Relief Assistance to Countries Devasted by War series in February
1947, Judd was instrumental in advocating and supporting congressional authorizations of $60
million emergency food imports to China, which represented 10 percent of the total $610 million
to other countries, contained in secret estimates prepared by the State Department.220
However, by mid-March, because US Ambassador Stuart in China generally believed
that the $60 million was an “adequate relief target for China,” he informed Secretary of State
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Acheson that due to the ineffectiveness and “difficulties” of Chinese Nationalist management of
the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRA), he advised that US
economic aid should be instead distributed in China directly by either UNRAA (under American
supervision) or by “UNRRA-trained Americans.”221 By April, Ambassador Stuart was even
more pessimistic about whether the United States should fund more post-UNRRA economic and
food aid to China because the Chinese Nationalists were diverting aid to conserve foreign
exchange, and that they could not conduct “adequate financing with local currency and
completion of a program of direct relief where it is really needed.”222
In early 1947, other US diplomatic archives reveal that many US State Department
officials were aware that the Chinese Nationalist government exerted significant state or “public”
control over key industrial sectors at the expense of Chinese and foreign private sector capitalist
business interests. Despite ongoing instability and armed sectarian conflict between the Chinese
Nationalists and Communists during the middle of the Chinese civil war period 1945-1949 on
mainland China, evidence in US State Department archives reveals official diplomatic
correspondence between Washington and the ROC Nationalist government inquiring on behalf
US business interests as to which Chinese industrial sectors would be suitable for American
private sector investment. This diplomatic activity was in response to a joint memorandum sent
by the China-American Council and the National Foreign Trade Council to the State Department
on December 6, 1946, that had requested “clarification” of which Chinese industrial sectors were

221
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State, Telegram, March 14, 1947, FRUS, 1947,
The Far East: China, Volume VII, 1299-1301.
222

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State, Telegram, April 12, 1947, FRUS, 1947, The
Far East: China, Volume VII, 1303-1304.

94
“reserved as [government] monopolies” or Nationalist state controlled, and further—which
public and private industries were open to American private sector investment.223
An exchange of several American diplomatic cables between George C. Marshall, the US
Secretary of State; John Leighton Stuart, the US Ambassador to China; and Monnett Bain Davis,
the US Consul General in Shanghai during February 13 to December 2, 1947, showed that the
US State Department acted upon this1946 memorandum’s questions about China’s “state control
of industry” and requested “clarification [of the] Chinese attitude” for:
…which fields industry will be open to direct investment American capital;…which
reserved as Govt monopolies;…which will Govt operate alongside private; what
assurance Govt enterprises not to get preference re taxes, allocations, etc.;…which fields
will there be joint Govt-private operations;…and which (aside from Govt monopolies)
closed to foreign corps.224

The context and details of these diplomatic exchanges reveal that Washington recognized
the degree that Chinese Nationalist statist economic policies would likely result in increased
central ROC government controlled monopolies of China’s industrial sectors. Indications that
these policies had a deleterious effect on attracting private capital investment to China is
apparent in Secretary of State Marshall’s guidance to Ambassador Stuart at the end of his first
telegram where he stated: “Suggest at your discretion you discuss with Chinese problems raised
by these questions, emphasizing anxiety of American business re effect on them of Chinese Govt
policy and report fully Chinese reaction.”225
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By mid-1947, as a result of the deteriorating situation in China during renewed hostilities
between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists in the ongoing Chinese civil war,
Washington’s broader concerns over whether to continue giving aid to the Chinese Nationalists
prompted President Truman to appoint Lieutenant General Albert C. General Wedemeyer, U.S.
Army as his Special Representative (or envoy) to China from July to September for the purpose
of “making an appraisal of the political, economic, psychological and military situations—
current and projected.”226 President Truman’s appointment of General Wedemeyer’s fact-finding
“Mission to China,” which included eight other senior members from the US War Department,
and State and Treasury Departments, also reflected Washington’s related policy dilemma over
whether to initiate and impose conditions on future US economic aid to the Chinese Nationalists.
These concerns were mirrored in Truman’s presidential directive that initiated
Wedemeyer’s Mission which stated that its purpose was to determine whether: “…the United
States Government can consider assistance in a program of rehabilitation only if the Chinese
Government presents satisfactory evidence of effective measures looking towards Chinese
recovery and provided further that any aid which may be made available shall be subject to the

Harry S. Truman, Directive to General Wedemeyer, July 9, 1947, Document 536. In “Mission to China
of Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer to appraise the political, economic, psychological, and military
situation,” FRUS, 1947, The Far East: China, Volume VII, 1972, Documents 532-613. Other related US State
department archives reveal that the genesis of Truman’s directive appeared to have originated from US Secretary of
State George C. Marshall who one week earlier in a memorandum to Robert A. Lovett (US Under Secretary of State
from 1947-1949) wrote: “For some time I have been considering what action we should take with relation to the
rapidly deteriorating situation in China. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the War and Navy Departments I believe, are
strongly in favor of supporting the Chinese Government both in a military way and in relation to the economy of the
country. I felt as did Vincent that the Chiefs of Staff paper was not quite realistic and solutions were offered which
were somewhat impracticable, particularly as to implementation in China. Nevertheless, the situation is critical and
it is urgently necessary I feel that we reconsider our policy to see what changes may be necessary if any, regarding
our continuing action in regard to China.” See: Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Under Secretary of
State (Lovett), July 2, 1947, Document 532, in “Mission to China of Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer to
appraise the political, economic, psychological, and military situation,” FRUS, 1947, The Far East: China, Volume
VII, 1972.
226

96
supervision of representatives of the United States Government.”227 These concerns over the
related economic aid issues and expected publicity surrounding Wedemeyer’s high profile
mission, was also evident by the composition of the mission’s members which included Mr.
Melville H. Walker, an economic advisor from the US State Department, Mr. David R. Jenkins,
a fiscal advisor from the Treasury Department, and Mark S. Watson, a reporter from the
Baltimore Sun, who was the Press and Public Affairs Advisor.228
Immediately after the conclusion of his high level and contentious mission to China
during August and September 1947, General Wedemeyer sent several official diplomatic cables,
gave public speeches, and released press statements intimating some of his main assessments and
recommendations to the Chinese Nationalists and the Chiang regime for what was deemed as
necessary political and economic reforms to justify the potential of further US economic aid.
Wedemeyer also anticipated that Washington would have to deflect the expected Chinese
Nationalists’ public criticism over his urging the ROC government to reform its handling of
China’s deteriorating political and economic situation during his trip.
As a result, shortly after his trip, Wedemeyer cabled US Ambassador Leighton Stuart to
reiterate Secretary of State Marshall’s additional guidance to him based on Truman’s directive
that the original purpose of his mission was to identify:
…concrete evidence that the Generalissimo and his government are establishing a
government structure and are instituting reforms (land, tax and political) that provide a
basis for U. S. cooperation and assistance…I can not conscientiously tell our President,
227
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the Secretary of State or the American people that such steps have been taken or are
being taken. My final press release was designed to jolt the government into action and to
strengthen the Generalissimo’s position in ruthlessly and realistically accomplishing such
reforms and changes in the government.229
On August 22, 1947 at the end of his “fact-finding” mission, General Wedemeyer
directly addressed President Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang, as well as the key leaders of
the ROC government and its State Council in a live speech in Nanking, China whereby he
summarized many of his mission’s findings and initial recommendations for reforming the
Chinese Nationalists’ policies for taxation, the military, civil-military relations, government
organization, corruption, national assets and resources, the ROC Secret Police, and “restoration
and revitalizing the Chinese economy.”230 Wedemeyer’s rather blunt public remarks identified
and criticized several notable negative aspects of corrupt Chinese Nationalist ROC government
policies and practices that he had judged as causing political and economic instability in China.
Wedemeyer’s public remarks in his August 22 speech, which reflected the conclusions in
his mission’s subsequent official report over whether Washington should give more economic
aid to China, were significant causes of concern among US government officials due to the
negatively portrayed causes for China’s economic conditions with passages such as:
Corrupt officials in many instances take more than the peasants are able to give and this
results finally in the peasants leaving the land and forming bandit groups. In contrast to
the taxation of peasants, Chinese businessmen and rich Chinese resort to devious and
dishonest methods to avoid payment of proper taxes to their government. It is commonly
known that Chinese business firms maintain two sets of books, one showing the true
picture of business transactions and the other showing a distorted picture so that they do
not pay as much tax as they should… One hears reports on all sides concerning
229
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corruption among government officials, high and low and also throughout the economic
life of the country… State ownership should be discouraged. Many Japanese Government
and private Japanese properties in Formosa, Manchuria and other parts of China have
been taken over by the Central Government. This was perfectly normal procedure, but the
government should dispose of these properties as quickly as possible to private
individuals or groups to encourage free enterprise. It should be a standing rule that
persons in government service, civil or military, should not participate in speculative
businesses, in banking and commercial enterprises.231
On August 24, 1947, Wedemeyer’s negative portrayals of the Chinese Nationalist ROC
government received significant public attention in his press release that announced the end of
his mission—the contents of which were also reprinted the next day in the prominent and widely
read American newspaper New York Herald Tribune.232 The initial publicity surrounding
Wedemeyer’s early press release was largely critical of Chiang and the Chinese Nationalists.
Wedemeyer stated that he had found “apathy and lethargy in many quarters” in China and that
“Instead of seeking solutions of problems presented, considerable time and effort are spent in
blaming outside influences and seeking outside assistance.”233
While Wedemeyer noted that China “still possesses most of the physical resources
needed for her own rehabilitation, recovery awaits inspirational leadership and moral and
spiritual resurgence which can only come from within China,” he directly criticized the Chinese
Nationalist ROC government as having “the large number whose conduct is notoriously marked
by greed, incompetence or both.”234 However, the last part of Wedemeyer’s press release was
particularly damning of the Chinese Nationalist ROC government in which he stated:
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Equally important, the existing Central government can win and retain the undivided,
enthusiastic support of the bulk of the Chinese people by removing incompetent and/or
corrupt people who now occupy many positions of responsibility in the government, not
only national but more so in provincial and municipal structures…To regain and maintain
the confidence of the people, the Central government will have to effect immediately
drastic, far -reaching political and economic reforms.235

Two days later on August 26, John Leighton Stuart, the US Ambassador to China, sent
Secretary of State Marshall an initial report summarizing the Chinese Nationalist ROC
government’s negative reactions towards Wedemeyer’s August 22 speech in which Stuart noted
that: “This specific act of General Wedemeyer will continue to have important repercussions as
the tenor of his remarks becomes more widely known in Chinese circles (as will certainly result).
As the Department is aware, General Wedemeyer made exceedingly frank statements with
regard to Government shortcomings…”236
While Stuart noted that President [Generalissimo] Chiang had telephoned him just prior
to Wedemeyer’s speech and suggested that Wedemeyer refrain from being “too critical of the
Government,” Stuart characterized the reactions by the ROC government officials attending as:
…blunt public statements for a foreign visitor seemed offensive. It has been reported
reliably that the president of the Examination Yuan, Tai Chi-tao, actually wept after the
meeting adjourned…There can be little question but that General Wedemeyer's talk
before the State Council and his final press release have been a rude shock to the Chinese
Government…it seemed to have become apparent to many prominent Chinese that they
could expect little encouragement from the Mission's visit in the way of unencumbered
material aid either economic or military.237
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As a result of the initial publicity surrounding the imminent release of Wedemeyer’s
mission report in 1947 to President Truman, but also from other similar US government and
State Department assessments, both the US Congress and Truman administration officials
became increasingly aware of evidence that the Chinese Nationalist regime fostered corruption,
statist economic policies, and lacked toleration for traditional capitalist free enterprise both in the
areas it still controlled on mainland China and on the island of Taiwan.238 Wedemeyer’s final 50page report and its annexes provided extensive first-hand observations and findings that were
critical of the Chinese Nationalist’s handling of China’s deteriorating economic conditions and
its “incompetence and corruption in the political and military organizations….”239 Wedemeyer’s
report also articulated that American “moral support” ought to be given to nations that would
establish “economic structures” similar to the United States, and that “aid may be given” to other
nations to “develop economic stability” if they used such aid “for the purposes intended” and if it
“contributes to the attainment of political, economic, and psychological objectives of the United
States.”240
Wedemeyer’s contentious 1947 report was also allegedly suppressed from wider
dissemination within the US government and from public release for two years by pro-Chinese
Nationalist officials within the Truman administration and Republican Party members of
Congress mainly because of its negative portrayal of the Chinese Nationalist ROC government’s
authoritarianism, corruption, and ineptitude.241 However, in mid-1949, following Truman’s 1948
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presidential election victory along with support from anti-Chinese Nationalist leaning US
Democratic Party leaders regaining control of both the House and Senate, the US State
Department publicly released Wedemeyer’s 1947 report together with over 1,000 pages of
formerly classified US diplomatic cables in the infamous and controversial China White
Paper.242 Consequently, this public release of official US government records negatively
portraying the Chinese Nationalists’ ROC government as illiberal and corrupt contributed to a
momentous decline in support among Washington politicians and the American public for giving
more US economic aid to Taiwan.
The overall tone and substance of Wedemeyer’s 1947 report implied the possibility of a
resumption of US economic aid to Nationalist China. However, such aid would be contingent
upon the Chinese Nationalists agreeing to implement future reform programs to resolve several
negative conditions impacting China’s economy. The report identified several problems for
resolution which included: China’s rising “hyper-inflation,” the ongoing Chinese civil war
between the Nationalists and Communists, the large national budget deficit, the need to reduce
the military budget, and that “Private Chinese funds tend to go into short-term advances,
hoarding of commodities, and capital flight.”243 The report further recommended that future US
economic assistance “could best be implemented under the supervision of American advisors”
and that China “accept American advisors as responsible representative so the United States
Government in specified military and economic fields to assist China in utilizing United States
aid in the manner for which it is intended.”244
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The report’s findings also included summaries from the mission’s extensive interviews
with American business representatives in China who had characterized the Chinese Nationalist
government as “apathetic in its efforts at economic improvement, and has taken refuge in the
thought of foreign assistance for solution for China’s problems,” and that such aid would
“prejudice achievement of necessary reforms in China, if financial assistance were to be
provided in any large amount with control of it sue to be left in Chinese hands.”245 The report
further linked the Chinese government’s “maladministration and corruption” as a hindrance to
Washington’s policy goals for China by stating: “Until drastic political and economic reforms
are undertaken United States aid can not accomplish its purpose.”246
While the report highlighted that the Nationalist government ineptly controlled several of
China’s economic sectors and functions as contributing to instability, corruption, and
inefficiency, it nonetheless still implied that a European style “Marshall Plan” could be
replicated in China with American economic aid funding and supervision in the implied form of
massive “economic reconstruction projects.”247
Overall, the report emphasized that the strategic security rationale for continued US
economic aid to China would be further justified by the spread of Soviet “influence and power”
in the region, Communist Chinese occupation and influence in the industrial areas of northern
China and Manchuria, and because “ a unified China friendly or allied to the United States would
not only provide important air and naval bases, but also from the standpoint of its size and
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manpower, be an important ally to the United States even though her poor communications and
lack of modern industrial development would make her contribution less effective than would
otherwise be the case.”248 The report also portended justification of future aid to the Chinese
Nationalists based largely on the imminent threat and rising possibility of China being overtaken
by the Chinese Communists during this stage of the civil war by noting: “A China dominated by
Chinese Communists would be inimical to the interests of the United States,” and that: “A
program of aid, if effectively employed, would bolster opposition to Communist expansion, and
would contribute to gradual development of stability in China.”249
During the same period of Wedemeyer’s mission, evidence in US diplomatic cables
presented a controversial accounting of the Chinese Nationalist ROC government’s anticipated
negative reaction opposing and criticizing many of Wedemeyer’s immediate public statements
that described the corruption and incompetence in its management of China’s economy.
Evidence of Chinese Nationalist dissatisfaction of Wedemeyer’s public statements and his
mission are contained in a series of diplomatic reports from US embassy officials in China to
Washington. As early as August 19, US Ambassador Stuart sent Secretary Marshall a short cable
in which he pessimistically concluded that:
The activities of the Wedemeyer Mission have of course aroused a great deal of Chinese
comment…“They admit the logic of all that we argue about what Chinese should do to
help themselves, get their own house in order first, etc., but feel utterly impotent in view
of the conservatism, feudalistic ideas, selfishness, narrow prejudices and similar
limitations prevalent among those who have the power to effect reforms, while the
Communists are rapidly making gains…the signs of willingness and ability to institute
progressive reforms are still sadly lacking…250

248

Ibid., 809-810.

249

Ibid., 773.

250

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to Secretary Marshall, August 19, 1947, in The China White Paper,
Document 140, 823-824.

104
On September 2nd, Monnet B. Davis, the US Consul General in Shanghai, China reported
that Chang Chun, the Chinese Nationalist Premier had given an interview to the United Press a
week after the Wedemeyer mission left China in which Chang stated that “there were many
things which Wedemeyer did not know” and that because “changes were already provided for in
the form of the new constitution and forthcoming national election” that Chang disagreed with
Wedemeyer’s assertion that the Chinese government needed “drastic and far reaching political
and economic reforms.”251 After Chang stated that: “Our American friends say the Chinese
Government is not efficient,” he further opined that reform of the Chinese government would be
made “step by step” and that “Chinese policy is fixed and will not change either domestically or
foreign.”252
Four days later on September 6th, Ambassador Stuart forwarded Secretary Marshall a
copy of the lengthy official Chinese government memorandum that it had sent Wedemeyer prior
to his departure from China in August. The memorandum’s purpose appeared to deflect the
Wedemeyer mission’s criticisms of Chinese Nationalist one-party rule over China by describing
and rationalizing reasons for the Nationalist Chinese government’s statist economic
mismanagement and repressive social and political policies in China.
While this Nationalist ROC government memorandum justified its need for repressive
statist policies due to China’s poor economy, inflation, and the exigencies and conditions caused
by the Sino-Japanese war period 1931-1945 and the ongoing Chinese civil war with the Chinese
Communists, it nonetheless implied the need for US aid because “economic rehabilitation work
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must be intensified as far as Government resources permit.”253 Two weeks later on September
20, 1947, Ambassador Stuart sent Secretary Marshall another cable that described the Chinese
Nationalist ROC government’s deteriorating political, military, and economic positions being
exacerbated by its perceptions that there would be less US aid forthcoming as a result of the
stinging criticism implied by the Wedemeyer’s mission, but also its internal government
dysfunction and renewed fighting with the Chinese Communists in China’s ongoing civil war.254
Stuart’s cable was noteworthy for his assessment that dismissed the Chinese Nationalists’
“flirtation with the Soviet Union” for aid as a “clever ploy” designed to serve as leverage in
negotiations with Washington for more US economic aid.255 Stuart then criticized the Chinese
Nationalists’ overreliance on US economic aid when he concluded: “Most disheartening features
of present Chinese situation in economic as in other spheres are overt reliance on deus ex
machina of American aid to extricate China from its pressing problems and corresponding lack
of self-reliance and self-help in tackling them.”256 However, Stuart sent Secretary Marshall an
updated situation report five weeks later in which he noted that because of China’s continued
deteriorating socio-economic conditions, Washington’s policy for continuing US “monetary aid”
to the Nationalists could be justified to “conquer Communist ideology” and “bring peace,
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freedom from oppression and economic recovery under democratic principles, including the
responsibility of the people to take part in reforming their government.”257
Another related major controversy erupted over the US State Department’s public release
of the 1947 Wedemeyer mission report’s findings and negative criticism of the Chinese
Nationalists that was by many accounts allegedly widely suppressed within the US government
and from public disclosure by the US executive branch for two years during 1947-1949. It was
not until August of 1949 that the Wedemeyer Report was included in the US State Department’s
seminal China White Paper when this 1,054-page compilation of official documentation of
previously withheld and classified US-China diplomatic correspondence was made available to
all US government officials and the American public. Evidence in official US executive branch
and State Department archives, as well as subsequent Congressional hearings and Wedemeyer’s
autobiography published in 1958, support claims that the Wedemeyer Report was suppressed
“personally” by then Secretary of State George C. Marshall because of several sensitive US
China policy concerns within the Truman administration and its negative portrayal and criticism
of Chiang’s Nationalist Chinese regime.258
Evidence of the report’s alleged initial suppression within the executive branch to only a
few top officials include the revelation that Secretary Marshall had dictated “over the secret
telephone” a secret memorandum to President Truman on September 25, 1947, in which
Marshall stated: “I understand General Wedemeyer is presenting his report to you at noon today.
It seems to me mandatory that we treat Wedemeyer’s report strictly top secret and that no
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indication of its contents be divulged to the public.”259 Despite the significant widespread
domestic and international publicity and notable public awareness of Wedemeyer’s fact-finding
mission to China that summer, US State Department officials recommended to President Truman
that “distribution should be [only] to eight executive branch officials.”260 Two months later
during his notable testimony before the US Senate Committee on Appropriations hearings over
allegations of “suppression” of the Wedemeyer Report in December 1947, Marshall famously
stated: “it contained confidential material the publication of which might cause embarrassment to
the nations concerned” and that “I did not join in the suppression of the report. I personally
suppressed it.”261
Another key motivation among Secretary Marshall and other senior State Department
officials who had allegedly “suppressed” Wedemeyer’s report was due to their concern that it
“should be treated as secret” and that “no press summary be issued” because it had neither been
read by the president nor adequately reviewed by key officials within the broader Truman
administration.262 In addition, many of these same senior officials warned President Truman and
Secretary Marshall that not only was Wedemeyer then advocating for the State Department to
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release “a public press summary” of his report, but that he had been invited by television news
officials at the New York-based National Broadcasting Company headquarters to appear on its
Foreign Affairs Program and discuss the details of his China mission which was scheduled to be
televised and broadcasted on October 5, 1947.263
While there is no evidence that Wedemeyer commented publicly about his report’s
suppression during the next 10 years, in 1958 his memoirs were published in which he wrote
about the criticism of his previously described public speech to the Chinese Nationalist
government in 1947 outlining some of his fact-finding mission conclusions that: ““I had a double
task: to convince the Chinese that they must produce proof that American aid would not be
wasted; and to convince Washington that such aid must be given. Had I known that “The
Wedemeyer Report” would be suppressed by the Secretary of State, I would never have made
my speech in Nanking, since my two aims were interdependent.””264 Wedemeyer further
recounted in his memoirs about the US government suppression of his report that:
I couldn’t understand the decision to handle the report so secretly. I felt that at least top
officials in the Pentagon, and certainly members of the Senate and House Foreign
Relations Committees, should have full access to it and to members of the mission if
explanation or amplification were required. Pressures were brought to bear on other
members of my mission, who had been similarly warned not to divulge the contents.
Soon it became known in all circles that a rigid clamp had been put down by the
President and Secretary of State. In subsequent testimony, before Congressional
committees, Secretary Marshall accepted full responsibility for this decision.265

After the US Congressional hearings and other controversies surrounding the Wedemeyer
report during the fall of 1947, by the early months of 1948 civil unrest in China accelerated due
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to intensified armed conflict between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists. As a result of
these renewed hostilities, Ambassador Stuart sent Secretary Marshall another diplomatic cable in
which he made a stronger and more optimistic case for more US aid to China because of the
deteriorating Chinese civil unrest when he stated: “If American aid should materialize in
adequate measure and palatable form, the tide may turn quickly in our favor.”266
Overall, Stuart’s analysis of the ongoing Chinese civil war suggested that US economic
aid be justified, not on capitalist economic ideology, but rather for the immediate short term US
policy goals of minimally opposing Chinese Communist aggression indirectly by enhancing the
overall efficacy and basic functioning of the Chinese Nationalist ROC government’s economic
mismanagement and alleviating the accelerating inflation in Chinese Nationalist controlled urban
areas. By early February 1948, as significant civil unrest occurred in China’s largest city
Shanghai, Ambassador Stuart cabled Secretary Marshall to explain that the causes “are economic
rather than political and must be dealt with by economic measures in conjunction with
determined police control” while noting that there “are factors…such as pending American aid,
which will undoubtedly have substantial effect on public morale thus tending to stabilize at least
temporarily.”267
Despite growing evidence of the deteriorating position, power, and function of the
Chinese Nationalist ROC government, the US State Department’s suggested that there was the
need for more US economic aid to buttress the declining plight of the Nationalists vis a vis the
Communists. This conclusion appeared to have influenced the US Congress towards justifying
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passing the China Aid Act of 1948, which resulted in authorizing $338 million in US economic
aid for China’s reconstruction and development, but with the caveat that it had to be used within
one year by April 3, 1949.268 Despite the time limit imposed upon the spending of this funding
package, the Act was soon followed by another Congressional bill which authorized an
additional $275 million in US economic aid to China, but with no specified expiration date.269
The Act also led to the creation of the joint US-ROC interagency entity known as the
Council for United States Aid (CUSA) as an official administrative mechanism for both
countries to bilaterally manage the use of US economic aid by the Chinese Nationalists in China
and Taiwan during 1948-1949. After a momentary pause during 1949-1950, the emergence of
significant subsequent events of the early cold war period described later in Chapter Three,
would result in retaining and establishing the CUSA as an enduring and systematic
administrative bilateral conduit of US economic aid to Taiwan during 1951-1963.270
The timing of the passage of the China Aid Act of 1948 was noteworthy as it occurred
simultaneously during a tumultuous period of high-level policy debates within both the US
Congress and in Truman’s executive branch about the apparent emerging contradictions
surrounding justifications for US economic aid to China during 1948-1949.271 These
controversies arose from the public release of the negative contents of Wedemeyer report and
more contentious debates in US Congressional hearings and executive branch policy reviews of
the deteriorating situation of the “corrupt” and “ineffective” Chinese Nationalist ROC
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government that was then in the midst of preparations for evacuating from mainland China to the
island of Taiwan. As a result, Washington was inclined to end military aid and only offer limited
economic aid under the existing Economic Cooperation Administration with an implied
possibility of not renewing it in 1950.272
In addition, the lack of a viable reason to continue US economic aid to the Chinese
Nationalists was evident during the Republican majority US House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 in which
Secretary of State Marshall characterized the lack of a coherent rationale in the US policy of aid
to China by stating:
…we in the executive branch of the Government have an intense desire to help China.
As a matter of fact, I have struggled and puzzled over the situation…. Our trouble has
been to find a course which we could reasonably justify before the Congress on other
than emotional grounds. It has been a long struggle to concoct an economic program and
clear it through the various Government agencies….We are already committed by past
actions and by popular sentiment among our people to continue to do what we can to
alleviate suffering in China, and to give the Chinese Government and people the
possibility of working out China's problems in their own way…we cannot afford,
economically or militarily, to take over the continued failures of the present Chinese
Government to the dissipation of our strength in more vital regions where we now have a
reasonable opportunity of successfully meeting or thwarting the Communist threat—that
is, in the vital industrial area of Western Europe with its traditions of free institutions.273
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Nationalists. Washington’s support for more US economic aid to China declined precipitously
due to indications of the portending and expected Chinese Nationalist ROC government
withdrawal from mainland China to the island of Taiwan, or “Formosa” as it was
interchangeably referred to in official US government national security memoranda at the
time.274
By January 14, 1949, as events quickly began to deteriorate in China to the detriment of
the Chinese Nationalist ROC government maintaining its rule on the mainland, the US State
Department recommended to President Truman on the subject of “U.S. Armed Forces at
Tsingtao” (primarily US Navy and US Marine units stationed at that mainland Chinese port) that
these operations “should be suspended” and more significantly that: “The Department of State
concurs in the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclusion that it is in our strategic interest that Formosa be
denied to communists.”275
That same day, Robert A. Lovett, the Acting Secretary of State sent President Truman
another memorandum regarding the subject of the Economic Cooperation Administration’s
previous suspension of its China aid program’s “Industrial Replacement and Reconstruction
Program for Formosa,” for which he recommended that it be reconsidered “insofar as it affects
Formosa” due to the “strategic importance of Formosa to the United States…”276 This statement
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implied that US economic aid to the Chinese Nationalists should resume based on Taiwan being
part of Washington’s broader strategic security interests in the region.
Beginning in early 1949 and concurrently as a result of the deteriorating situation in
China and Taiwan (Formosa), President Truman’s National Security Council (NSC) staff reacted
to these new developments by urgently revising, updating, and recommending corresponding
options for US policies revealed in the formerly classified NSC 37 series of documents known as
The [Current] Position of the United States With Respect to Formosa.277 On January 19, 1949,
Sidney W. Souers, the Executive Secretary of the NSC sent the senior members of the Council a
draft report of NSC 37/1: The Position of the United States With Respect to Formosa, whereby
he recommend that after NSC review, it be sent to President Truman for his approval of various
“courses of action” and subsequent implementation by executive branch departments “under the
coordination of the Secretary of State.”278 In this draft report, the NSC highlighted that the US
State Department had essentially endorsed the earlier Joint Chiefs of Staff conclusions in the
original NSC 37 dated December 1, 1948 that “it would be in the interest of U.S. national
security if Communist domination of Formosa could be denied by the application of appropriate
diplomatic and economic steps.”279
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However, the overall tone and conclusions reached at the end of NSC 37/1 were
pessimistic and critical of the Chinese Nationalist regime’s governance of the island of Taiwan
(and its administered adjacent island group known as the Pescadores) up to that point by stating:
The U.S. has not been impressed by Chinese administration on the islands and believes
that if there is continued misrule the Chinese authorities would inevitably forfeit the
support of world opinion…U.S. support for the governing authorities of Formosa will
inevitably depend in a large measure upon the efficiency of their regime and the extent to
which they are able to contribute toward the welfare and economic needs of the
Formosan people and permit and encourage active Formosan participation in positions of
responsibility in Government.280

By February 2, 1949 the US State Department had received several additional reports
about further rapidly deteriorating events in China which casted significant doubts on NSC
37/1’s endorsement of continuing the recommended policies of “diplomatic and economic steps”
due to the “strategic importance of Formosa” as “important to U.S. national security interests”
because these policies “may not succeed in preventing “Communist domination of Formosa.”281
In light of these new developments, by the next day on February 3rd, the NSC staff revised NSC
37/1’s policy recommendations by updating and replacing it with NSC 37/2 which stated: “When
the situation in China has developed to the point where we know what governing groups we will
have to deal with in Formosa,” and that Washington’s policy towards Formosa would be to “seek
to develop and support a local non-Communist Chinese regime which will provide at least a
modicum of decent government for the islands.”282
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While NSC 37/2 retained similar language as NSC 37/1 about the Chinese Nationalists’
“continued misrule of Formosa,” it added a third paragraph that expanded endorsement for US
economic aid to the Chinese Nationalists on the island by stating that Washington, “through the
most flexible mechanisms possible, should conduct a vigorous program of economic support for
the economy of Formosa, designed to assist the Formosans in developing and maintaining a
viable, self-supporting economy.”283
A week later on February 11, the National Security Council staff prepared NSC 37/3 that
included an annex of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) report entitled: “The Strategic Importance of
Formosa,” which James Forrestal, the Secretary of Defense had forwarded to the Council the day
prior.284 This JCS report, reflecting the US Defense Department’s strategic defense and national
security concerns over the Chinese Nationalists’ seemingly inevitable loss of the Chinese civil
war to the Chinese Communists on mainland China, identified potential “military measures” that
Washington could take as well as “an estimate of the extent of the threat to the United States
security in the event that diplomatic and economic steps to deny Communist domination of
Formosa prove insufficient…”285
The JCS staff opined in their report that the aforementioned strategic security threats
“would be serious,” by justifying this primarily in terms of the inevitability that if [Chinese]
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Communist military forces prevailed over the Chinese Nationalists on mainland China, that the:
“Loss, present and prospective, of availability of strategically valuable areas of China would
enhance the strategic value to the United States of Formosa in view of the potentialities of that
island as a wartime base capable of use for strategic air operations and control of adjacent
shipping routes.”286 This JCS report also contained further specific justification of the strategic
security significance of Taiwan to US security interests by stating that “Unfriendly control of
Formosa” would:
…result, in the event of war, in an enemy capability of dominating the sea routes
between Japan and the Malay area and an improved enemy capability of extending his
control to the Ryukyus and the Philippines,” and “would further be detrimental to our
national security interests in that Formosa would be lost as a potential major source of
food and other materials for Japan,” and “it having become more apparent than ever that
the United States faces the prospect of strategic impotence on the continent of Asia, our
military capabilities in the Western Pacific must rest primarily on control of sea lanes and
maintenance of strategic air potential from strategically tenable island positions. Enemy
control of Formosa would seriously jeopardize our capabilities in these respects while
constituting, on the other hand, a major contribution to enemy capabilities.287
Despite the JCS staff report’s characterization of valid and serious threats to US national
security interests should mainland China and Formosa [Taiwan] fall to the Chinese Communists
with the potential denial of economic resources for Japan or naval and air military basing and
logistics in the region, the Annex to this February 11, 1949 NSC 37/3 report was consistent with
the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s earlier November 24, 1948 report that recommended against US
military involvement for Formosa by repeating: “resort to military measures was tacitly
excluded.”288 The Joint Chiefs also reaffirmed that in their opinion, “in spite of Formosa’s
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strategic importance,” that “any overt military commitment in Formosa would be unwise at this
time,” because of:
…the current disparity between our military strength and our many global obligations
makes it inadvisable to undertake the employment of armed force in Formosa, for this
might, particularly in view of the basic assumption that diplomatic and economic steps
have failed, lead to the necessity for a relatively major effort there, thus making it
impossible then to meet more important emergencies elsewhere.289

This NSC 37/3 document also revealed was that while the JCS inferred leaving open the
possibility in the future for limited shows of US military force near Formosa “in support of
approved diplomatic and economic objectives,” they notably recommended against providing the
Chinese Nationalists with meaningful military support or actions on their behalf due to other
more vital US security interests in other regions.290 Just two days later on February 13, 1949, US
embassy officials in China further warned Dean Acheson, the new US Secretary of State about
the rapidly deteriorating civil unrest in China spilling over into Taiwan that was severely
hampering the Chinese Nationalists’ ability to effectively govern or control the worsening
internal political, security, and economic chaos unfolding on the island.
For example, John M. Cabot, the US Consul General at Shanghai reported in his
classified telegram that: “…anti-Chinese Government elements becoming increasingly restive to
start rebellious activities.”291 Cabot further commented on the Associated Press’s “nine
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paragraphs by [an] anonymous Formosan” public dispatch on February 11 about US economic
aid not going for its intended purposes on Taiwan by informing Secretary Acheson that: “need
close supervision ECA Taiwan to ensure aid reach people instead island’s new conquerors and
pocket officials.”292
This emerging new concern in Washington over the Chinese Nationalists’ misuse of US
economic aid to Taiwan resulted in a significant American diplomatic action that occurred just
one day later on February 14, when Secretary Acheson sent a classified telegram instructing
Ambassador Stuart to have Livingston T. Merchant, Counselor of Embassy in China to “assume
special responsibility with respect to Taiwan.”293 Acheson rather cryptically informed Merchant
that the publicly overt reason for this action was “occasioned by accounting regulations.”
However, Acheson’s actual specific intentions for appointing Merchant with this new “special
responsibility” was so that he could provide oversight and correct suspected irregularities in the
Chinese Nationalists’ use of US economic aid in Taiwan as revealed further in the telegram with
Acheson instructing Merchant to: “…retain title of Counselor of Emb [sic] and indicate that you
are merely going to Taiwan to oversee expanded US representation on that island which milit
[sic] events on mainland have occasioned and in particular with respect to ECA. Implication that
you have been transferred Taipei should be avoided.”294
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Just four days later, on February 18, the NSC staff sent President Truman and senior NSC
officials NSC 37/4, which was the US State Department’s overall formal statement of “specific
and immediate steps which the United States should take with respect to Formosa.”295 NSC 37/4
was in the form of a supplementary report that augmented and updated the previous NSC 37/3
that was the US Defense Department and JCS positions and advice on Formosa. The State
Department’s policy recommendations in NSC 37/4 represented two significant justifying
reasons that resulted in enhancing Washington’s diplomatic and economic aid policies towards
the Chinese Nationalists governing Formosa.
The State Department justified these enhancements for reasons consistent with mounting
evidence from US diplomatic cables of Washington’s growing anxiety and sense of urgency that
more support for the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa was needed to prevent an impending
Chinese Communist takeover of the island, similar to what was then occurring on China’s
mainland. These events appeared to have influenced the US State Department’s first main
recommendation to upgrade US diplomatic recognition of the island as an independent political
entity by stating it: “should strengthen and increase its representation on Formosa, and to that
end should immediately detail a high-ranking officer to Taipei” to meet with General Chen
Cheng, then the Governor of Formosa and a strong loyal supporter of Chinese President Chiang
Kai-shek.296
The second main aspect of the State Department’s recommendations in NSC 37/4
represented a seminal, yet sensitive policy shift in potential long-term commitments of US
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economic aid and related developmental support to the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa. While
Secretary Acheson cautioned in paragraph six of NSC 37/4 that “In the initial stages every care
should be exercised to minimize the appearance of United States official activities on
Formosa…,” the three preceding paragraphs recommended that an extraordinary level of US
economic assistance be extended to General Chen on Formosa with the following “assurances”
that:
…the United States Government is prepared, under legislation approved by the
Congress and by such other means as may be feasible, to give economic support for the
economy of Formosa, designed to assist in developing and maintaining a viable, selfsupporting economy on the island…the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission
to China should proceed with arrangements for completing the pre-project engineering
surveys of the industrial projects on Formosa…and that “The Economic Cooperation
Administration should also make a study of and submit recommendations for an over-all
program of economic assistance to Formosa.297

However, doubts about increasing US economic aid to Formosa emerged a week later on
February 25th, when US Consul General Kenneth C. Krentz, then the highest-ranking US State
Department official serving in Taipei, the Formosan capital city on the island of Taiwan,
telegrammed Secretary Acheson that after consulting other American officials there, he stated: “I
strongly believe any major plans should be deferred time being and no firm commitments made
beyond normal fertilizer program preproject [sic] surveys and small continuing selected RRC
projects.”298 Krentz’s pessimistic views of the viability of more US economic aid to Taiwan
stemmed from his important vantage point of being in Formosa at the time and his unique
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unfiltered access to sources and methods that allowed him to observe and report first-hand the
deteriorating economic and political conditions on the island.
Krentz’s first telegram to Secretary Acheson that day also included his observations that:
“Under deteriorating conditions plus nebulous and changing political conditions I consider aid
should not precede larger policy decisions. I believe we should now mark time hoping for
changes which may enable us obtain self-help conditions on more certain terms that hitherto.”299
It was also significant that Krentz followed up in another telegram just hours later on the same
day with a related negative assessment of Formosa’s Governor Chen’s leadership by stating:
“Chen Cheng is now governing by a kitchen cabinet of generals, notably Lo Cho-ying, with
nominal department heads ineffective, frustrated while deterioration all fields visible daily.”300
Throughout the spring of 1949, the Chinese civil war on mainland China continued to
deteriorate in favor of the Chinese Communists and to the detriment of Washington’s nascent
foreign policies opposing Communism in Asia and supporting the Chinese Nationalists on the
mainland and the island of Taiwan. These events also caused the Chinese Nationalists to
intensify initial preparations for evacuating their ROC government political and military
personnel to the island of Taiwan. Accordingly, on March 1, 1949, President Truman’s NSC
staff culminated this brief, intense period of internal executive branch policy deliberations over
Taiwan with the capstone document in the NSC 37 series known as NSC 37/5: Supplementary
Measures With Respect to Formosa.301
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While NSC 37/5 reiterated much of the previous JCS opinions in the preceeding NSC
series that “any overt military commitment in Formosa would be unwise at this time,” the Joint
Chiefs nonetheless reaffirmed that “Formosa’s strategic importance is, nevertheless great” and
appeared to slightly shift their position in support of linking US military means to economic
policy goals in Formosa by stating that: “some form of military support should be made available
now for assistance in vigorous prosecution of the approved diplomatic and economic steps set
forth in NSC 37/2 for developing and supporting in Formosa a non-communist regime.”302
Meanwhile, the US State Department’s opinions expressed in NSC 37/5 were consistent
with its previous statements in this series and reiterated the same language recommending an
unprecedented level of US economic assistance repeated verbatim with no changes from NSC
37/4’s three previously cited paragraphs.303 It was also noteworthy that the US State Department
once again argued against US military support for Taiwan by stating: “the establishment of U.S.
military forces on Formosa” because it “would be not only diplomatically disadvantageous but
also, and far more importantly, a heavy political liability for us.”304
However, the State Department modified its opinion about the possibility of introducing
US naval forces to Formosa when it opined: “Units of the U.S. fleet should not now be stationed
at or off Formosan ports in support of the political and economic measures envisaged above.
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This conclusion is without prejudice to a reexamination of this possible course of action should
developments on Formosa so justify.”305 Two days later on March 3, President Truman approved
NSC 37/5’s updated and slightly modified provisions as US policy towards Formosa (Taiwan) in
its entirety based on the endorsement and recommendations of the senior NSC staff, as well as
directing the State Department to lead “all appropriate Executive Departments and Agencies” of
the US government in implementing it.306
Just one day after the NSC staff endorsed and sent NSC 37/5 to President Truman for his
approval, Secretary Acheson apparently had enough confidence in the inevitably of
Washington’s commitment to enhancing US economic aid to Taiwan that he immediately
informed US embassy officials in China to begin more formal preparations to implement these
anticipated policies. On March 2, Acheson sent Counselor Merchant in China, (whom he had
previously designated with “special responsibility” for Taiwan on February 14), a diplomatic
cable that summarized the State Department’s imminent new roles for increasing economic aid
to Formosa (Taiwan) that were previously specified in NSC 37/1 and NSC 37/4 and requested
Merchant’s “views re [sic] timing and general considerations” for this future aid.307
Acheson’s cable clearly reflected Washington’s concern over the “timing” of new aid in
that an immediate large influx of US economic aid to Taiwan would have the same negative
results of misuse by the Chinese Nationalists on mainland China as evidenced by his statement
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that: “since precipitous commitment support might lead repetition pattern developments
mainland under which assurances self-help measures were not followed by performance.”308
Secretary Acheson also cited in his cable other concerns impacting the timing of
increased US economic aid to Taiwan because of the “deteriorating conditions” in Taiwan that
various US advisors had offered contradictory yet equally valid views, with some who argued for
“immediate” aid to alleviate Taiwan’s instability, while others advocated to “defer” aid and wait
for the ongoing volatile conditions to stabilize. As examples of the two opposing sides of this
argument, on one hand, Acheson referred in the cable to the “deteriorating conditions Formosa”
and warned of avoiding “repetition” of Chinese Nationalists’ recent misuse of US economic aid
as justifying arguments against immediately giving large amounts of US aid to Taiwan because it
“would make undesirable too early approach and commitment support.”309
However, other US experts had reached the opposite conclusion based on these same
“deteriorating conditions Formosa” as justifying an “early approach in effort stabilize situation
and enable ECA carry out its plans.”310 Acheson further mentioned to Merchant that officials
from the US Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) had opined that an effective US
economic aid program for Taiwan would have to be a “vigorous,” “sizable,” and “Large
mission;” while also noting that the Truman administration intended to “request Congressional
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authorization extend present aid program to June 30, 1949 by use of unexpended balance with
suitable provision for ECA administrative expenses beyond that date.”311
On March 3, Secretary Acheson seemed compelled to issue another formal statement on
“The Formosan Problem” in which he reiterated similar key points that he had made at the prior
35th meeting of the NSC on March 1st when the NSC staff had voted and sent their policy
recommendations contained in NSC 37/5 to President Truman for his approval.312 Acheson
reiterated in his statement that NSC 37/4 and NSC 37/5 represented “a policy of employing
diplomatic and economic means to deny Formosa to the Communists;” thus by extension, he
implied that the reason for ongoing and future US economic aid to Taiwan would be justified as
a means to achieve Washington’s goal of preventing a Chinese Communist takeover of the island
by providing support to the Nationalist Chinese and “Formosan Authorities” then governing it.313
However, while the bulk of Acheson’s statement forcefully rebutted the JCS
recommendations in NSC 37/3 that represented a “show of military force in Formosa,” he further
expounded upon the rationale for his opposition by stating that: “we cannot afford to
compromise an emerging new US position in China by overtly showing a pronounced interest in
Formosa. It is a cardinal point in our thinking that if our present policy is to have any hope of
success in Formosa, we must carefully conceal our wish to separate the island from mainland
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control.”314 Acheson’s comments reflected not only Washington’s preference for discretion and
implied secrecy for US economic aid policy tilting towards supporting Chinese Nationalist and
Taiwanese officials, but also the State Department’s disagreement with the Defense Department
about the Joint Chiefs’ increasing advocacy for sending US military forces to the island.
In addition to Washington’s internal debates over sending US military forces to Taiwan,
by the spring of 1949, US diplomatic cables continued to demonstrate that the disintegrating
political and economic events on mainland China and Taiwan also resulted in US economic aid
emerging as a main foreign policy dilemma facing Washington. Two related questions on this
topic of debate reflected repeatedly in the NSC 37 series’ policy prescriptions, crystalized into
Washington officials having to decide whether to facilitate separating Formosa (Taiwan) from
mainland China. A related policy quandary was whether to continue sending economic aid
directly to just the Chinese Nationalists, or to other semi-ROC aligned “Chinese officials” then
either independently advocating their inclusion or already integrated into the fledgling ROC
government structure in Taiwan.
By March 23, John Leighton Stuart, the US Ambassador to China, (then in Nanking,
China) cabled US Secretary of State Acheson to inform him that he (Stuart) was: “Looking
forward and even assuming decent government established Formosa receiving US economic
support, major decision US may well later face is what advice then to give Governor [Chen
Cheng of Taiwan] if Communist dominated coalition emerges on mainland…”315 However,
despite Ambassador Stuart’s initial comment expressing optimism, he casted doubt on whether a
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“coalition government” consisting of both Chinese Nationalists and Communists would “accept”
a separation of Taiwan from mainland China, while also discounting the likelihood of an
independent Taiwan emerging led by local “Chinese officials” by stating that: “Formosan
independence groups currently are disunited, politically illiterate, imperfectly organized and in
general worthy little reliance.”316
While his opinion warned of how the chaotic conditions in China and Taiwan might
influence Washington’s broader policy options in concert with the United Nations or “joint
[allied] intervention” to support a future independent Formosa, Stuart offered a third policy
prescription that linked US economic aid to the emerging cold war political-ideological
competition when he stated: “contenting ourselves with temporary holding operation under
which by economic and diplomatic support we contributed to improvement economic level and
quality government on Formosa, thereby reducing chance lasting Formosan acceptance
Communist ideology.”317
The next morning on March 24th, Secretary of State Acheson had consulted with the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in an executive session that had discussed the related issue
of whether to authorize $17 million in unexpended funds from the Section 404 (a) of China Aid
Act (that would have expired the next month on April 3) for the diversion of Chinese Nationalist
economic projects from mainland China to Taiwan.318 That same evening, Acheson informed
Ambassador Stuart that while “this will no doubt entail cut backs on ECA operations
mainland…,” the Senate committee favored the immediate transfer of the funds because “every
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reasonable attempt must be made to bring Formosan situation to a head sooner rather than
later.”319 On March 30th, Acheson sent another cable to Consul Edgar in China that illustrated
Washington’s policy vacillations over whether to transfer more related economic aid to an
unstable Nationalist governing entity on Taiwan, as recommended in NSC 37/2.320
Acheson’s cable indicated that it was then becoming more likely that US economic aid to
Taiwan would be halted due to the deteriorating political situation there and to avoid the
impression that the US government “would act unilaterally separate Formosa from mainland”
and that “time not yet ripe approach Governor Formosa along lines NSC 37/2 Feb 3.”321 While
Acheson informed Edgar that the United States’ ECA program was the “only means aid
autonomous Formosa…” he also rather optimistically speculated that more economic aid to
Taiwan “might” be forthcoming through President Truman’s new Four Point Program for giving
economic aid to foreign nations that he had announced just two months prior in his inaugural
address on January 20, 1949.322
Despite Washington’s hesitations in granting more US economic aid to Taiwan’s
seemingly unstable and authoritarian Nationalist governing authorities headed by Governor
Chen, by late March 1949, the US State Department initiated formal efforts to evaluate and
prepare for giving Taiwan more aid. The main reason for these efforts appeared to be that some
US Embassy officials in China had become increasingly convinced that the autocratic Governor
Chen not only met US policy conditions specified in Paragraph 1 of NSC 37/2, but that he would
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continue his tenure of remaining in power in Taiwan because of his backing and support by the
Chinese Nationalist government authorities then still in mainland China.323 From March to April
1949, the US Embassy also sponsored in-depth surveys of the vulnerabilities and needs of
Taiwan’s economy that were conducted by R. Allen Griffin, Acting Chief of the ECA China
Mission, together with Paul C. Parker, the acting US Treasury Department representative in
China and financial advisor to the ECA China Mission.
While Consul General Edgar reported on April 6th, that Counselor Merchant had been
negotiating with Governor Chen over Taiwan’s use of the “already scheduled” $17 million in
American JCRR and fertilizer funds, but “no hint any aid beyond,” Edgar’s cable clearly
indicated that the purpose of these surveys was to help American government officials better
understand Taiwan’s economic deficiencies that could be overcome with more US economic aid
in the future.324 American officials acknowledged in the cable that correcting these deficiencies
would require that the ECA emphasize to Chinese Nationalist officials on Taiwan that they
would need to initiate economic “self-help measures” with an “emphasis on exports with
vigorous efforts to secure control foreign exchange earned and certain anti-inflationary monetary
actions by Bank of Taiwan…”325
The contents in the cable also indicated that senior US government officials recognized
the precarious situation of Taiwan’s economy when they stated that the Chinese Nationalists
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would need to implement “vigorous provincial monetary and economic actions” which “should
retard inflation and provide stopgap enabling later examination of justification for continuing US
economic support. But there will be no margin for error or contingencies.”326
Back in Washington however, Congressional support had dwindled for appropriating US
economic aid originally intended for the Chinese Nationalists on mainland China but diverting it
to Taiwan. By April 7th, Secretary of State Acheson had become more pessimistic about
Congress’s intentions to terminate US economic aid to China and Taiwan by either December
31, 1949, or alternatively February 15, 1950. Another key reason underlying his concern was that
even Truman’s NSC Executive Staff had also rejected his recommendation that the ECA
administered $17 million in US economic aid be diverted from projects on mainland China to
Taiwan.327
Nevertheless, by the next day at another NSC staff meeting on April 8th, pressure from
other key officials within the US executive branch resulted in a temporary compromise over the
“problem of economic aid for Formosa” issue pursuant to implementing the policy
recommendations in NSC 37/5 and stipulations in Paragraphs 1 and 2 in NSC 37/2.328 This
compromise resulted in the NSC reversing its earlier opposition and approved Secretary
Acheson’s recommendations for diverting the $17 million from mainland China to Taiwan, but
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with the caveat of not entering into formal discussions with Governor Chen for “an all out [US]
economic program on the island.”329
However, Acheson’s new reasoning on April 8th indicated that he had reached the
opposite conclusion that Consul Edgar at the US Embassy in China had “reluctantly”
communicated just two days earlier to Acheson characterizing Governor Chen as likely to
continue his tenure with Nationalist backing in Taiwan. Acheson informed the NSC staff that he
was countering previous US Embassy reporting by now expressing his lack of confidence in
Governor Chen and Counselor Merchant’s assessment that “he did not consider the time ripe for
an approach to the Governor of Formosa in view of the possibility that the incumbent might be
supplanted by General Sun Li-jen, an American-educated officer considered to be more
competent than the present Governor.”330 Acheson’s cable echoed a recurring theme found in the
diplomatic archives indicating Washington’s policy dilemma of preferring to counter Chinese
Communist expansionism by supporting non-Communist, albeit authoritarian Chinese
Nationalist leaders of questionable leadership competency and integrity in Taiwan.
Acheson also indicated that despite the “time not being right” then for giving more US
economic aid to Taiwan, the State Department would still coordinate with the ECA to prepare a
comprehensive plan for future US economic aid and assistance to Taiwan by stating:
Plans will be laid for a program of economic support to Formosa, including proposed
capital expenditures for industrial replacement and reconstruction, which should be
brought as near to the point of consummation as feasible without additional allocation of
funds. No capital expenditures will be authorized unless and until the political
circumstances are judged to be propitious for an all out economic program on the island.
However, it is not considered that the time has yet come to institute such a program.331

329

Ibid., 310.

330

Ibid., 310.

331

Ibid., 310-311.

132

By April 11th, the Chinese Nationalists formally exhibited more signs of increasing
anxiety over the importance of Taiwan not only as a safe-haven refuge for retreat should they
lose the Chinese civil war to the Chinese Communists and evacuate the ROC government there,
but also because of the island’s deteriorating economic situation had reached a critical stage that
was compounding the worsening social instability among the Taiwanese populace. For example,
on April 11th at the urgent request of President Chiang, T.V. Soong, one of the most prominent
Chinese Nationalist leaders closest to Chiang (and former ROC Premier 1945-1947), left
mainland China to meet with Consul Edgar in Taipei to explain to American embassy officials
that he was there to “find political, economic, military formula to preclude Communist takeover:
Taiwan economy must be restored,…”332 Edgar’s cable to Secretary Acheson that reported on
this hastily arranged meeting indicated that the main focus of his conversation with Soong
entailed the Nationalist leader imploring Edgar for more American economic aid to resolve
Taiwan’s imploding economy.
Edgar recommended to Soong, (much to his apparent chagrin), that Governor Chen’s
“three-point program” was already in place to: “(1) strengthen not separate Taiwan yen, (2)
retain 40% export proceeds, (3) solve mainland remittance problem by goods imports, not
currency credit.”333 Edgar described Soong’s verbal reactions that reflected his criticism of each
of these three solutions by paraphrasing his retort that: “Taiwan needs simple clear-cut bold
solutions;” and another urgent request that Chinese Nationalist leaders meet “with American
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official best posted in economics here.”334 The contents of Edgar’s cable also implied American
foreknowledge of a high likelihood that anticipated a lack of future economic success posed by
the Chinese Nationalist statist ROC government-run commercial industries in that he had also
“Criticized nationalization all island industry resulting inefficiency and expressed desire unload”
during his meeting with Soong.335
Edgar’s cable also reflected the high level of sensitivity of the issue of US economic aid
to Taiwan, since Edgar was communicating directly to the Secretary State asking for instructions
about how to formally reply to Soong, particularly when Soong twice rejected Edgar’s offer to
meet directly with Loris F. Craig, the Director of the ECA Office, Taiwan to discuss US
economic aid for the island.336 While Edgar’s cable did not indicate why Soong twice rejected
his proposal to meet ECA Director Craig, it is likely that Soong, who was educated in the United
States, fluent in English, and was President Chiang’s personal representative to President
Roosevelt in Washington during World War Two, was already familiar with Craig’s circumspect
and critical views of the Chinese Nationalists’ previous alleged corruption and misuse of
American economic aid during that period. As a result, Soong likely perceived that Craig would
be less deferential to future Chinese Nationalist requests to Washington for US economic aid.
The very next day on April 12th, Consul Edgar sent another rather urgent cable directly to
Secretary Acheson that once again illustrated Washington’s frustration with indications that the
Chinese Communists were prevailing over the Chinese Nationalists on mainland China, as well
as the increasing salience of the policy dilemma of whether to provide more US economic aid to
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Taiwan.337 In this classified cable, Edgar withdrew and reversed his earlier recommendation six
days before endorsing American economic aid to Taiwan under the leadership of Governor
Chen, by recommending aid now be deferred. Edgar justified his new recommended reversal on
US economic aid policy to Taiwan by stating:
On other hand knowledge (which would unavoidably soon become public) of substantial
US aid forthcoming would give Communists new handle to propaganda jug, disappoint
Formosans who resent present Chinese authorities and confirm widespread mainland
Chinese fears that we have imperialistic designs on Island…I have doubted ultimate
usefulness US aid to present Governor and his clique. I had hoped his displacement by
enlightened Chinese leader would provide setting in which US aid could be effectively
translated into direct improvement Formosan’s lot. These hopes have not materialized nor
do they seem likely to now. At this moment I see nothing to be gained and much to be
lost by approaching Governor Chen with view committing US economic aid beyond
routine continuation present modest ECA commodity imports and current slow moving
JCRR program.338
Secretary Acheson’s reply to Consul Edgar three days later on April 15th revealed
evidence of Washington’s agreement with Edgar’s recommendation to defer more future US
economic aid to Taiwan. Washington officials now expressed mounting concerns over the
likelihood that if the corrupt and inept Chinese Nationalists did not improve and reform their
ROC government’s effectiveness, that they would repeat their previous misuse of American aid
in Taiwan as they had done on mainland China. Acheson revealed these concerns in this cable by
stating: “Question US econ aid Formosa inevitably involved with pattern previous US efforts aid
China…Unless Chi auths [sic] will and able measures this nature, external aid wld [sic] be of
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little significance and inevitable result wld be of little significance and inevitable result wld be
repetition mainland situation.”339
Acheson further directed Edgar to reply to Soong in general along the lines implying that
the Chinese Nationalists needed to demonstrate more prudent political, military, and economic
competence and governance by stating:
…to them their own efforts will be determining factor and US aid can only be
supplementary such efforts. Failure establish this point clearly with Chi auths [sic] would
inevitably result eventual failure US efforts prevent Commie domination island…US
Govt has no desire see mainland chaos spread Formosa and would be inclined view
favorably question economic aid Formosa shld [sic] Chi take steps prevent Commie or
coalition govt control island… US Govt has, however, viewed with misgiving recent
developments Formosa which give promise repeating mainland pattern…it is hoped Chi
auths can take measures establish basis for effective econ support.340
Secretary Acheson’s cable also contained the first indications that Washington was laying
a proto-ideological foundation for a new future policy that would justify US economic aid as a
means to “showcase” Taiwan as a potential alternative capitalist-style state economic
reconstruction model versus Communist inspired economic development ideology when he
stated: “Formosa represents valuable economic assets which could be made self-supporting with
efficient admin as example of non-Commie Chi Govt achievement.”341 Nevertheless, Acheson’s
cable also indicated evidence of the State Department’s internal policy schism versus the Joint
Chiefs of Staff that soon emerged to undermine Washington’s precarious and controversial
high-level “consensus” over whether Taiwan represented a vital US national interest.
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While overall there was a general consensus in Washington that it was in the US national
interest that Taiwan should not be under Chinese Communist control, many senior American
government officials judged that the island did not represent a major US national interest worth
expending considerable military or economic support to the Nationalist there in 1949 as
exemplified by Acheson informing Edgar that:
However in certain quarters there is obviously a misconception of US interest Formosa:
for example that US considers island essential link Western Pacific defense chain. US
Govt is entertaining no designs on Formosa and does desire establish bases Formosa.
Although it looks with favor on denial Formosa to Commie control, Formosa not of
sufficient strategic importance in mid 20th century which has sufficiently moved away
from coaling-station strategic concept that there is no question of US employment forces
to effect destiny of Formosa.342

Meanwhile, by late April 1949, senior US officials in Washington and China who were
directly involved in implementing US economic aid to Taiwan increasingly recommended
against more aid to the Chinese Nationalists there due to their pessimistic perceptions that the
growing political and social instability on the island would result in misuse or be wasted, thus
yielding little or no tangible results. A key classified diplomatic cable from April 29 supporting
this claim is contained in a “Top Secret” letter sent by Allen Griffin, Acting Chief of the ECA
China Mission to Harlan Cleveland, Director of the China Program of the ECA back in
Washington.343
Chief Cleveland appeared to have judged the contents of this classified letter, containing
Griffin’s report of the disintegrating political and economic conditions in Taiwan from April
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14th, to have been of such vital import impacting US economic aid policy there that he sent it to
none other than Walt Butterworth, the State Department’s Director of the Office of Far Eastern
Affairs. Director Cleveland informed Butterworth that Griffin “recommends strongly that no
action be taken to set up a Taiwan operation under present circumstances, and giving the present
elements with whom it would be necessary to deal there.”344
The contents of Chief Griffin’s classified letter reveal that he specifically informed and
warned Butterworth about the negative impacts of more US economic aid going to support the
corrupt Chinese Nationalist ROC government’s statist economic industrial management policies
by stating that the ECA “should not risk a great failure there in promoting the industries that are
controlled by a handful of men, and that will be operated for their benefit.”345 Chief Griffin’s
letter reveals that he believed that his colleague Consul Merchant, also there in China, was
similarly in agreement. Thus Griffin’s letter is not only startling by its frankness and alarming
tone, but is even more significant because it revealed his first-hand observations expressing
severe criticism of the Chinese Nationalists’ ability to effectively govern Taiwan, when he stated
in ominous terms that:
…no reform in the evil practices that have undermined the Government has taken place
in the Army, the political structure and bureaucracy, or in the financial setup…I have
come to the conclusion that no reform has even been possible in the face of the habits and
available personalities of the political and military leaders on the Nationalist front…The
evils that have undermined the regime appear to have been fixed in mucilage…We now
come to the field of what is possibly our next adventure—Formosa. Events and
circumstances of the past two months, one following another, have convinced me that we
should stay out of Formosa so far as any longterm operation is concerned…it is my
opinion that we should leave it alone…Formosa has become the redoubt of the Gimo’s
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[sic] favored elements, the very people whose selfishness, corruption and
shortsightedness have destroyed their regime on the Mainland.346

Throughout the same day and evening of April 29, Consul Edgar in Taipei sent Secretary
Acheson in Washington no less than three more classified telegrams describing his conversations
with Governor Chen and other high level Chinese Nationalist leaders about their seemingly
inability to resolve not only the ongoing civil war raging between them and the Chinese
Communists on mainland China, but also their “action to halt economic deterioration and
stabilize island economically and politically” with respect to Taiwan.347
However, Consul Edgar’s discussions with other Chinese Nationalist officials handling
economic issues in the ROC government, including C.K. Yen, Finance Commissioner and K.C.
Wu, the mayor of Shanghai (and who had just arrived in Taipei and would serve as the Governor
of Taiwan later in 1949), yielded little reason to change Washington’s growing pessimism that
these Chinese officials were taking tangible steps to improve Taiwan’s economy and govern
responsibly there.348 By early May, Consul Edgar urgently informed Secretary Acheson that the
“rapid development” of events and civil war chaos ensuing in mainland China resulting in the
fall of major Chinese cities and large swaths of territory to the Chinese Communists, had also
resulted in large scale Chinese Nationalist evacuations of large numbers of ROC affiliated
refugees to the island of Taiwan as a safe haven.349
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Consul Edgar’s confidence in the ability of the Chinese Nationalists to prudently govern
the island’s economy had by then reached such a low level that he suggested a complete
“revision,” rather than a “delay in execution,” of the NSC 37 series policies towards Formosa
due to the nature of these rapidly unfolding events. Edgar’s sudden and adamant insistence for a
reappraisal of US economic aid policy towards Taiwan was also caused by the portending
deleterious and uncertain negative impacts stemming from the island’s “abrupt severance” from
mainland supplies, as well as a massive influx of “economically nonproductive refugees” that
had resulted in rising consumer prices and inflation.350
In particular however, Consul Edgar’s firsthand assessment of how he expected the
incompetent and authoritarian Chinese Nationalists to misgovern Taiwan’s economy was
revealed in his statement that forecasted:
Whereas month ago possibility existed Formosa might become autonomous and be run
for benefit its people by enlightened governor, it is now almost certain that under either
Generalissimo or Li control it will be developed as a fortress which is not compatible
with rational economic development of Island…Formosa cannot now be turned into
welfare laboratory without far larger subsidy than US has so far considered. New and
powerful forces of economic deterioration are at work. Even with massive aid, there is
little chance governing group with its attitudes and available technical brains could
effectively and wisely use such aid. American advisers or a large ECA mission could not
compensate for these deficiencies.351

On the other hand, Consul Edgar opined rather optimistically that despite the Chinese
Nationalists arriving in Taiwan in the expected massive magnitude of a few million or more, the
island could still be “run as a fortress on a siege basis for a considerable period.”352 Although
Edgar did not specify what length of time he meant by a “considerable period,” he implied a
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timeframe of one to two years based on the Nationalists’ foreign exchange and gold reserve
amounts, as well as if they could successfully manage Taiwan’s economy. Edgar’s analysis was
particularly perceptive as he expressed doubt whether more US economic aid would have had
appreciable effect on improving the Nationalists’ stewardship over improving Taiwan’s
economic stability.
Edgar’s dire predictions to Secretary Acheson about the corrupt and incompetent Chinese
Nationalist regime’s ability to use US economic aid for Washington’s intended purpose of
arresting Taiwan’s economic instability, as well Taipei diverting economic aid for military
purposes, were revealed in his statements that the: “marginal beneficiaries of US aid would be
governing groups and military...would really amount to subsidy of military on Island,” and that
the “liabilities, however, which we would assume for economic aid of doubtful utility to either
Formosan or our own interests are considerable,” while recommending that: “US should abandon
contemplated ECA reconstruction program on Formosa.”353
While the survival prospects of the Chinese Nationalist regime deteriorated on mainland
China in May 1949, Harlan Cleveland, Director of the China Program of the ECA queried senior
US State Department officials in Washington as to whether to terminate or transfer to Taiwan the
$17 million ECA-contracted pre-project engineering surveys for several pending industrial
projects that had been completed by the American New York-based J.G. White Engineering
Corporation.354 ECA Director Cleveland indicated to Walt Butterworth, Director of the Office of
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Far Eastern Affairs that he was in favor of retaining the services of J.G. White but “only if there
is a prospect that an industrial program will be activated on the island of Taiwan.”355 While
Director Butterworth’s reply on May 9th was non-committal, he indicated that Counselor
Merchant from Taipei was to return soon back to Washington for internal US State Department
discussions and would address this pending issue.356
That same afternoon however, Secretary Acheson sent an urgent telegram recalling both
Consul Edgar and Counselor Merchant from Taipei and requesting them to “proceed Washington
soonest for consultation” among high level officials in the Truman administration over the
effects on US interests resulting from the “possibility chaos from mainland spreading Taiwan”
and whether the Chinese Nationalists could “prevent Commie extension control over island
either by infiltration or by direct attack.”357 By May 18th, Secretary Acheson recommended to the
senior NSC staff that while the $17 million in remaining ECA funds would still be expended
pursuant to the NSC 37 series stipulations, he stated that it would be “unwise” to give more US
economic aid to Taiwan because it would be “construed as intervention by the United States in
the internal conflict for the control of remnant National Government assets,” and also because
Governor Chen was allowing a massive influx of mainland China refugees that Washington
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judged would “prove detrimental to the political health of and an economic liability to
Formosa.”358
Portentously just one day later on May 19th, the Chinese Nationalist ROC provincial
government on Taiwan declared martial law over the island’s populace in response to the
mainland China-based Nationalists losing the civil war to the Chinese Communists, thus causing
them to flee south and prepare to evacuate the ROC government together with over a million
military and civilian refugees to the island.359 On May 24th, Counselor Merchant, who from his
vantage point of being in Taipei and observing first-hand the accelerating catastrophic political
and economic conditions there, sent Director Butterworth a lengthy report analyzing the situation
in the context of how these new developments impacted Washington’s moral and democratic
anti-Communist ideological inspired justification for more economic aid to Taiwan as specified
in the NSC 37 policy series.360
While Edgar’s memorandum reiterated that the NSC 37 series was “designed to secure
the denial of Formosa to any Communist or Communist-dominated government on the
Mainland,” he also noted that any further US economic aid would be conditioned on whether
Taiwan was being ruled by an: “enlightened leadership…providing Formosa with the sort of
liberal government which alone could ameliorate the hatred of the Formosans for their Mainland
rulers and in so doing build up political stability on the Island which would minimize, if not
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eliminate, its susceptibility to Communist infiltration and ultimate seizure of control from
within.”361
Counselor Merchant’s memorandum revealed that because he believed Taiwan was still
under the uncertain, corrupt, and “unenlightened” leadership of Governor Chen, and had not
received “certain assurances” from Chen, that Washington should not proceed with reviving the
“suspended [ECA] industrial reconstruction program on the Island.”362 However, Merchant
implied that Washington should resume economic aid to Taiwan if Governor Chen was replaced
with General Sun Li-jen, a senior Chinese Nationalist military officer who was “an American
trained officer of integrity, competence and liberal philosophy,” but who was also in contention
with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Chen for the “remaining treasure, territory and armed
forces not yet under Communist control.”363
Reflecting another harbinger that negatively affected Washington’s ideological and moral
justification for more US economic aid to Taiwan, Merchant pessimistically opined that “The
Government in power is corrupt and incompetent,” while also offering his seemingly resigned
and exasperated assessment that: “there is no possibility, short of the dangerous and risky effort
to finance and promote a coup d’état, that the present Government will be replaced or alter its
character in the direction of liberal political rule and wise economic action.”364
Merchant further directly argued against more US economic aid to Taiwan by stating:
“The economic assistance if properly formulated and directed would slow down, though not
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cure, the current economic decay. We would, however, see the reservoir of Formosan goodwill
to America drop sharply and we would hand the Mainland Communists a ready-made irredentist
weapon for their propaganda.”365 Finally, Merchant’s contextualization of the negative moral
values impacting Washington justifying more economic aid to the authoritarian Chinese
Nationalist regime on Taiwan is illustrated in one of his closing paragraphs in which he stated:
“…it should behoove the United States to guard its moral position not only on Formosa and in
China but throughout all Southeast Asia by minimizing its association with a governing group
which has already in a large theater demonstrated its incompetence and unpopularity.”366
By June 1949, Washington appeared to have concluded that it could not justify more US
economic aid to the authoritarian Chinese Nationalist regime governing Taiwan because they
could not resolve the chaotic political and socio-economic instability on the island as evidenced
by James E. Webb, the Acting Secretary of State’s telegram to Consul Edgar in Taipei stating
that he was to inform ECA officials there that: “activation industrial reconstruction program or
other massive economic aid appears improbable.”367 In addition, throughout the summer of 1949,
emerging East-West geopolitical rivalry within the United Nations and the related uncertainty
over the legal status and ownership of Taiwan and its ultimate sovereignty soon became another
significant development resulting from the Chinese civil war that contributed to Washington’s
reluctance to give more economic aid to the Chinese Nationalists controlling the island.368
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On June 11th, Consul Edgar telegrammed Secretary of State Acheson with new
information adding to the growing consensus in Washington that more US economic aid to
Taiwan would be futile and could not be justified, as evidenced by his firsthand observations
that:
Since fall of Shanghai and Tsingtao and with influx of retreating troops to Formosa, a
defeatist atmosphere had developed here. Several officials have resigned and are
departing for US and Europe, others planning to. ECA Craig [Loris F. Craig, the Director
of the ECA Office, Taiwan] has requested his release…Craig says economy completely
out of hand…Backstage activities of Generalissimo add to feeling of futility…General
feeling is island is falling apart and something drastic should be done but that nothing
will.369

Another major development throughout the summer and fall of 1949 that inhibited
American efforts to justify more US economic aid to Taiwan was the massive influx of Chinese
Nationalist military forces who began retreating from the mainland to the island to escape the
advancing Chinese Communist military forces. This new development resulted in establishing an
enduring financial cost burden upon the Chinese Nationalist government to such a degree that
many American and some Chinese officials became wary that Taipei would divert US economic
aid to support Taiwan’s growing military establishment at the expense of reconstructing and
developing its overall economy and related private sector business enterprises. As early as June
24th, Consul Edgar specifically warned Secretary Acheson about this issue when he stated:
During the past week Chen’s four principal economic advisers, Hsu Pai-yuan, C. D.
Yen, Jen Hsien-chuen and K.C. Wu, in discussing fiscal reform have all told me biggest
economic problem is excess military here. Can carry two or three armies but over that
produces diminishing economic, political, military returns. Sun Li-jen has said same
thing many times and yesterday quoted Generalissimo in same vein but stated
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Generalissimo’s lieutenants want more for possible attack on mainland and Chen wants
personal troops here.370

By the end of June 1949, Secretary Acheson indicated to Consul Edgar in Taipei that
senior US State Department officials had judged that the controversial issue of excess Chinese
Nationalist troops would negatively impact Washington’s policy choices for justifying more US
economic aid to Taiwan. Acheson informed Edgar that the State Department was “fully aware
liability excess troops constitute on Taiwan,” and instructed Edgar to “continue informally to
stress to Governor’s inner circle political, economic consequences and disaffection risk inherent
in idle troops in excess island’s defense needs.”371
Meanwhile at a high level State Department meeting in Washington on June 29th,
Secretary Acheson and four senior ECA officials discussed various policy recommendations
impacting the “NSC Series 37 directive” for US economic aid to Taiwan and the “problem of
Formosa” in which they concluded that a major overhaul of that policy was needed because the
United States could not ““support “vigorously” the economy of Formosa.””372 While the meeting
also revealed that the ECA mission in China had been “liquidated” from 100 down to 20 staff
members, Secretary Acheson nonetheless told Edgar that: “efforts to increase the export trade of
Formosa should be continued together with the existing ECA program on the island.”373
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A week later on July 6, 1949, George Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning Staff in
the US State Department floated a bombshell memorandum to Secretary Acheson entitled
“Policy Planning Staff [PPS] 53: United States Policy Toward Formosa and the Pescadores” in
which he stated: “It now seems that there is little likelihood that the policy set forth in NSC 37/1,
37/2 and 37/5 will attain our major objective with respect to Formosa and the Pescadores—the
denial of the islands to the Communists through their separation from Chinese mainland
control.”374 Kennan’s memorandum also urged the NSC staff to immediately review
Washington’s overall Taiwan policy based on his warning of the imminent collapse of the
dysfunctional Chinese Nationalist regime on Taiwan and “Chinese Communist domination of the
islands” in a “matter of months.”375
However, Kennan’s most alarming and controversial recommendation in PPS 53 was his
advocation of:
…removal of the present Nationalist administrators from the islands and in the
establishment of a provisional international or U.S. regime which would invoke the
principle of self-determination for the islanders and would eventually,…conduct a
plebiscite to determine the ultimate disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores. Formosan
separatism is the only concept which has sufficient grass-roots appeal to resist
communism.376
The logic and political foundations of Kennan’s new provocative recommendations in his
“change in regime” policy implied that any future US economic aid to Taiwan would be
conditioned first by an American style political ideology-inspired democratic process involving
native Formosans determining their own fate. This new proposed policy would necessitate
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vigorous courses of action by Washington or the United Nations becoming more directly
involved in Taiwan’s internal political affairs. Kennan’s proposed courses of action would also
have very likely involved the United States in extensive unilateral and international diplomatic
efforts to reverse support for the corrupt authoritarian Chinese Nationalist regime and instead
back other Chinese pro-Formosan independence leaders vying for political control of the island.
However, Kennan’s overall analysis, conclusions, and implications in PPS 53 about the “only
alternatives” and ways in which regime change in Taiwan might be accomplished, implied that
the level of US diplomatic effort required would be not only be extensive, but nearly next to
impossible to implement given the complex nature and speed of the deteriorating conditions on
the island resulting from the Chinese civil war.377
Kennan’s sober analysis and dire prognoses in his draft PPS 53 memorandum revealed
that he recognized the futility of external powers such as the United States or the United Nations
attempting to achieve independence for Taiwan. Accordingly, he further recommended against
Washington adopting his proposed courses of action by stating that the Chinese Nationalists
“should be rejected and that we should reconcile ourselves to the prospect of Formosa’s falling
into the hands of the Chinese Communists.”378 In addition, Kennan’s attached Annex to his draft
PPS 53 memorandum entitled “A Possible Course of Action With Respect to Formosa and the
Pescadores,” contained severe criticism of the authoritarian Chinese Nationalist regime’s
governance over Taiwan by suggesting the preparation of “a chapter in the White Paper on China
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dealing with Formosa, with particular emphasis being laid upon Chinese misrule of the islands
since VJ-Day….”379
The Annex also reflected Kennan’s appeal to the international community to support
administering a plebiscite for Taiwan’s self-determination because of:
…the need for a responsible and stable administration on the islands during the present
period…of the shocking record of misrule during the past four years by the Chinese and
of the many leas from representative Formosans for autonomy,…Chinese administration
on the islands has been rapacious and oppressive and the chaos and strife which wracked
and gutted China Proper now threaten to engulf these islands.380

Meanwhile, by the end of July 1949, Consul Edgar reported in a secret telegram to Walt
Butterworth, the State Department’s Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, that Chinese
Nationalist political leader K.C. Wu, the former mayor of Shanghai and a senior close confidant
of President Chiang Kai-shek and Taiwan’s Governor Chen, approached US embassy officials in
Taipei asking for Washington to assist “those Chinese leaders who are working for internal
reform” and “indicate those lines of reform which the United States believes would improve the
situation on Taiwan.”381 The text of this Chinese Nationalist ROC government’s self-serving
request appeared to project the impression to Washington that reflected Taipei’s new-found
humility and self-introspection giving them the appearance of a deceptive pseudo effort to
positively influence more economic aid to the island in light of the catastrophic events rapidly
unfolding there. Director Butterworth apparently reached a similar conclusion as evidenced by
the attached “Annex— “Tab B” to his memorandum prepared for Secretary Acheson to
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personally hand to the aide-memoire of Chinese Ambassador Wellington Koo, then in
Washington.382
This Annex contained Washington’s strongest yet articulation of its disappointment with
the Chinese Nationalists’ inept governance over Taiwan as demonstrated by the opening
statement which read: “The United States has watched with deep concern evidence of the
deteriorating political and economic situation on Taiwan. There seems, however, much that
could be done by resolute, liberal and far-seeing administration on Taiwan, to improve the
people’s livelihood…”383 The Annex also contained five recommendations reflecting American
liberal democratic and capitalist ideological values for the Chinese Nationalist ROC government
to implement in Taiwan.
These recommendations implored Taipei to enact land reforms, reduce the massive influx
of Chinese “civilian emigres and mainland troops…who are economically non-productive…to
reduce the burden now placed on the food and other resources of Taiwan;” as well as measures
to stabilize the currency, improve tax collection, lower tariffs, control credit and extend it “to
truly productive loans, and “increase and diversify” exports to earn foreign exchange which “will
require realistic pricing of export commodities, a drastic removal of restraints on the initiative
and ingenuity of individual exporters…”384
While the latter parts of these recommendations reflected Washington’s concerns about
the inequities inherent to Taiwan’s nascent private sector, the fifth recommendation sought to put
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the corrupt ROC government on notice that: “steps should be taken to ensure the utilization of
competent administrative personnel in all positions and effective delegation of authority and
responsibility, particularly with respect to those civilian officials dealing with financial,
economic and other matters requiring specialized knowledge and importantly affecting the
economy and administration of the Island.”385
However, there is some historical controversy over whether Kennan’s forceful and
critical verbiage in the form of the actual document referred to in PPS 53 as “Annex—Tab B”
was ever handed to or verbally briefed to Secretary Acheson. Ultimately, it appears that after a
high level meeting between senior State Department officials on August 2nd that Secretary
Acheson did not subsequently deliver it in person to Ambassador Koo’s aide-memoire because it
“would be unwise to make this demarche in the teeth of the publication of the White Paper.”386
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the reference to the “White Paper” was the infamous
China White Paper which the State Department published and released publicly with great
fanfare two days later on August 5, 1949. The explosive and controversial contents of the China
White Paper contained hundreds of formerly classified secret US diplomatic cables covering the
official record of American diplomatic interaction with China and Taiwan during 1944-1949.387
By most accounts, the US State Department was extremely motivated to release these records
because it wanted to show that US diplomatic officials had been rightfully and professionally
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competent in prudently not supporting unjustifiable and wasteful military and economic aid
policies to prop up an incompetent and authoritarian Chinese Nationalist regime.
Although it remains a certainty that all cables that were ever produced were not published
in this document, the US State Department would have been at least partially biased and
selective in choosing which cables to release. Much of the released cables revealed evidence of
the authoritarian Chinese Nationalist regime’s corrupt political and statist economic practices. In
addition, most scholarly accounts indicate that the Truman administration intentionally released
it for the purpose of deflecting growing Congressional criticism that the president was “soft on
Chinese Communism” and had failed to sufficiently support the Chinese Nationalists with
sufficient economic and military aid.388
On August 4th, just one day before the China White Paper was released to the public, the
State Department sent its updated recommendations to the NSC staff in the form of NSC 37/6:
Current Position of the U.S. With Respect to Formosa which was a memorandum that
reexamined the NSC 37 policy series towards “Formosa” (Taiwan). These recommendations
largely remained consistent with the more recent policies during that summer that Washington
should continue to “urge” Taiwan’s Governor Chen to adopt “constructive political and
economic measures designed to quiet unrest and reduce Formosan susceptibility to Communist
propaganda,” and “maintain an ECA program of present moderate proportions,” but not to
activate Washington’s “suspended industrial reconstruction program” for the island because it
“would have further fed the inflation.”389
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The memorandum reiterated similar reasons for Washington to not expand economic aid
to Taiwan due to its rising political instability, the influx of massive refugees there from the
mainland, “drastic inflation,” and little possibility “for the installation of an effective and liberal
administration on the Island.”390 Finally, the memorandum also poignantly reiterated severe
criticism of the Chinese Nationalist ROC government by essentially concluding that its
demonstrated governance was antithetical to American democratic and economic values and
principles as demonstrated by the following statements:
The government in power is corrupt and incompetent. It lacks the will to take the
necessary political and economic steps to modify the deep and growing resentment of the
Formosans. The burden of supporting the mass of Nationalist troops and government
establishments is now so great as to accelerate the economic disintegration of the island.
Moreover, economic aid from outside cannot in the absence of a basic change in the
government alter or cure this situation,...391

By October 1949 with internal social instability continuing to rage out of control on
Taiwan, and indications that Chinese President Chiang Kai-shek was increasingly successful in
consolidating his repressive political control of the island, the NSC staff prepared NSC 37/8: The
Position of the United States With Respect to Formosa for President Truman’s approval of the
document’s minor policy updates for Taiwan.392 The NSC 37/8 document presented a lengthy
summary, analysis, and conclusions about the then current and expected dire future for Taiwan’s
economy and internal stability, as well as policy options based on the pros and cons of various
courses of action that the president could take. These policy options contained few practical
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opportunities for Washington to realistically improve Taiwan’s economy without denying the
Chinese Communists a propaganda victory based on their increasingly vitriolic public
denunciations of “US imperialist” designs to occupy Taiwan by collaborating with the Chinese
Nationalists as proxies.
Washington’s policy options were also fraught with other constraints suggesting there
would be no good future outcomes resulting from more US economic aid to Taiwan because
American government diplomats and intelligence officials had concluded that the corrupt and
authoritarian Chinese Nationalists could not be expected to reform their mismanagement of the
ROC government-run public sector dominated economy. Therefore, given this expected outcome
that would be antithetical to American foreign policy interests and liberal democratic values,
more US economic aid would have most likely have led to worsening instability and social
unrest on the island of Taiwan.
More broadly, Washington was also highly reluctant to extend more economic aid to
Taiwan largely based on the US Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterating in NSC 37/8 that their
judgement remained consistent with earlier assessments that “the strategic importance of
Formosa does not justify overt military action,” and more specifically because “so long as the
present disparity between our military strength and our global obligations exist (s), a disparity
that may well increase as a result of budgetary limitations and the commitments implicit in the
North Atlantic Treaty.”393 Similarly, the US State Department reaffirmed that the “political
importance of Formosa does not give rise to considerations of such importance as to justify
overriding, on political grounds, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff…”394 Despite the NSC
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opining in NSC 37/8 that Washington “might endeavor to insure the continuing freedom of
Formosa from Communist control by means of a greatly expanded program of economic aid
coupled with a program of military assistance,” the NSC staff reaffirmed its earlier
recommendations against this course of action as “unwise to embark upon such a program at this
time.”395
The NSC further justified this recommendation against giving more US economic aid to
the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan because “it would commit American resources and prestige
to what is in all probability a lost cause unless the Chinese themselves were to initiate and
faithfully carry out essential measures of self-help, and at the same time it would tend to remove
their incentive to do this…”396 The NSC staff also concluded that the Nationalists were
disingenuous in requesting more US economic aid because they already had significant financial
resources to be self-sufficient in the near term by stating that:
…the present weakness of the Island does not arise from lack of economic resources or
military material. The major portion of the Chinese Government’s gold and silver
holdings and foreign currency reserves, estimated to be in excess of one hundred million
US dollars is located on Formosa and available to the Chinese administration there…the
Generalissimo stated privately that he had sufficient resources to hold out on Formosa for
at least two years without outside assistance…the economy of Formosa could be made
almost completely self-sufficient under efficient administration,…the provision of any
additional aid will depend upon the future performance of the Chinese administration on
Formosa.397

Throughout the fall of 1949, Washington continued to emphatically communicate
directly to ROC President Chiang Kai-shek and other Chinese Nationalist leaders on the island
about American official concerns over their use of illiberal and authoritarian means of political
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governance to repress the Taiwanese people, as well as their inept government intervention in
and control over Taiwan’s economy. Washington justified these concerns as reasons for
constraining and limiting US economic aid to Taiwan. US State Department officials also told
Chinese Nationalist leaders that the “US Govt does not intend to commit any of its armed forces
to the defense of the Island,” while further berating these officials about their “previous
misgovernment of Taiwan” because they had not provided the Taiwanese people with sufficient
political and economic “well-being,” without which “serious unrest” could not be avoided.398
Washington further implied general conditions that the Chinese Nationalists would have
to meet to receive future US economic aid, which would depend “largely on the action of the
present Chi administration in establishing an efficient admin which wld [sic] seek to bring to the
people a higher level of polit and econ [sic] well-being,” and that Taiwan already had
“sufficient” financial and “material” resources to “improve conditions through its own
efforts.”399
Overall, there is a significant amount of evidence found in the declassified archives of
American and Chinese diplomatic exchanges revealing the reasons influencing Washington’s
decision to limit and gradually end US economic aid to the Chinese Nationalists during the late
1940s. The main contributing factors that influenced Washington’s decision to end aid can be
traced to the Chinese Nationalists’ corruption and incompetence in using US economic aid which
resulted in further damaging Taiwan’s fragile economy and increasing social instability.
US State Department archives reveal that senior American officials were aware of and
concerned about the corrupt Chinese Nationalist leaders’ preferences and ROC government plans
398
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to divert US economic aid to fund Taiwan’s public sector industrial enterprises with little regard
for developing Taiwan’s private business sector. More alarmingly, from an economic ideological
perspective, were the signs that the Chinese Nationalists had used US economic aid intended to
promote capitalist style development, to instead instill a quasi-socialist, state directed command
economy favoring the ROC government run public sector at the expense of the private sector in
Taiwan.
In addition, the uncertain and chaotic events arising from the Chinese civil war in China
spilling over into Taiwan also led to intense and controversial debates in Washington over
whether to give more US economic aid to Taiwan. Except mainly for the US Congress passing
the China Aid Act of 1948, which was intended to be of a temporary and limited time frame
beginning in 1948 and ending in February 1950, Washington was largely reluctant to continue
US economic aid to the Chinese Nationalists in mainland China or after December 1949 when
the majority of the ROC government relocated and sought refuge on the island of Taiwan.
By the end of 1949, senior officials in Washington had also concluded that Taiwan did
not represent as much a vital American national interest compared to other more pressing global
security, political, and economic interests and commitments, particularly those in Western
Europe. Overall, these perceptions and events largely resulted in a lack of sufficient support in
the US Congress for more US economic aid to Taiwan during President Truman’s early and midadministration period from 1945 to 1949.
However, as the next chapter covering the later years of the Truman Administration
during 1950-1952 and President Eisenhower’s first term during 1953-1956 will argue—new
security, economic, and political ideological factors representing existential threats to American
style democratic and capitalistic principles soon emerged from the momentous events of the
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early cold war period. These events included the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and
escalating diplomatic, economic, and military tensions between the United States and its allies
versus the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party led by Mao Zedong who had
proclaimed the new People’s Republic of China on the Chinese mainland on October 1, 1949.
These tensions would prove decisive in setting into motion and catalyzing US executive branch
and congressional support for large amounts of long-term programmed US economic aid during
1950-1965 to the Chinese Nationalist dominated ROC government managing a statist command
economy to the detriment of the private business sector on the island of Taiwan.
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Chapter Three: Cold War Onset and Aid Expansion, 1950-1956
By late 1949, the Chinese Nationalists had lost the four-year post-World War Two Era
Chinese Civil War to the Chinese Communists. The Republic of China (ROC) government,
together with over two million Nationalist military and civilian refugees, then retreated from
mainland China by evacuating 90 miles across the Taiwan Strait to the island of Taiwan, where
the ROC remains intact today.400 Then, the emerging cold war tensions between the United
States and its allies versus the Soviet Union and Communist China, in addition to the outbreak of
the Korean War on June 25, 1950, influenced Washington to develop a containment strategy to
oppose the competing threats from communist and socialist inspired military, economic, and
ideological expansionism. The emerging aggressive Soviet and Communist Chinese inspired
actions during 1949-1952 became the main external causal factors used by the US Congress and
executive branch to reinitiate and justify economic aid to Washington’s former World War Two
ally—the Chinese Nationalist single-party ruled authoritarian ROC government on the island of
Taiwan, or “Formosa.”
Thus, within a year after Secretary Marshall’s 1948 testimony, and the subsequent last
three years of President Truman’s second term, a transitional period for overall strategic US
foreign policy and economic aid emerged during 1949-1951 with the onset of the cold war.
During this policy transition, Washington responded to increasing US-Soviet bloc and
Communist Chinese security tensions in the early cold war period by forming the initial ends,
ways, and means for the US containment strategy against communist expansionism. This
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response included President Truman imploring the US Congress to support funding for new
economic aid programs for developing nations like Taiwan as part of Washington’s overall
global commitment to fostering military and other security objectives to counter similar
competing measures by the Soviet Union and Communist China.
President Truman’s fourth main point of his inaugural address in January 1949
established the foundations for Washington’s novel early cold war era foreign economic aid and
technical assistance linked to other US strategic security ways and means of responding to the
“false philosophy” of communism. These new initiatives included establishing new global
economic aid programs for the purpose of expanding world trade and building upon the Marshall
Plan that had begun in 1948 as the “greatest cooperative economic program in history” to
“invigorate and strengthen democracy in Europe...”401
This part of Truman’s 1949 inaugural address, variously referred to as his “Fourth Point
speech,” “Four Point Program,” or “Point IV program,” established the underpinnings of US cold
war economic aid to developing nations by stating: “we will continue our programs for world
economic recovery…we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our
scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of
underdeveloped areas…we should foster capital investment in areas needing development.”402
By the end of 1949, the Truman administration further sought to counter growing Soviet
and Chinese Communist influence in Asia by formulating new and broader strategic security
objectives using unilateral and multilateral military, political, economic, and psychological ways
and means that were articulated in NSC 48/2: The Position of the United States With Respect to
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Asia.403 This top secret classified NSC 48/2 document, approved by President Truman on
December 30, 1949, expressed Washington’s security objectives as supporting “non-Communist
forces in taking the initiative in Asia” by developing “sufficient military power in selected nonCommunist nations of Asia to maintain internal security and to prevent further encroachment by
communism,” as well as the “gradual reduction and eventual elimination of the preponderant
power and influence of the USSR in Asia to such a degree that the Soviet Union will not be
capable of threatening from that area the security of the United States or its friends…”404 This
new broader American security strategy and policy for Asia included Washington providing
“political, economic, and military assistance and advice where clearly needed to supplement the
resistance of the other governments….”405
The economic components contained in NSC 48/2 were seemingly relevant in
foreshadowing that there would be more US economic aid forthcoming to Taiwan because
Washington now sought to take new measures such as those contained in the Point Four
program, to encourage a broader “atmosphere favorable to economic recovery and development
in non-Communist Asia, and to the revival of trade along multilateral, non-discriminatory
lines.”406 Most auspiciously however, was that this document stated that Washington’s donorship
of US economic aid would be justified and conditioned by the phrases that the “economic
policies of the United States should be adapted to promote, where possible, economic conditions
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that will contribute to political stability in friendly countries of Asia,…,” the “maintenance of a
liberal United States trade policy with Asia and stimulation of imports from Asia,” and “efforts
to obtain the adherence of Asiatic countries to the principles of multilateral, non-discriminatory
trade as embodied in the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, as a means of reducing trade
barriers…”407
However, the specific language in NSC 48/2 still reflected Washington’s policy dilemma
and lack of commitment over providing more economic aid to what it judged as an authoritarian,
unstable, and corrupt Chinese Nationalist regime in Taiwan. Washington’s lingering and
wavering hesitation and lack of confidence justifying more US economic aid to Taiwan is
implied further along in NSC 48/2 which reiterated that the United States should continue the
policies in the NSC 37 series of “attempting to deny Formosa and the Pescadores to the Chinese
Communists through diplomatic and economic means,” but with caveats that there remained
“limitations imposed by the fact that successful achievement of this objective will primarily
depend on prompt initiation and faithful implementation of essential measures of self-help by the
non-Communist administration of the islands,…”408
Meanwhile back on the floor of the US Senate on January 9, 1950, Republican Senator H.
Alexander Smith, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who had just returned
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from conducting an official survey trip to Taiwan and other nations in East Asia during
September and October of 1949, described his firsthand observations in a lengthy address
entitled “American Foreign Policy in the Far East.”409 Senator Smith also had the contents of his
more extensive trip report addressed to Secretary of State Acheson on November 4, 1949,
inserted into the Congressional Record.410 Senator Smith’s motivations for his trip and
subsequent report came from his self-described “complete feeling of frustration after studying
the China white paper, and after discovering the wide divergence of opinion among experts
whom I had consulted,” as well as his concern over “the developments leading up to the present
debacle in China…the mistakes of policy, or, perhaps better stated, the lack of policy, of the
administration in the far-eastern situation.”411
Smith also described that the purposes of his trip related to what his interest was in
“seeking to do is to find, if possible, some formula for the future and see if there is any salvage in
the existing Chinese situation, and “because he was “profoundly interested in what may be the
right answer to the legitimate question pressing us on all sides as to our future course and policy
in the Far East if we are to stop the creeping paralysis of communism in that area.”412
Henceforth, Senator Smith’s speech and report in early 1950 exemplified Washington’s lingering
foreign policy dilemma over how best to contain Soviet and Chinese Communist expansionism
in Asia prior to the Korean War, while simultaneously justifying giving aid to support the corrupt
authoritarian regime of the Chinese Nationalist ROC-led government on the island of Taiwan.
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The testimonies and speeches by Smith and other members of Congress reveal the moral and
political ideological contradictions inherent with the US Congress justifying more economic aid
to alleviate the severe socio-political decline and disruption in Taiwan, then being accelerated by
the influx of over three million Chinese Nationalist refugees fleeing to the island from mainland
China.
Senator Smith illustrated these contradictory aspects by stating that while in Taiwan he
had met and spoke with “many American-trained Chinese who have the vision of our western
Christian tradition,” as well as President Chiang Kai-shek, whom Smith professed support for by
stating: “in spite of all the mistakes he has admittedly made in dealing with this situation, is
nevertheless in my judgment, one of the most important figures World War II produced, and who
may still have much to contribute to the salvation of his country.”413 Furthermore, Smith
observed that among the several hundred American and foreign officials whom he interviewed
during his trip, that their opinions about Taiwan’s precarious situation were “divided into two
main groups”—those that viewed the “Nationalist cause as completely washed up,” and “second,
those who are sharply critical of the United States policy and feel we are largely to blame for the
let-down of morale of the Nationalists and who feel there is still salvage in the existing situation,
desperate though it is.”414
The contents of Senator Smith’s speech also reveal that during his personal discussions
with President Chiang, he [Smith] stated that while adhering to the Truman administration’s
instructions to not discuss the issue of “further military aid for the defense of Formosa,” he
alternatively “wanted to highlight my own conviction that there was another approach to the

413

Smith, “American Foreign Policy in the Far East,” 151.

414

Smith, “American Foreign Policy in the Far East,” 151.

165
Chinese problems from the ideological side which had been too much neglected.” Smith then
reported that he expanded upon this significant ideological-inspired alternative recommendation
by not only stressing to Chiang that the “Nationalist Government had not offered the Chinese
people any program of reform and rehabilitation which could compete adequately with the
Russian-inspired Communist promises,” but also offering further criticism of Taiwan’s
authoritarian political repression by stating: “Unfortunately, the island has had Nationalist
governors who had the purely militaristic point of view, and who unfortunately treated the
Formosan people not as liberated Chinese, but as a conquered population.”415
Even more pointedly related to American liberal political ideology and moral values,
Smith emphasized to his fellow US senators that:
…we have overlooked a far more important factor than mere military aid. That factor is
what might be called the psychological or ideological factor which could have meant
support and backing for those high-minded Chinese whom we well knew and who were
seeking reform and who should never have been given the discouragement that came
from the feeling that their old traditional friend, the United States, had abandoned them in
their time of greatest crisis.416

Next, Senator Smith highlighted several of his observations that exemplified
Washington’s inclination and preference to aid Taiwan while it simultaneously struggled over
resolving the dilemma of justifying more economic aid to the Chinese Nationalists whose
authoritarian rule over Taiwan exhibited neither a political nor economic affinity with American
ideological values and principles. Smith’s first observation centered on the “yearning among all
peoples in the far-eastern areas to express their own nationalism and to be free from external
controls,” while emphasizing that this “yearning for freedom and self-expression” existed in
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Taiwan—“where the natives are demanding freedom and are even suggesting that they might set
up an independent state protected from the Communists on the one hand and not left under the
subjection of the Nationalists on the other hand...and who are innocent bystanders and onlookers
in the holocaust that is going on.”417
Smith’s second observation noted that “the people in the Far East were yearning for
economic reform and rehabilitation,” yet were conflicted over the stark choices between either
replicating the legacy of Western mercantilist “old-fashioned colonialism” or Soviet and Chinese
Communist inspired “totalitarian controls” associated with a new movement that was:
…fooling the people by false promises of freedom and reform. Unfortunately we of the
western democracies have failed adequately to explain and interpret the foundations of
true liberty which are deeply spiritual in their nature and which through a thousand years
of sweat, blood and tears have made possible the building of a great country such as the
United States.”418
Senator Smith’s seventh observation advocated for Washington to adopt a new
“courageous ideological approach aimed at Chinese rehabilitation” to counter the Soviet Union’s
“ideological penetration” of China begun 25 years earlier when Chinese students “were being
prepared in Sun Yat-sen’s university in Moscow for this strategy. They stole the Sun Yat-sen
name at that time and gave it to a university in Moscow,…And they succeeded in their
design.”419 Senator Smith’s example of “ideological penetration’ by the Soviet-established
Moscow Sun Yat-sen University was accurate because this school had educated thousands of
Chinese post-secondary Chinese Nationalist and Communist party member students with a
Russian Communist style revolutionary curriculum during 1925-1930.
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The Soviet Union established the Moscow Sun Yat-sen University in 1925 as a quasiaffiliate of the Chinese Nationalist-established Sun Yat-sen University which opened in southern
China in 1924. The Soviet Union outwardly presented its new Russian Communist Party
sponsored academic institution by branding it as a Chinese Sunist-affiliated namesake institution
paying homage to the late Chinese Nationalist leader and his quasi-Socialist governing
philosophies. However, Moscow’s real political ideological purpose was to influence thousands
of Chinese foreign students who would be sent there to be indoctrinated into various academic
renditions of Marxist, Leninist, Communist, or Socialist-themed political and economic topics.
As previously described earlier in Chapter Two, Chinese Nationalist party founder Dr.
Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) created the archetypical Chinese Nationalist ideological socioeconomic development and political governance philosophy known as the “Three Principles of
the People.” After Sun died in 1925, Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek adopted and
synthesized Sun’s three principles of nationalism, democracy, and socialism into a novel form of
authoritarian political rule and statist socio-economic development for China. Beginning in 1920,
the Soviet Union used its external political and ideological outreach organization known as the
Communist International (Comintern), to assist not only the fledgling Chinese Communist Party,
but also Sun’s revolutionary Chinese Nationalist Party in adopting many Russian Communist,
Leninist-inspired political, organizational, and ideological methods to reinforce its authoritarian
rule over China.420
As early as 1912, the Russian Communist revolutionary and Bolshevik leader Vladimir
Lenin began corresponding with Sun Yat-sen, thus setting the stage for many Soviet government
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and Comintern agents to enter China and assist in reorganizing, building, and merging Sun’s
larger Chinese Nationalist [Guomindang] party with key members of the fledgling Chinese
Communist party during 1920-1924.421 After Lenin’s death in January 1924, the Russian
Communist Party under Joseph Stalin began providing Chinese political revolutionaries with
large amounts of financial support for over three decades under the auspices of a trilateral quasipolitical party alliance formed in 1924 between the Soviets and both the Chinese Nationalists and
Chinese Communists.422
In early 1924, Sun sent his underling and protégé Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kaishek to visit the Soviet Union for the purpose of expanding the two nations’ political, military,
and economic ties under this newfound bilateral Russian Communist-Chinese Nationalist
political party alliance.423 Beginning in 1925 after his visit to the Soviet Union the year prior,
Chiang Kai-shek sent his son, Chiang Ching-kuo as part of the first cohort of over 300 students,
which expanded over the next five years to include thousands of other would be future Chinese
Nationalist leaders to study at the Moscow Sun Yat-sen University until it was dissolved in
1930.424
During 1926-1938 hundreds of other Chinese Nationalist and Communist students were
educated in Moscow at the Soviet Comintern’s International Lenin School, which was later
renamed as the International Communist University in 1930. During the same period, another
well documented and significant development resulting from Chiang’s visit in 1924 was the
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Comintern assisting the Chinese Nationalists with Soviet advisors, organizational expertise, and
financial aid to establish the Whampoa Military Academy in the southern Chinese city of
Guangzhou to train future Chinese Nationalist and Chinese Communist military and political
leaders during the 1920s and 1930s.
As a result, both Soviet academic institutions instilled world views reflecting Communist
style indoctrination into Soviet methods of authoritarian state-led political-economy national
development and modernization upon a new generation of young Chinese Nationalist and
Communist affiliated students. Many of these students went on to become key Chinese
Nationalist and Chinese Communist political leaders in Taiwan and China respectively.
Consequently, many of these future Chinese leaders would prefer statist and quasi-authoritarian
Socialist economic modernization programs featuring central government control of a large
public sector at the expense of a capitalist-based private sector and free enterprise model of
development for their nations. Most of these students also had in common Soviet style,
Bolshevik based ideological training in political economy related subjects such as Leninism, the
“economy of capitalism,” “imperialism,” the “economy of the transition from capitalism to
socialism” (“economy of the transformational”), the “history of the Communist International,
strategy and tactics of the world proletariat,” and the “history of socialist construction in the
USSR.”425
Informed by these Sino-Soviet multiparty quasi-Communist political ties, Senator Smith
then impressed upon his fellow members of the US Senate that “Moscow simply outwitted us”
and that the growing ideological competition emerging between democracy and communism
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required the United States to devise a counter-strategy of ideas and values to oppose Soviet and
Chinese Communist ideology by stating:
We in this country are slow to understand that we live in an ideological age. And we have
been slow to realize that this is a cold war for men’s minds. We try to meet that
ideological penetration with economic aid and with business as usual…We have sent
educators and missionaries, but as a nation we must face the tragic result that the ideas of
Marx and Lenin have taken over this vast territory and that the Christian heart of our
democratic faith, the spirit that has brought us liberty in political form after thousands of
years of struggle will be slowly strangled in the life of China. If we recognize this tragic
fact, we shall begin to create a new kind of strategy. We shall fight to insure that along
with economic and military strength, we are ideologically prepared.426

Senator Smith then expressed his disappointment that neither President Truman,
Secretary State Acheson, nor a significant enough number of members of Congress were in favor
of approving more economic and military aid to the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan. Despite
Smith’s advocacy that both Washington and Taipei should reverse the previous neglect of
funding the “all-important economic, political, and ideological aspects,” he conceded that more
US military aid to Taiwan would likely not be forthcoming. Despite calling for more economic
aid to Taiwan, other passages in Smith’s own testimony appeared to simultaneously undermine
his reasoning and justification for a pro-Taiwan policy.
Smith justified more funding for US ECA economic aid programs to Taiwan by stating
the intended purposes were to “avoid the antidemocratic and antiprogressive influence of the
armed camp on Formosa, so that reasonable hope may be entertained for political and economic
progress…,” establish “a form of democratic government participated in by the Formosan people
themselves, and the building up of a democratic and socially just economy,” and “develop the
economy of the island for the benefit of the population, and to establish firmly the institutions
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and practices of democratic self-government.”427 Thus Smith’s testimony implied that Taiwan’s
Nationalist regime lacked both a democratic political system and capitalist economic system of
free enterprise.
Senator Smith also offered a seemingly contradictory characterization of then recent US
economic aid as having no positive impact on Taiwan. This admission is contained in his
extensive post-trip report in the Congressional Record accompanying the text of his speech on
the Senate floor that includes the following statement: “Consequently our most recent
contributions of military supplies, and especially the last $125,000,000 under the ECA bill of last
year, were of no value whatever since prior to the turning over of those supplies the morale of
the people had collapsed.”428 Smith then offered that US foreign policy towards Taiwan should
“not permit short range financial pressures to outweigh long range ideological objectives” by
emphasizing “an ideological program of reform and rehabilitation…to develop for the Formosan
people themselves a program which would mean the assurance of their freedom and the
rehabilitation of their industries…” because he believed that the “Taiwan people would
cooperate with the Nationalist Government in setting up through our ECA operations a type of
recover which might be an example to other provinces in China…”429
Further, Smith optimistically expressed “strong hope” that after he had met with Chiang
Kai-Shek during the fall of 1949 that he [Chiang] would “accept the American democratic
challenge and exert his leadership to put into effect the principles of democracy and economic
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construction which he inherited from Sun Yat-sen.”430 Overall, Smith’s speech and written
testimony highlighted many of the well-known and seemingly negative anti-capitalist and
undemocratic aspects of Chiang’s Nationalist regime’s following Sunist-inspired socialist and
statist economic philosophies that were contrary to American political and economic ideological
principles. Smith’s testimony also appeared to have ostensibly reinforced the similar prevailing
negative impressions held by other US Congressional members, thus hindering their support for
justifying and passing legislation for more economic aid to Taiwan.
Following Senator Smith’s speech, fellow Senator William F. Knowland, a leading
Republican supporter of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalists along with former US
President Herbert C. Hoover and fellow Republican Senator Robert A. Taft as part of the so
called “China bloc” in the US Congress, strongly criticized the US State Department and the
Truman administration’s lack of support for the Chinese Nationalists. Senator Knowland’s main
argument against the Truman administration’s downgrading of Taiwan’s importance to
containing Chinese Communist expansionism failed to convince his fellow senators to support
more economic aid to the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan.431 In his subsequent exchange with
Senator Knowland, the testimony of Democratic Senator Scott W. Lucas typified the prevailing
Congressional sentiment against giving more economic aid to Taiwan when he stated the United
States had: “spent pretty close to $3,000,000,00 there in an effort to help the Nationalist
Government, and what happened to the money everyone knows. That Government simply did
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not perform. It did not follow orders…They would not take orders from Marshall or anyone else.
They did so, and they came to their ruination and downfall.”432
Consequently during 1949, against this backdrop of these and other related events, there
was a lack of unified Congressional support for giving more US economic aid to the Chinese
Nationalist regime in the future. The US Congress was also reluctant to pass significant
legislation in support President Truman’s Four Point Program due to a lack of adequate
justification for expending large financials sums for foreign aid, and because of other more
pressing domestic budgetary considerations under debate that had emerged in 1949 as the
looming “Year of Crisis” for the following fiscal year in 1950.433
Despite Congress’ reluctance to fund more US economic aid to Taiwan, Truman
administration officials soon became aware of new Soviet-inspired foreign economic aid
initiatives in early 1950 when the US State Department’s Policy Planning Staff published a
secret study entitled “Recent Soviet Moves.” This classified study informed American leaders
that there would be an emerging cold war confrontation with the Soviet Union’s “new” and
“reckless” military, economic, and “political warfare” actions by concluding that Moscow would
make “every effort…to establish and maintain effective Soviet control in China,” and perceived
that the United States “would emerge as the citadel of the non-Soviet world and therefore the
primary enemy against which the USSR would of necessity have to wage a life-and-death
struggle.”434 The document’s economic related conclusions also sounded the growing alarm that
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Soviet leaders believed that “an economic crisis is actually in the incipient stage in the West and
that this and succeeding cries will contribute to an eventual Soviet triumph,” while further noting
that “Soviet actions make clear that Moscow’s faith in the inevitable disintegration of capitalism
is…a messianic faith…”435
Both Washington and Taipei were also alarmed by Moscow and Beijing’s new
cooperation in bilateral political, security, and economic aid relations resulting from Chinese
Communist leader Mao Zedong’s heralded visit with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in Moscow
during a two-month period from December 1949 to February 1950 that led to the USSR and the
PRC signing their landmark “Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual
Assistance” agreement on February 14, 1950.436 This 30-year Sino-Soviet Treaty’s provisions
established and led to two other related agreements for Soviet economic aid such as an initial
$300 million of loan credits over five years to the Chinese Communists, including several “SinoSoviet joint ventures” involving reconstructing the PRC’s economy in the main industrial sectors
of aviation, shipbuilding, mining, petroleum, and steel production industries.437 The Sino-Soviet
Treaty also represented an ironic reversal and abrogation of Moscow’s “Leninist dual policy”
inspired earlier Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance on August 14, 1945 with the
Chinese Nationalists—domestic archrivals of the Chinese Communists.438

Ibid., 146-147; and Dean Acheson, “United States Policy Towards Asia,” The Department of State
Bulletin Vol. XXII, no 560, March 27, 1950, 468.
435

Yang Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Alliance and Nationalism: A Contradiction,” Parallel History Project
on NATO and the Warsaw Pact, The Cold War History of Sino-Soviet Relations (June 2005): 1-12.
436

437

Ibid., 10.

Robert C. North, “The Sino-Soviet Agreements of 1950,” Far Eastern Survey 19, no. 13 (July 1950):
125-126, 129.
438

175
Although this new bilateral Sino-Soviet treaty committing the Soviets to providing the
Chinese Communists with extensive new economic aid did not immediately lead to Washington
and Taipei consummating a similar economic aid treaty, the Chinese Nationalists and their
American political supporters would soon use this development to bolster arguments justifying
more US economic aid to Taiwan later during the 1950s. Similarly, by 1950, if not earlier in
1945, Washington had been aware of Moscow’s initiating, leading, and managing a socialiststyle bilateral cooperative economic development agreement with the totalitarian North Korea
Labor Party-led Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Communist regime in northern Korea
during 1945-1950.439
By 1945, both Taiwan and Korea had just experienced decades of state led systems of
economic centralization and exploitation under Japan’s authoritarianism and oppression when
Japan ruled both nations as colonies during 1895-1945 and 1910-1945 respectively. Moscow
largely replicated this historical legacy by introducing “Soviet advisors and Koreans loyal to the
USSR” to form a planned socialist economic system in northern Korea in 1945 with a “joint
Soviet-Korean” statist economy featuring public sector heavy industrialization at the expense of
the private sector.440
By early January 1950, with the bulk of the recently evacuated Chinese Nationalist ROC
government now ensconced on the island of Taiwan, Wellington Koo, the Chinese Ambassador
in Washington, sent a formal request to Secretary Acheson for an extension of US aid to assist in
the reconstruction of Taiwan’s infrastructure and economic sectors. Acheson’s reply to Koo
indicated that while US economic aid to Taiwan was “intended” to continue under the existing
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ECA program “with funds made available by Section 12 of Public Law 47 (81st Congress),”
Acheson warned that the United States was concerned about how this “economic assistance
might contribute to a vigorous and effective effort by the Chinese Government to create and
maintain stable economic and political conditions on Taiwan,” thus implying that Washington
would continue being circumspect in the “process of review and implementation” of future
economic aid requests.441
Later that same month, when the Chinese Nationalists contacted American ECA officials
in Taipei inquiring if there was “flexibility” in the ROC government diverting US economic aid
to “resolving the Chinese Government’s financial deficit by reducing military expenditures and
the size of the military establishment,” Acheson instructed the US Embassy in a top secret
telegram to inform ROC officials that this would be “possible only if Gimo [sic] aware such
steps indispensable survival Chi Govt Taiwan and takes determined forceful action accordingly.
Successive rewards within capacity US Govt cannot be decisive factor and US Govt shld [sic]
not place itself in position promising subsidize Chi Govt through additional aid…”442
Similarly, US Ambassador at Large Philip Jessup, while on an official inspection tour of
Taiwan when he visited Taipei during January 15th -17th, met with Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek and K.C. Wu, the Governor of Taiwan, to discuss their requests for more US economic aid.
Jessup’s confidential memorandum of conversation during his meeting with Wu revealed that the
governor indicated that the Chinese Nationalist led ROC government was aware that it had to
implement significant political, economic, and military reforms to “correct present ills” in
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Taiwan.443 Wu further commented on economic reform matters by indicating that there was a
“need for more production, free enterprise and land reform,” while insisting that “the U.S. must”
give economic aid to Taiwan, and “permit the [Nationalist] Government to use a part of this
economic aid to employ foreign military advisors.”444
Wu’s comment about the ROC government diverting US economic aid to fund Taiwan’s
military efforts would later emerge as another controversial issue used by critics in Washington
opposing more US aid for Taiwan because the Chinese Nationalists maintained too high of a
defense budget, thus detrimental to and undermining overall economic development on the
island throughout the 1950s and 1960s. As a portent for supporters in Washington who
advocated for more US economic aid to Taiwan by justifying it for opposing global communism,
Jessup reported on his meeting later that same evening with ROC President Chiang Kai-shek that
he (Chiang) expressed his view that “further American aid to him was the only way in which the
world could be saved” [from communism].445
By mid-May 1950, US embassy officials in Taiwan reported to Secretary Acheson in
Washington that they believed that the “fate of Taiwan sealed” because of the imminent threat of
a Communist Chinese military invasion of the island sometime between June 15th and the end of
July 1950.446 Due to this portending attack and threat to American lives, these officials also
recommended immediately evacuating all Americans and reducing embassy personnel, attaches,
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and ECA staff managing US economic aid funded reconstruction programs on Taiwan.447
Furthermore, US embassy officials recommended eliminating ongoing and future planned ECA
economic aid contracts, but also operations of the bilateral US-China Joint Commission on Rural
Reconstruction (JCRR) projects under the ECA-CUSA framework funded by the 1948 China
Aid Program, thus signaling the end and further use of US economic aid for the Chinese
Nationalists on Taiwan.448
By the end of May, Taiwan’s precarious and dire security and economic situations had
broader impacts on the strategic thinking of US officials in Washington who vacillated over
growing negative American public opinion and globally over whether the United States lacked
““forthright action on our part in the Far East; that Formosa presents a plausible place to “draw
the line” and is, in itself, important politically if not strategically, for what it represents in
continued Communist expansion.””449
This dilemma facing Washington over the “loss” of China to Communism and whether to
support the anti-communist Chinese Nationalists now on Taiwan within the broader context of
the early cold war period was illustrated in a top secret draft memorandum prepared by Dean
Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, for Secretary Acheson which stated:
“The United States faces a new and critical period in its world position. The loss of China to
Communists who, it now seems, will work in Asia as junior partners of Soviet Communism has
had tremendous repercussions throughout the world. It has marked a shift in the balance of
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power in favor of Soviet Russia and to the disfavor of the United States.”450 Washington officials
also noted that Chinese Communists attitude regarding economic trade was “toward monopoly”
after concluding that they “intend to monopolize exports first, then imports,” thus representing
expected future behavior that would be antithetical to the basic capitalist economic ideological
concept of “free trade.”451
Overall, the emerging Sino-Soviet economic expansionism and outreach with vulnerable
developing nations during the nearly 18 months after President Truman’s 1949 inaugural speech
outlining his Four Point economic aid initiatives finally culminated in the US Congress taking
action to address perceived deficiencies in US foreign economic aid policies. On June 5, 1950,
the 81st Congress finally respond by approving the landmark legislation known as the “Foreign
Economic Assistance Act of 1950” in which Title IV of Public Law 535, specified it as the
“Point IV Program,” and entitled it as the “Act for International Development.”452
Just over a week later on June 14, 1950, (just 10 days prior to the outbreak of the Korean
War), the calamitous military and economic situation on Taiwan and the imminent threat of
invasion of the island posed by the Chinese Communists influenced General Douglas
MacArthur, then based in Japan as the Commander-in-Chief of the US Department of Defense
Far Eastern Command (FECOM), to send US Secretary of State Dulles and Secretary of Defense
Johnson a top secret memorandum emphasizing the “strategic importance of Formosa as well as

450

Extract From a Draft Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to
the Secretary of State, [Top Secret] May 30, 1950, in FRUS 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, 349.
451
Memorandum by Mr. Charlton Ogburn of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, [Subject: Remarks on the
Situation in China by Consul General McConaughy at the Inter-Departmental Meeting on the Far East] June 2,
1950, [Confidential] in FRUS 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, 354.

US State Department, “Legislative Background of Point Four Program,” (Washington DC: June 20,
1950) in FRUS, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I, Document 304.
452

180
its importance as a political area to western ideology.”453 MacArthur, citing “a disaster of utmost
importance to the US” if Formosa [Taiwan] were to fall to “Communist domination,” requested
approval from Washington to personally travel to Taiwan and conduct a “survey of the military,
economic and political requirements to prevent the domination of Formosa by a Communist
power that the results of such a survey be analyzed and acted upon as a basis for US national
policy with respect to Formosa.”454
The importance of this classified memorandum, as well as MacArthur’s other related
subsequent speeches, letters, and conversations with senior officials in the US government,
influencing Washington’s support for Taiwan cannot be understated. This five-page
memorandum contained MacArthur’s famous and widely known publicly spoken phrase
comparing Formosa [Taiwan] to “an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender.”455
General MacArthur’s advocacy of support and aid for the Chinese Nationalists would influence
members of the US Congress and the American public to favor more economic aid to Taiwan
due to his prestige as the FECOM Commander, five-star general officer rank, and the wellknown legacy of his military service during World War Two. MacArthur’s main argument for
supporting the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan was based on his characterization of the island’s
strategic significance as a geographical, military, and political-ideological bastion of antiCommunism.
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MacArthur further justified aiding Taiwan to prevent the island from being used as a
staging base for Chinese Communist military forces, as well as relating that since 1948 he had
been “concerned as to the future status of Formosa and I have been convinced that the strategic
interests of the United States will be in serious jeopardy if Formosa is allowed to be dominated
by a power hostile to the United States.”456 MacArthur also described the regional economic
importance of Taiwan by claiming its past self-sufficiency in foodstuffs and exporter of rice and
wheat, while implying as a harbinger for more US economic aid to the island because “there is
no reason to believe that able political and economic advisors cannot once more establish
Formosa as a prosperous economic unit. Such a factor, particularly the availability of a food
surplus, may be of considerable importance in reestablishing the economies of those Oriental
nations now largely dependent upon United States assistance.”457
While the US State Department replied back on June 22nd to MacArthur’s staff that the
“implications” of the memorandum were “being studied” back in Washington, just 72 hours later
the Soviet inspired North Korean military aggression starting the Korean War on June 25th would
significantly contribute to the momentous “fundamental change” in US foreign policy towards
Taiwan that included Washington committing large amounts of US military and economic aid
support to the Chinese Nationalists during the next 15 years.458
Washington’s fundamental policy change towards Taiwan occurred just 48 hours after
the outbreak of the Korean War as specified in President Truman’s renowned statement on June
27, 1950, that he had “…ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a
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corollary of this action I am calling on the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and
sea operations against the mainland…The determination of the future status of Formosa must
await the restoration of security in the pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by
the United Nations.”459 Two months later, due to various controversies in the public sphere
circulating over growing confusion about what Washington’s specific intentions towards Taiwan
were, President Truman further clarified “that there be no misunderstanding” about his earlier
June 27th statement by detailing that US policy was “an impartial neutralizing action” designed
to “keep the peace” in the Taiwan Strait due to Chinese Communist threats of conflict towards
the island or to “United Nations forces operating in Korea…”460
Supporters in Washington for more US economic aid to Taiwan would also use the
pretext of the Korean War by linking it as part of the strong US military response to North
Korean aggression against South Korea on the Korean peninsula together with broader military
and economic actions countering expected further Soviet and Chinese Communist aggression
and influence elsewhere throughout East Asia. Immediately at the start of the Korean War on
June 25th, the US State Department prepared its secret “Intelligence Estimate No.7: Korea”
informing senior officials in Washington that the Soviet Union and Communist China would be
emboldened to act elsewhere in the region if the United States did not immediately defend and
aid South Korea.461
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While the contents of Estimate No.7 revealed that the US State Department judged that
the “North Korean Government is completely under Kremlin control” and that the “move against
South Korea must therefore be considered a Soviet move,” it further concluded that “liquidation
of the South Korean Government would fit into Soviet global strategy” as a ““test on ground
militarily most favorable to the Soviet Union of the resolution of the US in its announced policy
of “total diplomacy.””462
This estimate further explained that the Soviet Union’s motivations for instigating the
Korean War were either intended or otherwise would embolden the Chinese Communists in
making similar aggressive moves in the region because such a test: “would probably be
considered important in connection with possible Chinese moves in support of Ho Chi Minh,
Burmese Communists, or Malayan Communists…,” and that if South Korea was defeated: “a
severe blow would be dealt US prestige throughout Asia and the encouragement which has been
felt in widely scattered areas in consequence of the premise of more active American support of
anti-Communist forces would be reversed.”463
In light of the new Sino-Soviet treaty alliance signed just months earlier, the estimate also
forecasted that successful US intervention on the Korean Peninsula in support of South Korea
against the Soviet backed North Korean regime could undermine this alliance by producing “a
marked psychological reaction in the…minds of the Chinese Communist leaders” because
“doubts would be created, or increased, as to the ultimate success of the Soviet camp in the cold
war” and the probability that the “relative weakness or ineptness of the USSR in its Korean
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adventure, but also by the threat of the newly militant posture of the US in the Far East, a threat
that had all but been created by Soviet blundering.”464
The State Department’s estimate also projected that successful US military intervention
in Korea, accompanied with a simultaneous show of force as a defensive action neutralizing the
Taiwan Strait, would not only “forestall Chinese Communist capture of Formosa,” but also
redirect and deter potential Chinese Communist involvement in support of Soviet and North
Korean forces against US military forces on the Korean Peninsula.465 Further, on the evening of
June 25th, President Truman convened an emergency meeting at Blair House to discuss the
“Korean Situation” with no less than the 13 highest ranking members of US State Department,
Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the military Service secretaries at the
beginning of which General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the JCS read aloud to the group a
summary of General MacArthur’s top secret memorandum prepared 10 days earlier on June 14,
1950 emphasizing “his views about the importance of denying Formosa to the Communists.”466
Next, both Secretary of State Acheson and Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval
Operations supported MacArthur’s position on Taiwan by recommending that President Truman
“immediately” order the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet to “proceed to Formosa” to “prevent attacks
from Formosa as well as on Formosa;” which was intended to deter and prevent both the Chinese
Communists and Nationalists from attacking each other from either side of the Taiwan Strait.467
Four days later on June 29th, the JCS issued a top secret emergency directive broadening and
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supplementing MacArthur’s military mission in defense of South Korea and Formosa by stating
that “by naval and air action you will defend Formosa against invasion or attack by Chinese
Communists and will insure that Formosa will not be used as a base of operations against the
Chinese mainland by Chinese Nationalists.”468
Overall, the conclusions reached at the June 25th meeting were consistent with subsequent
intelligence estimates and diplomatic reports of hostile Soviet and Chinese Communist intentions
in East Asia that influenced Washington to expand its early cold war policies and programs for
expanding military and economic aid to other friendly anti-communist or pro-US allies in the
region such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and the ROC government in Taiwan.
Although Washington had been previously inclined to abandon and limit economic aid to
Taiwan during 1948-1949 as described in Chapter Two, the sudden onset of these early cold war
controversial series of diplomatic, economic, and political events triggered highly contentious
debates within the US government over the existential threats posed by Soviet expansionism and
the outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950. As a result, the United States reversed
course and supported the Chinese Nationalist-led ROC government in Taiwan with extensive
amounts of economic and defense security related aid. These developments also influenced the
US Congress and the Truman administration to implement the ways and means of a cold war
containment strategy confronting Soviet and Chinese Communist aggression by reaffirming and
increasing long-term military and economic aid to support Washington’s non-communist Asian
allies, most notably South Korea and the ROC on the island of Taiwan.469
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The outbreak of the Korean War also resulted in a large increase in the volume of official
letters exchanged between American and Chinese Nationalist political leaders over issues
involving Taiwan’s requests justifying more US economic and military aid to Taiwan. The
contents in various key letters, many of which were printed in various editions of the US
Congressional Record during the period, revealed significant details of the emerging puzzle
exposing the contradictions inherent to the purposes of US economic aid intended to develop
democracy and its ideologically related components of capitalist free market and private sectors
for an anti-democratic Taiwan with its socialist inspired government run statist public sector
dominated economy.
Together with the outbreak of the Korean War, a key related catalyst influencing more
US economic aid to Taiwan stemmed from correspondence in English between key American
political leaders and leading Chinese Nationalist political leaders who had previously lived in the
United States and spoke or wrote fluent English. The Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan largely
justified, feigned, and amplified their economic aid requests to Washington by emphasizing the
alleged core sociopolitical ideologies of democracy, capitalism, free speech, and religious
freedom shared between the two nations.
As previously mentioned in Chapter Two, Madame Chiang Kai-shek achieved notable
success in her efforts during World War Two in persuading high level officials in Washington to
give more economic aid to China. By 1950, another key influential Chinese Nationalist leader,
K.C. Wu, Governor of Taiwan, or as formally titled: “Chairman of the Taiwan Provincial
Government” during 1949-1953, also became instrumental in successfully influencing members
of the US Congress to support US economic aid to Taiwan. Governor Wu, who had previously
been the Chinese Nationalist mayor of Shanghai during 1945-1949, was fully proficient in the
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English language, having earned his master’s degree in economics from Grinnell College, Iowa
in 1923, and his doctoral degree in political theory from Princeton University in 1926.470
Governor Wu leveraged the legacy of his American education in Iowa during the 1920’s
to send a formal letter dated November 23, 1950, to Iowa Republican Congressman Karl M.
LeCompte updating him on Taiwan’s overall sociopolitical situation. On December 1, 1950,
Congressman LeCompte, who requested Wu’s letter be inserted into the official printed US
Congressional Record, stated on the House floor that Governor Wu was:
…a very sound statesman. I have a recent letter from him, in which he describes his
efforts to establish representative government and government by elected public officers
in the Taiwan Province of China. We are very anxious to aid the forces against
communism in the Orient at this time. I feed certain that the Members of the House and
particularly the members of the Foreign Relations Committee will be interested in this
letter….471
In general, Governor Wu’s letter is one of the era’s typical exemplar correspondences
revealing the overall ideologically contradictory puzzle of US economic aid going to develop
liberal capitalism and a private sector economy for the authoritarian socialist Chinese Nationalist
regime in Taiwan. This letter contained the consistent narratives and themes purported by
Chinese Nationalist political officials that the ROC government was effectively using US aid for
its broader intended purposes—to promote democracy, capitalism, and human rights in the
authoritarian, undemocratic, and socialist-inspired public sector dominated recipient nation of
Taiwan.
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Governor Wu and many other senior Chinese Nationalist officials clearly recognized that
there were a few, but influential detractors and critics among members of the US Congress who
were not inclined to support budget authorizations for increasing US economic and military aid
to Taiwan because of these inherent moral and ideological contradictions. As a result, Chinese
Nationalist leaders such as Wu made concerted overtures to Washington that the ROC
government had made progress at reforming itself to meet the intended purposes of US economic
aid, despite specific conditions tied to many of these goals remaining rather vague at the time.
This letter and hundreds of other prior diplomatic cables and reports show that
Washington possessed the knowledge, facts, and evidence about the actual deplorable and
widespread state of economic and social instability caused by the authoritarian ROC
government’s repressive and dysfunctional leadership over Taiwan. Governor Wu’s letter to
Congressman LeCompte nevertheless presented a contrary and pseudo-fictional accounting of
Taiwan’s sociopolitical situation and progress as he pled for more US aid by late 1950. In one
key paragraph describing US economic aid’s impact on a “democratic” Taiwan, justified in part
by opposing Communism, Wu’s letter stated that:
…in the achievement of stability on Taiwan we have been greatly benefited by American
assistance, ECA aid has been particularly useful in the solution of our economic
problems. There can be no doubt that with the American people’s generous support, both
moral and material, we shall not fall to tide over the present crisis and contribute our
share to the democratic nations’ joint efforts for checking Communist expansion.472
Other notable passages in Wu’s letter described the ROC government’s purported
progress in achieving social stability and establishing democracy in Taiwan appeared
contradictory to the true state of Chinese Nationalist political repression and economic turmoil
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there on the island that had been exasperated by it imposing martial law on May 20, 1949. In
deflecting criticism that Taiwan’s society was in turmoil due to the ROC government’s
authoritarian rule, Wu claimed that the Chinese Nationalists’ “achievement of stability has
enabled us to maintain peace and order throughout the island and increase Taiwan’s security
against Communist invasion…The people are contented….” In refuting criticism of Taiwan’s
lack of democracy, Wu noted that: “we have already made a good start in inaugurating the
popular election of officials of the local governments…The elections were free in every sense of
the word. There was not the slightest interference from governmental authorities... We are highly
gratified with the success thus far attained, which undoubtedly augurs well for the future of
popular government in China.”473
Rather astonishingly, Wu countered criticism of the ROC government’s martial law
restrictions that seriously lacked even basic forms of human rights laws and modern liberal civil
jurisprudence system of courts to protect civil liberties by stating:
…we are placing great stress on rule of law. The Government has directed that the
liberties of the individual must be respected, and all persons tried in military courts will
soon be permitted to have legal counsel. For many decades China’s judicial system, in
both theory and practice, has largely been dominated by the concepts of continental law,
but now we have begun to adopt and emphasize the principles of Anglo-Saxon law,
which holds that a man bust be considered innocent until he is proved guilty.474

In other related strategic foreign policy developments, it was also during this critical
period in 1950 that the US executive branch formed economic components of Washington’s cold
war containment strategies and policies versus Soviet and Chinese Communist global
expansionism. Several US executive branch primary sources reveal evidence within the US cold
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war containment strategies for evolving ideological concepts of US economic development aid
goals for foreign nations. Examples include presidential speeches, memoranda, and declassified
US foreign aid and economic policy related materials produced from within the US executive
branch to include the National Security Council (NSC), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and
the State Department.
The earliest and most well-known example is the formerly top secret classified, and
foundational US cold war containment strategy articulated in the 1950 NSC Paper NSC-68:
United States Objectives and Programs for National Security. 475 The genesis of the economic
related components of this executive branch NSC document resulted from its formation in
cooperation with the Truman Administration’s Secretary of the Treasury, Economic Cooperation
Administrator, and Council of Economic Advisors.
The majority of NSC-68’s ends, ways, and means focused on the US and allied response
to the Soviet threat of military force and atomic weapons. However, the external focused
economic goals and US “international economic activities” expressed as “containment” to thwart
Soviet economic power included the explicit statement that: “We must lead in building a
successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world.”476 NSC-68 established
foundational US intentions to use “foreign economic policy as a major instrument in the conduct
of United States foreign relations” and as “an instrument peculiarly appropriate to the cold
war.”477 It also articulated promoting the ways and means of economic aid to allied nations
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towards containing the global Soviet threat by noting how Washington should improve the
American domestic economy so as to further “build-up of the economic and military strength of
itself and its allies…” and “some increase in economic assistance programs” through extending
bilateral and multilateral grants, loans, credits, and trade agreements.478
Another key feature of NSC-68 that influenced Washington to resume giving more
economic aid to Taiwan was that it specifically called for integrating US diplomatic, economic,
and military plans and programs into the ways and means of its emerging cold war strategy of
“containment” versus the “organized and aggressive growth of communism.”479 Washington had
concluded that because the Soviet Union initiated its own organized integrated expansionist
strategy, the US had implemented the Marshall Plan for economic aid to European nations as a
way to “preserve democracy against the spread of communism” as part of the new containment
policy, defined as restricting “the authority of the Soviet to those regions in which their
domination now prevails.”480 However, Taiwan did not appear explicitly linked to NSC-68 at
this time because it had been finalized and sent to President Truman for approval in April
1950—two months prior to the outbreak of Korean War on June 25, 1950.481
While NSC-68 generally described those conditions for success of US economic
assistance to Western Europe such as with the European Recovery Program were favorable,
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similar conditions in Asia among “moderate governments” were “doubtful.”482 Further, other
Asian countries such as India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines were specifically
listed in NSC-68 as likely intended recipients of US economic aid, yet China and Japan were not.
This likely reflected the controversies within the US government over whether to give economic
aid to the corrupt and authoritarian Chinese Nationalist regime in Taiwan following the
tumultuous Chinese civil war period and Washington’s lack of confidence in Taipei’s
competence to effectively govern the island and resist a Chinese Communist invasion.
By the end of 1950, the Truman Administration instituted a formal Foreign Aid Steering
Group “with eight subsidiary Task Forces” led by the US State Department, in coordination with
the US Defense Department, to combine both military and economic aid requests into a “singlepackage” of proposed annual foreign aid legislation sent to the US Congress as part of President
Truman’s Point Four Program and the Mutual Security Program envisioned by NSC-68.483 A key
purpose justifying this new executive branch administrative initiative was for “building
necessary strength in the free world through the necessary military and related economic
activities and to strengthen areas against possible aggression.”484 On January 8, 1951, the US
State Department’s newly created Office of the Director, International Security Affairs (S/ISA)
assumed responsibility for the “general direction and coordination” of “military assistance
programs and economic assistance programs designed to support military assistance.”485
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Also on January 8, 1951, President Truman presented his annual State of the Union
address to the 82nd Congress wherein he cited the dual global threats of Soviet “imperialism”
through Moscow’s methods of exporting military aggression and “subversion and internal
revolution.”486 This speech included Truman proclaiming that the Soviets “deliberately try to
prevent economic development,”—a charge that he suggested the US Congress react to by
funding new initiatives to meet this new challenge by extending “economic assistance, where it
can be effective” to other foreign nations based on the success of the Marshall plan in Western
Europe where “our programs of economic aid have done much to turn back Communism.”487
Truman also called for further economic aid to European nations while justifying it as
“specifically related to the building of their defenses” while also calling for new funding for
economic development in other regions such as Asia because of the growing security threats
from Soviet-inspired communist expansionism.488
Following President Truman’s speech and as his administration ramped up the US
government’s cold war related plans and programs for domestic defense mobilization and giving
more military and economic aid to allied nations during 1950-1951 to counter global
Communist-inspired aggression, it also considered the degree that American domestic public
opinion favored such new aid on foreign nations. The Truman administration’s renewed focus on
ascertaining American public attitudes was in reaction to the emerging controversies and debates
within the US Congress and amongst the American public over the spending level for the US
government’s growing annual foreign aid budgets. These budgets had significantly grown to
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fund the European Recovery Program (or Marshall Plan) for Europe in 1948 and for the “Far
East” due to Soviet, North Korean, and Chinese Communist aggression following the end of the
Chinese civil war in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.
By the fall of 1950, the US State Department, citing the “military reverses in Korea,”
expanded its public opinion surveys to ascertain American attitudes towards supporting “U.S.
foreign aid plans” for both economic and military “forms of aid” to Europe, the Far East, the
Near East, and the Western Hemisphere.489 In its Special Report on American Opinion dated
January 15, 1951, the US State Department reported that among American attitudes towards the
“Far East,” the Korean War had resulted in strong public support for US military aid to
“governments in Asia threatened by Communism” such as “Nationalist China,” but that
““relatively few have supported Mr. Stassen’s large-scale proposal of a “Marshall Plan for
Asia.””490
Like many prominent American politicians among both political parties during the early
cold war era that supported more US economic aid to like-minded foreign nations such as the
ROC on Taiwan, the “Mr. Stassen” referred to in this 1951 report was the prominent Republican
politician Harold E. Stassen (1907-2001) from Minnesota and perennial aspiring Republican
presidential nominee front-runner. Stassen appeared to have been largely influenced by his
beliefs in religious freedom (stemming from his active life-long involvement in Baptist
organizations), American democratic political values, and economic concepts of capitalism and
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free enterprise to oppose communism’s anti-religious, anti-democratic, and anti-capitalist
ideologies throughout his long political career.
Stassen would soon figure prominently in expanding US foreign economic aid while
serving as the Director, Mutual Security Program in 1953 and the US Foreign Operations
Administration during 1953-1955 in the Eisenhower administration. While in these positions he
oversaw the implementation of US foreign aid to friendly governments that he had earlier
advocated for in 1951 such as the ROC on Taiwan and other nations supportive of Washington’s
cold war policies of containment versus Soviet and Chinese inspired expansionism.
The State Department’s 1951 report highlighted that the Korean War had influenced over
half of the American public in favor of support for “assistance to help backward peoples” such as
in the “Far East or Asia,” and that the “traditional pro-Chiang group, have favored military aid to
the Nationalist army and its use in the struggle against Chinese Communists.”491 However, the
report also implied that the unfavorable American public support for economic aid to Taiwan
was likely due to perceptions that the Nationalist-led ROC government on the island was a
corrupt authoritarian regime maintaining a repressive political regime overseeing an inefficient
state-run economy that was antithetical to US moral, political, and economic values. For
example, the report noted that among the larger American public that ““an articulate group of
“moderates” and “liberals” have continued to disapprove support of the “discredited” Chiang
regime. There is almost no current discussion of economic aid to the Nationalists.””492
By the spring of 1951, with the ongoing involvement of Chinese Communist miliary
forces versus UN forces on the Korean Peninsula raging, Washington initiated a limited program
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of military assistance for Taiwan by establishing a Joint United States Military Advisor Group
for “Formosa,” and increasing funding and defense materials under the Mutual Defense
Assistance Program.493 More broadly by the summer of 1951, the NSC staff sent President
Truman a new report that supplemented the NSC 68 series in the form of NSC 114/1: Status and
Timing of Current U.S. Programs for National Security for his approval.494
The extensive contents of NSC 114/1 centered on justifying future US “budgetary
determinations” during 1953-1954 based on countering major elements of Soviet power,
particularly new “atomic capabilities,” supported by the conclusion that the “world situation
shows that the danger to our security is greater now than it was in April 1950.”495 It also
reaffirmed the “urgency” for military and economic assistance programs while noting that “In
the Far East the United States aid programs together with the struggle against aggression in
Korea have played an important part in stemming the tide of Russian-inspired subversion and
conquest; but much remains to be done…”496
However, NSC 141/1 indirectly reflected the lack of major US economic aid for Taiwan
by mentioning Washington’s awareness and concern over the lingering difficulties and
impediments among foreign national governments using US economic aid because of their
“insufficient political cohesion and resoluteness” and “caution” among “many non-European
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countries, they enfeeble efforts to improve the internal security situation and to execute programs
of economic improvement.”497 It was also noteworthy that both NSC 141/1, and its subsequent
updated version in the series with NSC 114/2: United States Programs for National Security just
two months later on October 12, 1951, made little reference to China and no significant mention
of US economic or military aid to Taiwan.498
In addition, NSC 114/2 contained an annex with an enclosure of the CIA’s Special
Estimate on “Probable Developments in the World Situation Through Mid-1953”499 which was
critical of the Chinese Nationalists by concluding and warning that the “Nationalist military
position on Taiwan should gradually improve with US aid. However, the security of Taiwan will
continue to be hampered by the regime’s economic difficulties, general inefficiency and
corruption, and will require close US control if US military and economic aid is to be
effective.”500
By the fall of 1951, the US Congress passed new legislation in support of executive
branch policies that linked US economic aid to broader security assistance and collective defense
among the United States and its global allies versus these new threats that resulted from the
Korean War, as well as Soviet and Chinese Communist inspired military aggression in Eastern
Europe and Asia respectively. This new legislation included the landmark “Mutual Security Act
of 1951” passed by both houses of Congress on October 10, 1951 which represented the seminal
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cornerstone legislation establishing enduring US economic aid linked to Washington’s emerging
cold war foreign policy “to friendly countries to strengthen the mutual security and individual
and collective defenses of the free world, to develop their resources in the interest of their
security and independence and the national interest of the United States…”501 During President
Truman’s publicly staged event on October 10th when he signed the new Mutual Security Act of
1951, he stated: “I am thinking particularly of the necessity of supporting the free nations of Asia
in their efforts to strengthen the economic foundations of their independence.”502
The Act is also significant because it superseded, consolidated, reaffirmed, and extended
the rationale of security purposes linked to justifying economic aid expenditures to friendly
“Asia and Pacific” nations within Congress’ previously passed bills related to Truman’s Point IV
Program such as the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of
1949, the China Area Aid Act of 1950, and the Act for International Development in 1950.503
The overall provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 authorized the executive branch to
oversee and use these appropriations for “the general area of China,” to include “economic and
technical assistance,” as well as authorized but unexpended appropriations from the previously
passed bills totaling $237 million through the fiscal year ending June 30, 1952.504
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While the Act’s provisions set several requirements and conditions on recipient nations
receiving US military and security assistance, Congress also inserted a short declaration of its
policy linking US economic aid to nations based on their expected adherence to certain capitalist
“free enterprise” principles. These principles in the Act included Congress’ policy that US
economic aid to foreign nations be conditioned on “steadily increased participation of free
private enterprise,” while discouraging “cartel and monopolistic business practices prevailing in
certain countries receiving aid under this Act,” encouraging “suitable competition,” and
“strengthening of the free labor union movements as the collective bargaining agencies of labor
within such countries.”505 While Taiwan was not specifically mentioned in the Act, (like nations
such as the Republic of Korea and the Republic of the Philippines), the terms were rather clear
that Congress’ intent for US economic aid to recipient nations would be conditioned upon their
progress towards implementing the above-mentioned characteristics of capitalist free enterprise
economic systems.
The Act’s ambiguity and lack of specificity towards US economic aid to Taiwan
indicated that there was either division within the Congress or it lacked confidence in Taiwan as
a worthy recipient of US economic assistance. However, the Act did contain similar language
from the China Area Aid Act of 1950 with authorized the US president to extend such aid to
“those portions of such area which the President deems to be not under Communist control,” “the
general area of China,” and “selected citizens of China.”506 The Act’s specific lack of inclusion
of the terms “Republic of China” (ROC), “Formosa,” or “Taiwan” was likely due to Taiwan’s
nascent economy then exhibiting little to no capitalist free enterprise characteristics at the time
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with its central state-run public sector dominated economic system. Taiwan’s domestic political
structure and economy was dominated by Taiwan’s Chinese Nationalist government controlled
public sector state-enterprises that it had either took from the mainland or expropriated from the
former Japanese colonial administrators during 1945-1946.
The overall relative lack of US military support for the Chinese Nationalist-led ROC
government, combined with the success of the Chinese Communists’ comprehensive insurgency
efforts and the Nationalists’ own political, economic, and military failures in China during
Chinese civil war period 1948-1949 resulted in the Chinese Communists prevailing over the
Chinese Nationalists on the mainland. By the end of 1949, the Chinese Nationalists were forced
to evacuate their ROC government to the island of Taiwan. Just two years later by 1951, Chinese
Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek had nationalized nearly all of the island’s infrastructure and
55 percent of Taiwan’s industrial economic sectors.507
The newly arrived Chinese Nationalists also prevented the majority of the eight million
“native” Taiwanese living on the island from either participating in the public sector or
developing a private sector because of the ROC government’s fear of native Taiwanese gaining
economic and political power versus the Chinese Nationalists there.508 This resulted in the
Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan creating a large government dominated public sector economy
with an inherently undeveloped private sector, domestic consumption components, or trade and
export capacity to earn foreign exchange to fund the initial stages of a large defense burden
oriented against the Chinese Communists on mainland China.509
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It was only after the Chinese Nationalist-led ROC government’s retreat to Taiwan in
1949 that the Nationalists achieved significant success in reviving and reforming their hybrid
authoritarian political party and government system in the initial critical early period during
1950-1952. This revised ROC governance system was characterized by a synthesis of antidemocratic and anti-capitalist ideological elements of both Soviet inspired Leninist and their
rival political opponents’ Chinese Communist party-state “democratic centralism” principles and
models of organization and political work.510 These Chinese Nationalist party organizational
reform efforts included new economic modernization goals, and propaganda work infused with
historical and cultural Chinese Confucian concepts of authoritarianism and hierarchy in politics
and social relationships to reconstruct Taiwan’s economy and eventually instill the legacy of
Sun’s vague and undefined form of a political “democracy” for China.511
On one hand, the United States exhibited and preferred a Western-based capitalist
ideology for economic development, both at home and abroad. On the other hand, the Chinese
Nationalists preferred a statist, government run quasi-socialist economic development model that
was antithetical to the former in purposes, efficiency, productivity, and outcomes. As a result of
these significant divergences between fundamental and disparate economic development
philosophies and practices, a key puzzle emerged over the apparent ideological contradictions
and intended purposes of US economic aid to Taiwan. These apparent contradictions can be
framed and interpreted as between a liberal capitalist-oriented donor state—the United States,
giving economic aid to an illiberal, statist, and corrupt authoritarian regime—the Chinese
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Nationalists ROC government recipient state that implemented a largely socialist based planned
and managed economy in Taiwan during this early period.
Following the end of the Truman administration in 1952, Washington exhibited two main
stages of evolution justifying its rationale for US economic aid to developing nations such as
Taiwan during President Eisenhower’s eight-year administration covering his two terms in office
during 1953-1960. The first evolutionary stage began in 1953 with the Eisenhower
administration formally extending the early cold war era rationale of the Truman administration
for US economic aid to Taiwan. This extension was implemented under several US economic aid
programs, most notably under the Mutual Security Administration (MSA), justified primarily by
Washington’s concerns over Soviet and Communist Chinese military, political, economic, and
related ideological expansionism throughout East Asia.
During the first year of the Eisenhower administration in November 1953, US foreign
policy towards the Chinese Nationalist-led ROC government on Taiwan was revised by
codifying and reaffirming Washington’s firm policy of extending significant military and
economic aid within NSC 146/2: United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to
Formosa and the Chinese National Government.512 This policy contained Washington’s eight
objectives for Taiwan, with the fifth being: “Development of a strong and expanding Formosan
economy.”513
The text in NSC 146/2 justified US economic aid to “Free China” on Taiwan based on
the military and political threats posed by the Chinese Communist forces from the mainland; the
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severely damaged Taiwanese economy experiencing extremely high inflation and disrupted
trade; lack of foreign exchange, rising retail and wholesale prices; and the ROC’s military
defense costs consuming 80 percent of the national budget.514 NSC 146/2 also initiated a longerterm program for US economic assistance to Taiwan through Washington’s aspirational policy
statement that: “…application of modern methods could make it, with proper guidance,
assistance, encouragement and opportunity for trade, a splendid “show window” of the free
world in Asia.”515
However, at this early stage of the Eisenhower administration in 1953, the general
purpose and goals of US economic aid to the authoritarian Chinese Nationalist regime on Taiwan
appeared to be tied to developing the ROC’s military defense capacity and relieve short-term
internal stability problems due to inflation and poor economic growth rather than sounder longterm capitalist economic development principles because it also stated:
…it is evident that the Formosan economy cannot be sustained without external
assistance for at least three or four years. While present aid planning is based upon the
concept of progressively diminishing economic (as distinct from military) assistance,
…self support for the Formosan economy may become a more distant goal. The U.S.
economic aid program (including common-use items) for Formosa totaled $98 million for
fiscal year 1951, $81.5 million for fiscal year 1952 and $105.5 million for fiscal year
1953. The objectives of the economic aid program are to: (a) maintain economic stability,
(b) lend economic support to the U.S. military assistance program, (c) develop industry
and agriculture so that Formosa can become more nearly self-supporting.516

Another significant development that enhanced security and economic aid ties between
United States and Taiwan occurred when the two nations formalized their bilateral defense
commitments by signing the “Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the

514

NSC 146/2, 12.

515

NSC 146/2, 13.

516

NSC 146/2, 13.

204
Republic of China” on December 2, 1954.517 The Treaty, which was overwhelmingly supported
in a significant bipartisan manner by both houses of Congress, represented a new long-term
commitment buttressing not only Washington’s overall cold war containment policy versus
global communist expansionism, but also by the United States’ new commitment to defending
Taiwan as a major military ally.
A noted precursor that motivated and influenced the Chinese Nationalists to seek such an
agreement, likely resulted from a similarly worded US bilateral defense treaty with South Korea
that had just gone into effect shortly after the signing of the Korean Armistice in late 1953. The
Treaty not only reassured the Chinese Nationalists that the United States was committed to
Taiwan’s military defense, but was also intended to ameliorate tensions that had emerged in USROC economic cooperation and the Chinese Nationalists’ use of US economic aid for prudent
development purposes.
Official US diplomatic evidence supporting this conclusion is in part based on a formerly
classified secret memorandum sent from Taipei on November 4, 1955, by Karl Rankin, the US
Ambassador to the ROC to Thomas Bowden, the Acting Director of the International
Cooperation Administration in Washington, who in addressing “economic problems” tied to a
“lack of cooperation by the Chinese Government” stated:
I believe that the Mutual Defense Pact in all probability prevented a considerably more
serious worsening in the field of cooperation…The Chinese on Taiwan are very much
aware that the United States wrote them off once before; they do not exclude the
possibility of our doing so again…this treaty commits the United States, both expressly
and my implication, to a more definite and longer term policy toward Free China than we
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had ever acknowledge previously. Bi-partisan support in the Senate provided an earnest
of overwhelming Democratic as well as Republican approval.518

One of the initial clauses that justified the Treaty was influenced by legacy references to
both nations opposing Japan’s military aggression in China during World War Two based on a
“common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side by side against imperial aggression
during the last war.”519 However, without mentioning specifically the two nations by name, the
Treaty implied that “Mainland China” (PRC) and by extension the Soviet Union, were the main
antagonists underlying this formal document’s purposes of mutual bilateral military defense and
economic aid cooperation.
This landmark bilateral defense treaty between Washington and Taipei contained eight
articles specifying various provisions for stationing US military forces on Taiwan to defend their
mutual territorial interests and “individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and
communist subversive activities…”520 In addition, one of the eight articles, Article III, expressed
a vague reference to their bilateral commitment on economic matters by stating that both parties
agreed to “undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with each other in the
development of economic progress….”521
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Soon after the signing of the 1954 US-ROC Defense Treaty, in early 1955 the United
States significantly enhanced and expanded economic development assistance for Taiwan during
the Eisenhower Administration with the promulgation of NSC Report NSC 5503: US Policy
Toward Formosa and the Government of the Republic of China. However, the Report expressed
general conditions tied to continued economic aid based on Washington’s economic
modernization objectives and outcomes for Taiwan’s authoritarian regime that were loosely
linked to the US goals favoring a more politically inclusive and representative Chinese
Nationalist government and development of a capitalist private sector. Examples of the Report’s
provisions to develop “a stronger Formosan economy,” albeit without directly characterizing
Taiwan’s economic system as a state-run authoritarian public sector dominated one, included:
Encourage and assist the GRC [Government of the Republic of China] to take steps
leading toward more responsible representative government suited to the Chinese
environment and having a constructive social and economic program… [and] employ
U.S. assistance as a lever to this end…Continue to provide such technical and economic
assistance to Formosa as will promote U.S. objectives and will be consistent with other
U.S. programs of economic and military aid for the Far East…Continue to work with the
GRC toward better fiscal procedures and the revision of programs which run counter to
prudent U.S. advice…Encourage the GRC to adopt policies which will stimulate the
investment of Chinese and other private capital and skills for the development of the
Formosan economy, under arrangements avoiding “exploitation” yet acceptable to
private interests.522

Concurrently during 1955, Washington became increasingly concerned about whether US
foreign economic policy objectives were being undermined by a lack of private sector
development and investment in US economic aid recipient nations exhibiting socialist, statedirected economies such as Taiwan, and the related case of India. At the time, India’s nascent
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economic development model exhibited similarities to Taiwan’s statist public sector dominated
economy. As a result, both countries received increased US Congressional scrutiny over the
seemingly ideological contradictions inherent to the intended purposes of US economic aid going
to develop capitalistic private sector and free enterprise for their preferred statist government-run
public sectors and socialist-inspired economic development programs. Washington’s other
related cold war inspired concern was that both countries, bordering Communist China in “areas
near to the communist heartland,” were emphasizing “public sector development” with laws
restricting private sector development and investment, thus resulting in precluding “a more
favorable investment climate.”523
Washington also judged that there was a contradiction and dilemma for anti-communist
governments such as Taiwan and India in “free Asia” because they were under intense internal
domestic pressure to quickly develop their economies, yet were adopting anti-capitalist
autocratic economic development systems resembling both Soviet and Chinese Communist
“monuments of economic progress [and] achievement.”524 By 1955, both Taiwan and India had
implemented a “Socialist Pattern” of government mandated five-year economic planning models
as a means of achieving “rapid economic progress” for developing their state public sectors at
the expense of their countries’ private sectors mainly because capitalist style private investment
had not met their “anticipated [economic] goals.”525
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As a result of the emerging cold war era competition over divergent economic systems
between the “Free World” and Communist bloc, the Eisenhower administration implemented and
reformed US foreign economic aid programs intended to boost capitalism in developing
countries and “promote our foreign economic objectives within a framework of democratic
institutions.”526 Despite these new efforts however, the ideological contradictions would
seemingly become even more apparent in that these countries, while espousing varying
aspirations for becoming democracies with capitalist centric economic development goals, still
maintained state-centric public sector economies.
Nonetheless, the Eisenhower administration implemented new efforts to enhance the
“means of stimulating American private investment in specified areas” by creating and extending
more types of development loans with favorable terms to developing countries.527 These new US
loan packages and related private sector investment tax incentives were integrated within the
overall umbrella framework of US foreign economic aid programs to counter the developing
world’s perceptions of the “success” of alternative non-capitalist socialist style Soviet and
Communist Chinese development models.
These measures were also seemingly influenced by the broader strategic rivalry between
Washington and the Moscow-Beijing alliance within the overall cold war ideological economic
competition context as distinctly described in December 1955 by John C. Baker, US
Representative to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations who stated: “In the
present period, we are entering a new era in the struggle between East and West. We have two
weapons: (a) ideas and ideals, and (b) economic and technical help. Both must be used. We
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should develop constructive attitudes and policies which would permit us to take aggressive
leadership with new ideas in various economic areas.”528
Baker also offered other recommendations for enhancing US bilateral foreign economic
aid policies aimed at countering criticism that Washington was not following through with its
publicly announced capitalist-centric program goals of stimulating private foreign investment
with countries such as Taiwan by stating:
We talked a great deal about the flow of private capital, but still do too little about
it…there is a feeling among representatives of many countries…that we are not really
interested in having our capital go abroad, and for that reason they show little interest in
this subject when we mention it. This tends to move them into domestic polices which we
describe as “socialistic” or unfriendly to us.529

Baker further recommended that Washington needed to counter other international
criticism that US economic aid programs were intended primarily to enhance US military aid
programs by stating: “we might try to disengage our economic aid as much as possible from the
military aspects of our programs” to show that US economic aid was “based on genuine concern
for their economic welfare and not solely on or desire to build them up as military barriers to
Communism.”530 However, Baker’s last point reflected Washington’s broader dilemma resulting
from another related major external impetus that emerged as a significant causal factor
influencing Washington’s rational justifying US government programs extending economic aid
to developing nations such as Taiwan during 1952-1956 when the Soviet Union began to
implement new international economic aid policies and programs for the developing world.
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These new developments began when Moscow declared its intentions to greatly expand Soviet
international economic aid programs to developing nations at its Nineteenth Congress of the
Soviet Communist Party in 1952 and began implementing them following the Twentieth
Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956.531
This resulted in a new feature of cold war competition between American and Soviet-led
spheres of economic modernization and development systems for the developing world. This
new Soviet form of international economic assistance included “trade, loans, technical
assistance, and other means of political persuasion,” which had been proceeded by the 1950
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance and Beijing’s 1953
announcement of its first Soviet inspired first Five-Year Plan, 1953-1957 for the PRC’s
comprehensive national socio-economic development.532
These and other early cold war developments resulted in an enhanced economic
component of the ideological competition pitting Washington against Moscow and Beijing over
economic modernization models and aid for developing nations during the 1950’s and 1960’s.
By the summer of 1955, Harold E. Stassen, Director of the Foreign Operations Administration,
sent a memorandum to President Eisenhower outlining the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s
House Report No. 912, Mutual Security Act of 1955 which reflected overall positive bipartisan
support for foreign economic aid programs under the Mutual Security Act of 1955, and in which
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he expressed optimism for similar legislative support for the next year’s Mutual Security
Program funding in 1956.533
Stassen’s memorandum reaffirmed that the US executive branch should continue to
influence Congress’s positive support for foreign aid by justifying it because the “Communists
are now concentrating on the Asian nations. It is extremely important in the United States
national interests that we follow through to a successful program that gives Japan and India and
other Asian nations a chance to earn a living, to remain non-Communist,…”534
Nevertheless, while Stassen noted that such US economic aid would be substantially “in
the form of loans, we will use it to foster private enterprise and opportunities for private
investment,” he implicitly suggested purposely overlooking US aid going to develop capitalism
in friendly nations following state-led or non-capitalist economic development models like
Taiwan by cautioning against strict US aid conditions because if “too rigid and hard restrictions
are placed on the program in the first instance, this may cause the effort to fail. In this vast area
we need flexibility and continuity to score another success for the United States and for the free
world.”535
Stassen’s concern about avoiding “too hard and rigid conditions” seemed to apply to US
economic aid going to authoritarian Asian nations like Taiwan, particularly since Section 418 of
the Mutual Security Act of 1955 included the “President’s Fund for Asian Economic
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Development” for which of the $200 million authorized, Congress ultimately appropriated $100
million “to be spent any time before June 30, 1958.”536
Later, at the 266th NSC meeting on November 15, 1955, CIA Director Dulles briefed
Vice-President Nixon and other senior Eisenhower cabinet officials about the recent increase in
“Soviet Bloc” offers of economic assistance and aid loans to developing nations, particularly in
the Near East and Southeast Asia.537 When Nixon queried Dulles about the difficulties facing the
United States in countering or competing globally with the “Soviet aid program,” he replied that
a “comparison of the U.S. and the USSR assistance had convinced many officials of the
underdeveloped countries that, for their countries at least, the Soviet system might have more to
offer in the way of quick results than the U.S. system.”538
Next, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson expressed his reservations over the “very
difficult problem” of US economic assistance to “underdeveloped countries” by indirectly
implicating Taiwan and other non-communist nations aligned with Washington that had
authoritarian government dominated economic systems by postulating that “If we went in and
spent our money building industrial plants and other installations for some backward country,
who was going to have title and ownership over these plants which had been built with U.S.
funds? If the ultimate owner was the state, we would be helping these countries to proceed down
the road which led to state socialism or to Communism.”539 Similarly, Undersecretary of State
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Herbert Hoover opined that “in many instances our assistance programs were actually
subsidizing state socialism in the underdeveloped areas.”540
A week later at the 267th NSC meeting at Camp David on November 21, 1955, with
President Eisenhower in attendance, the main topic of discussion again focused on determining
how much Washington should expand US economic assistance programs and its foreign aid
budget for “underdeveloped countries” in reaction to the “new world-wide Soviet program of
assistance.”541 Secretary Dulles opined that many “underdeveloped” countries “had been
enormously impressed” by how the Soviet Union had rapidly industrialized its economy “over a
brief period of time” and as a result, the leaders in these countries “drew the deduction that a
Communist system would likewise prove most efficient in accomplishing their own
industrialization.”542
Dulles also justified the need for more US economic assistance programs based on the
strategic security rationale that the “scene of the battle between the free world and the
Communist world was shifting. The United States and the free world must be prepared
henceforth to meet much more serious Soviet economic competition.”543 However, George M.
Humphrey, the Secretary of the Treasury, and noted economic free-market advocate, emphasized
the need to “stimulate private industry in those countries which were recipients of U.S. military
and economic assistance.”544
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A month later at the 273rd NSC meeting on January 18, 1956, the topic of “U.S.
Economic Assistance for Asia” took centerstage in these high-level discussions, particularly in
the context of Secretary Dulles’ remarks that Asian nations were “enormously impressed” with
and increasingly attracted to replicating the “Great Russian Experiment” of successful Soviet
style state led industrial and economic modernization programs within their own countries, in
contrast to the alleged diminishing “prestige” of the “Great American Experiment.”545 Dulles
further noted that Washington had “very largely failed to appreciate the impact on the
underdeveloped areas of the world of the phenomenon of Russia’s rapid industrialization…We
can ill afford to ignore the enormous impact on Asians and other underdeveloped areas which the
Russians have made…if the United States failed to solve this problem, the Soviet Union would
end by dominating all of Asia.”546
Secretary of Defense Wilson expressed his view that “he was greatly worried because the
industrial transformation of the Soviet Union had been the work of a totalitarian government.
Ours, on the other hand, was the product of private and free enterprise.”547 Dulles’ warnings over
the growing attractiveness and future implications of the Soviet state-led economic
modernization model and aid for Asia, would serve as a major reason justifying more US
economic aid for the anti-Communist Chinese Nationalist-led ROC government in Taiwan.
Together, Dulles’ and Wilson’s similar persuasive rationales and justifications were instrumental
in not only influencing policymakers within other agencies of the US executive branch, but also
among members of the US Congress for increasing economic aid to Taiwan during their tenure.
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However, some of the other NSC principals at this meeting also expressed their views
that once again highlighted the fundamental ideological economic contradictions and dilemma
facing Washington in justifying US economic aid for capitalist style development in foreign
nations ruled by authoritarian regimes and managing predominating government run economies.
For example, in responding to Secretary Wilson’s reference to American style industrial
transformation being attributed to the principles of “private and free enterprise,” Secretary of the
Treasury Humphrey’s statements were most relevant in highlighting this contradiction by
warning:
…we should not, accordingly, by virtue of our assistance programs create and maintain
other government-controlled economies in the underdeveloped nations of Asia and
Africa. To do this would be self-defeating for the United States…We should, however,
move in the direction of freedom of the individual and private enterprise in the countries
we were assisting rather than to support government control of industry.548
Secretary Stassen not only supported Dulles’ views on US economic aid, but also added:
“The important thing was to back private enterprise as much as possible in the countries we were
assisting.”549 However, it was Vice President Nixon who came closest to describing
Washington’s contradiction in giving US economic aid intended to promote capitalism in
authoritarian nations running state-led economies such as Taiwan by agreeing with President
Eisenhower when he stated that the “United States would have to work in Asia with what if
found there. This might mean that we would have to assist in the development of governmentcontrolled enterprise rather than to work with a free enterprise system as we would naturally
prefer.”550
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Of all the participants, it was Theodore C. Streibert, Director of the US Information
Agency who expressed the strongest need for linking the success of US economic aid in Asia to
capitalist ideology as an outwardly directed US publicity theme versus communist-inspired
propaganda narratives for its economic development ideology by pointing out that he felt:
…constrained to point out that in our dealings with the Asian people, we were
concerned with ideas just as much as with pure economics. The Soviets had been
assiduously and successfully planting in Asia the idea that Communism was the wave of
the future and that capitalism was dying…we would derive more profit from our aid
programs if we kept in mind, in connection with them, the need of supporting the ideals
of free enterprise and enlightened capitalism. We must not minimize the impact of ideas
on the minds of the people of Asia.551

These high level NSC discussions during 1955-1956 revealed that Washington faced a
growing dilemma in countering Moscow’s new foreign economic aid initiatives by expanding
US economic aid programs to promote capitalism’s main ideological principles of free trade and
private sector development in many foreign nations that were ruled by authoritarian-like regimes
favoring government-led economic modernization programs. Despite this dilemma, the
Eisenhower administration pressed ahead with submitting larger annual foreign economic aid
budget proposals to the US Congress justified by the perceived need to counter and compete with
growing Soviet inspired economic assistance that was promoting Moscow’s preferred anticapitalist, socialist like state-led modernization programs among developing nations.
President Eisenhower’s letter to John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary State on December
5, 1955, typified his growing support for the “promotion of economic associations, somewhat as
we have done in the military” based on his concern in the “continuing struggle between the
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Communistic and the free worlds” from Moscow’s new challenge using “economic weapons” to
wage “economic warfare.”552
A few months later in April 1956, the US State Department’s Policy Planning Staff
published its study on “Soviet Economic Penetration” for Washington’s policymakers. This
study took a self-described “broad look at US policy toward the underdeveloped world” and
contained recommendations for improving and reforming Washington’s existing foreign
economic aid policies to compete and counter the new “Communist Bloc policies” associated
with their collective emerging “economic campaign” that were having growing “appeal” in the
developing world.553 One part of this study singled out Asia as a region of particular concern for
US foreign economic aid and advised that Washington should “refrain from threats of cessation
of US aid” because “most sovereign governments will be inclined or will be forced by public
opinion to respond negatively to outright US pressures; and a US position that could be
interpreted as reflecting opposition to economic development will be untenable anyway.”554
Already by 1955 there were emerging pressures from within the US Congress towards
comprehensively reforming US foreign economic aid programs to enhance the development of
capitalism, free trade, and private sector business growth. These pressures collided with the
contradiction between the “need for consistency between announced US principles and US
practice” and the reality of US economic aid going to Taiwan when juxtaposed with the Chinese
Nationalists’ authoritarian, undemocratic, and government-run economic development model.555
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This study also recommended that because of the Soviet Union’s accelerating provision
of foreign economic aid without restrictive conditions to develop socialist-like command
economies was gaining attraction among developing nations, the United States should have the
same or more “flexibility” in its own foreign economic aid policies. Furthermore, the study
posited that one overriding consideration in US foreign economic aid policy should factor in
whether there were ““unnecessary and politically unproductive “conditions” imposed on US
assistance? If so, can they be minimized by administrative action or are changes in legislation
required?””556
This inclination to adjust US foreign economic aid policies to be more “flexible” and
refrain from openly threatening to “withhold” US economic aid from some nations that were not
following the tenants of more conventional capitalistic-inspired ideological precepts of free trade
and private sector development, reflected the emerging new reality of Washington undermining
its own preferred economic development principles. Thus, these reforms in US foreign economic
aid policies reflected Washington’s practical adjustment of these goals to counter new Soviet
Bloc socialist-inspired global economic outreach initiatives. As a result, Washington intended to
be more pragmatic and refrain from imposing rigid conditions on US economic aid for
exclusively requiring strict conditions on developing traditional capitalism upon friendly anticommunist, yet authoritarian regimes implementing state-run socialist-like command economies
such as the Chinese Nationalist-led ROC government in Taiwan.
Another related dilemma representing a unique challenge and feature in the cold war’s
ideological competition over foreign economic aid revolved around Washington’s realization
that US foreign economic aid for allied or friendly authoritarian regimes was often purposed or
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diverted for exclusively supporting their proportionally over-sized military establishments. In
late 1955, the NSC specifically identified “Formosa” [Taiwan], together with Turkey, Iran,
Pakistan, Vietnam, and South Korea, as receiving a “high proportion of U.S. military and
economic assistance” despite their local economies being unable to support their overextended
military budgets “now or in the foreseeable future,” thus requiring US economic aid subsidies “at
an annual cost ranging from $100 million to $800 million to each of the countries.”557 The
implications of these enormously high NSC aid estimates, representing the likely staggering
sums that the Eisenhower administration would base its foreign aid requests on for fiscal year
1957 for just these six countries alone, appeared to have prompted the NSC staff to conduct a
special study in the form of a “Review of Military Assistance and Supporting Programs.”558
The study concluded that because of “current Soviet moves in the economic field in the
underdeveloped areas” that President Eisenhower should request from Congress “greater
flexibility and latitude…to the specific appropriation for military and economic assistance, a
fund of the order of several hundred million dollars which may be used, in his discretion.”559
This study revealed that the executive branch sought a much larger discretionary “contingency
fund” to “provide flexibility to meet unexpected developments” for aid implementation and relief
from Congress’ legislative restrictions and conditions imposed on recipient nations such as
Taiwan, by stating that “it may be desirable to seek greater latitude in the granting of military
and economic assistance than is permitted by existing statutory requirements relating to
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commitments or policies of the recipient countries…For economic assistance for development
and related purposes wherever new or expanded programs appear in the U.S. interest.”560
The study also directed the formation of a new Interdepartmental Committee on Certain
U.S. Aid Programs as a key feature of the Eisenhower administration’s Project Clean Up to
“examine special country situations” receiving US military and economic aid.561 The purposes of
the Committee were to determine if overall US aid programs would overburden the US economy
by comparing the “extent, origin and status of U.S. commitments” to “the objectives, missions,
assumptions, feasibility, costs and justification for planned force levels…in light of the capability
of the country to sustain them on a continuing basis consistent with economic objectives.”562
As a harbinger of Washington’s interagency concern and scrutiny over US economic aid
to authoritarian regimes, the original classified confidential source document listed “Formosa”
[Taiwan] as the second of 12 countries specified to come under review, of which eight were
located in East Asia.563 The Committee’s purpose was also to analyze how efficiently each
country implemented US aid and determine the extent that it benefitted their burgeoning military
and repressive internal security forces compared to their overall national economic growth
benefitting ordinary citizens and the private sector versus the public sector.
By the end of 1955, the Eisenhower administration’s Council on Foreign Economic
Policy had received the report entitled “U.S. Foreign Investment in Less-Developed Areas” that
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it had previously requested from the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and
Financial Problems to prepare for the purpose of globally expanding private investment and
private enterprise. The report identified deficiencies and made recommendations to enhance
Washington’s overall cold war US foreign policy through new efforts at expanding private
investment tied to economic development goals for countries such as Taiwan. Among the
deficiencies identified in US foreign economic growth strategies, the report highlighted that
Washington, in its role as a donor state, had not “emphasized the use of public loans to stimulate
the development of United States or native private enterprises in less developed countries”
because it wanted to “avoid the possibility of competition with private sources of investment
funds.”564
However, the report indirectly referred to US economic aid recipient countries such as
Taiwan in “less developed areas” that exhibited barriers and conditions that inhibited the inflow
of private investment such as “political and economic instability, legislation and attitudes
affecting investment, [and] economic nationalism,” which ““cannot be “programmed” by
government policy or action.””565 To resolve these deficiencies, the report recommended that US
foreign economic aid and technical assistance programs place more emphasis on “stimulating
those conditions under which private investment and enterprise can develop and operate
effectively” while devoting more attention to “assist the development of indigenous private
enterprise abroad as well as to promote private foreign investment.”566
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These new areas of emphasis and expansion of “U.S. technical cooperation activities”
designed to develop capitalism’s basic underpinnings of private sector free enterprise and
investment in foreign countries, would soon clash with Washington’s growing awareness of the
ideological contradictions inherent to the reality of Taiwan’s public sector dominated socialist
economic model. By the end of the Eisenhower administration in the late 1950s, Washington
would gradually judge this ideological economic contradiction as unsustainable for justifying US
aid to Taiwan. However, due to the existentialities of the cold war economic threats posed by the
Soviet Union and Communist China, Washington’s progress in reforming and tying conditions to
promote capitalism in Taiwan would turn out to be a slow and controversial process requiring
considerable effort expended over several years during the later 1950s and early 1960s.
By the mid-1950s, Washington’s initiatives to reform of US foreign economic aid
programs were mainly driven by the challenges posed by Moscow’s new foreign economic aid
initiatives. However, Beijing would soon pose a complimentary ideological economic
competition threat with its Chinese Communist inspired economic development model. This
development would also influence Washington to extend more US economic aid to the Chinese
Nationalists on Taiwan.
The CIA’s optimistic intelligence estimates of Communist China’s growing economic
success based on the Soviet model of modernization and Beijing’s intentions to export economic
assistance to Asian and other nations also appeared to have influenced the Eisenhower
administration to advocate to Congress for more economic aid to Taiwan. For example, an early
1956 formerly classified secret CIA National Intelligence Estimate stated that “with Soviet help”
the Chinese Communists’:
…armed forces have been greatly strengthened and to a large extent modernized, and
economic output has for the most part reached or surpassed previous peaks. As a result of
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its achievements and growing power, Communist China’s prestige and influence in Asia
have greatly increased…Peiping [Beijing] will emphasize the advantages of technical and
economic assistance from Communist countries as well as ‘mutual self-help’ among
underdeveloped countries. They will also seek a reduction in Western military,
commercial, and other privileges in the area.567
Having been seemingly previously aware of Beijing’s new economic aid initiatives in the
region, in early 1956 the Chinese Nationalists appealed with alarm to the United States by
describing their perceptions of growing Soviet and Communist Chinese economic aid initiatives
in Asia as the “new economic offensive launched by the Soviet and Chinese Communists” and
that “the intention of the Peiping Communist regime is to employ trade relations as a means to
win over the support of the Chinese communities abroad, especially in countries which have
accorded it recognition.”568 This evidence is contained in Taiwan Foreign Minister George K.C.
Yeh’s official diplomatic letter to US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles dated April 9, 1956
with an attached memorandum entitled A Regional Economic Plan for Free Asia to Counter
Communist Penetration specifying Taipei’s proposal of new joint US-ROC initiatives for
“economic countermeasures” with a “regional and interregional economic plan brought into
relationship with United States aid programs to counter the Communist economic penetration in
Asia.”569
According to this archived source, ROC Foreign Minister Yeh’s letter to Secretary Dulles
was directed to be transmitted by ROC President Chiang Kai-shek following Dulles official
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diplomatic visit to Taiwan during March 1956. A week later, President Chiang reiterated,
endorsed, and further expanded upon the memorandum’s reference to threats posed by new
Soviet and Chinese Communist foreign economic aid initiatives throughout Asia as previously
mentioned in the Regional Economic Plan through sending another lengthy official letter to
President Eisenhower.570
In his letter, Chiang rather provocatively prefaced his remarks on his views of American
policy in Asia by claiming that as a result of the unprecedented official diplomatic talks between
the United States and the PRC the previous year during July 18-23, 1955 in Geneva to reduce
bilateral tensions, that: “there has been felt an acute sense of uneasiness and bewilderment
among the free peoples of Asia,…that the United States itself might be contemplating a shift of
policy toward Soviet Russia and Communist China.”571 Chiang also warned President
Eisenhower that the Soviet Union was increasing its international “tactics” for infiltration and
subversion to promote “internal revolution” in Asia with such activities “usually carried out
under the guise of political collaboration, economic cooperation or cultural and technical
exchange.”572
In an apparent effort to endear Taiwan to the United States for continuing aid and
support, Chiang then invoked the legacy of Sun Yat-sen whereby Chiang stated that Sun was “a
great admirer of American ideals and institutions, advocated close collaboration with the United
States in China’s international relations long before the founding of the Chinese Republic in
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1911.”573 Using words implying a request for more US economic aid, Chiang further reiterated to
President Eisenhower what he had told Secretary Dulles during his visit to Taipei the previous
week during March 16-17 that “a more positive approach” was needed by Washington and that
“a close study should be made to better tailor the United States foreign aid programs to the
demands of the political aspirations of the Asian people. Admittedly, it involves difficulties.”574
This last reference likely denoted Chiang’s perceptions of American domestic criticism of
Taiwan’s authoritarian political rule and statist economic policies based on his judgement of the
nature of debates within the US government and the exchange of diplomatic cables over issues
relating to whether Washington would continue giving US economic aid to Taiwan.
A few months after Secretary of State Dulles’ visit to Taipei in March 1956, President
Eisenhower sent President Chiang an official letter on July 7, 1956, that coincided with VicePresident Nixon’s official state visit to Taipei during 7-8 July. The contents of Eisenhower’s
letter reveal that he expressed his “admiration” to Chiang for his “unyielding stand against
Communism,” and that Chiang’s “leadership and courage have served as an inspiration to your
people and to free men everywhere who have stood firm against the Communist tyranny.”575
Eisenhower also reaffirmed that the United States would continue its strong support of the ROC
by stating that he was:
…encouraged to hear of the progress which has been made in improving the security and
well-being of the people of Taiwan despite the dangers and difficulties confronting you. I
am sure that you share my own confidence that the close cooperation which has so long
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characterize our relations will continue. No problems are too great for solution when a
will to work together exists.576
However, these and other details in Eisenhower’s carefully crafted text, which credited
Chiang with improving the “well-being” of the Taiwanese people, also cryptically referred to
unspecified “problems” which appear to have been allusions to the political and economic
ideological differences between the democratic and private sector free market capitalist practices
held by the United States, yet with Washington facing the increasingly untenable perennial
dilemma of having to justify giving US economic aid to Chiang’s authoritarian and undemocratic
Chinese Nationalist-led ROC government exhibiting a socialist style public sector development
model.
During Vice-President Nixon’s official state visit to Taiwan during July 1956, he
reiterated to President Chiang that “on the economic side” the United States “would attempt to
meet Soviet moves” and “meet communist economic and subversive activities.”577 Chiang
reciprocated officially on July 20 with a letter to President Eisenhower in which he stated: “In
my opinion the greatest danger confronting Asia today is the effect already evident in Asia of the
‘smile’ tactics and economic penetration waged by Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists,”
thus acknowledging that in the context of the aforementioned joint US-ROC Regional Economic
Plan that US economic aid to Taiwan was indirectly tied and justified to confront the broader
external threats of new communist inspired economic aid initiatives in the region, particularly in
Southeast Asian countries with significant ethnic Chinese communities.578
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Concurrently with the Eisenhower administration’s bilateral diplomatic outreach and new
military and economic aid support initiatives for Taiwan, increased US Congressional concern
over the efficiency of US foreign economic aid programs influenced the president and his NSC
staff to initiate a broader internal executive branch effort to study, justify, and recommend
additional economic aid to Taiwan and other key US defense allies. This effort, underway since
December 1955 by the Prochnow Committee, released a separate report on Taiwan on July 6,
1956, then included it along with a study of five other allied nations as part of a composite
classified secret Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs on
August 3, 1956.579
The report justified increasing and maintaining annual US economic aid to Taiwan at
between $300-$325 million through 1960 based on Taiwan’s then low level of economic
development, inability to fund and maintain its armed forces facing the Mainland Chinese (PRC)
military threat because it was “beyond the economic resources of Taiwan,” and Taiwan being
“intimately connected with our entire position in the Far East and with our national security.”580
The report also noted that of the roughly $400 million in US economic aid given to Taiwan
during 1951-1955, Taipei had only directed 25 percent to actual economic related “fixed capital
development” with an overwhelming amount of 75 percent going to “immediate defense support
purposes” because of “preoccupation with military problems.”581
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The report also addressed the question of whether US economic policies and aid
programs should be “designed to strengthen the Taiwan economy and if so to what extent?” by
citing both the previously described 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty and NSC 5503’s eight US
policy objectives as precedence to justify and continue US economic aid to Taiwan because it
was a “relatively underdeveloped country” with a “tremendous burden of supporting large
military forces.”582
Despite citing projections for the need to increase US economic aid for Taiwan to
between $360-$490 million annually during 1955-1960, the report criticized Taipei’s “sprawling
and inefficient central government,” and its “disposition toward government ownership and
operation of productive enterprise, including monopoly in certain cases,” and the government
running increasingly large fiscal deficits with Taipei’s “assumption that a deficit can be met by
U.S. aid or deficit financing.”583 The report further assessed that the prospect for Taiwan’s ability
to reduce its government budget deficit “within the next five years for improvement is
meager,…” and that improving its economy would depend on “fiscal reforms, controls over
consumption, and ability to overcome development bottlenecks.”584
While the report provided a comparative forecast with projected impacts on Taiwan over
future scenarios and implications of continuing or alternatively reducing US economic aid, it
continued to justify such aid due to the military threat posed by the Chinese Communists on the
mainland to the Chinese Nationalists on the island of Taiwan. Despite the report’s mild criticism
of Taiwan’s inefficient state-run economic system, monopolies, and deficit spending, it clearly
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advocated for more US economic aid to Taiwan based on Washington’s cold war containment
interests and the ongoing Chinese Communist threat. However, the report lacked specific and
concrete language requiring the linkage of US economic aid for Taiwan to meet Washington’s
conditions for specific longer term or more authentic capitalist economic development principles
based on broader and pluralistic concepts of free enterprise and access to capital by encouraging
a private sector in Taiwan.
In summary these developments reveal that after the early Eisenhower administration’s
initial large expansion of economic aid to Taiwan began in 1953, during 1955-1956 the US
Congress increased its scrutiny and opposition to the seemingly contradictory ideological
rationale underpinning and justifying US foreign aid to develop capitalism in allied authoritarian
regimes exhibiting inefficient and wasteful state-led public sector dominant economic systems.
These new reforms of US foreign aid policies and programs that imposed more strict conditions
on economic aid recipient nations, as well as Taiwan’s growing self-sufficiency and success,
would eventually result in Washington gradually winding down US economic aid to the
authoritarian Chinese Nationalist regime soon thereafter during the majority of Eisenhower’s
second term.585
As early as 1955, the Eisenhower administration and the US Congress began a new
process of reforming and implementing elements consistent with a more capitalist economic
ideological approach for all its foreign economic aid programs. This included the United States
dissolving the Foreign Operations Administration and replacing it in 1955 with the International
Cooperation Administration (ICA) under the guidance and management of the US State
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Department which set new goals and conditions for US economic aid going to recipient nations
such as Taiwan.
As the next chapter explains, the ICA remained in effect until early 1961, when the
Kennedy administration renamed, reorganized, consolidated it together with other related aid
programs into the new US Agency for International Development (USAID).586 However, this
reorganization had been previously authorized by the US Congress and planned for during the
Eisenhower administration’s second term as part of Washington’s overall US foreign economic
aid reform initiatives. These new reform initiatives included more rigid policy conditions on
recipient nations such as Taiwan. Chapter Four examines how these developments, begun in
Eisenhower’s second term, led to an irreversible transition period that resulted in a gradual
reduction of US economic aid to the Chinese Nationalists during the Kennedy administration and
finally ending it by the early Johnson administration in 1965.
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Chapter Four: Reform, Transition, and Aid Drawdown, 1957-1965
By the beginning of President Eisenhower’s second term in 1957, US Congressional
opposition and additional new foreign economic aid policy reform initiatives previously debated
during 1955-1956, finally began to be formalized and implemented. Washington’s new reforms
included reducing inefficiencies and implementing new purposes, justifications, and imposing
stricter conditions on recipient nations. These reform measures, in addition to Taiwan achieving
economic success by regaining its pre-World War Two level of GNP per capita for the first time
the year prior in 1956, would also result in justifying a gradual decrease in US economic aid to
Taiwan. Overall, these new foreign aid reform developments emerged as another evolutionary
stage in US economic aid to Taiwan which can be characterized as a transition period beginning
in 1957 that resulted in drawing it down and eventually ending it by 1965.
As described in Chapter Three, after the early Eisenhower administration’s initial large
expansion of economic aid to Taiwan began in 1953, during 1955-1956 the US Congress
increased its scrutiny and opposition to the seemingly contradictory ideological rationale
underpinning and justifying US foreign aid to develop capitalism in allied authoritarian regimes
exhibiting inefficient and wasteful state-led public sector dominant economic systems. These
new reforms of US foreign aid policies and programs that imposed more strict conditions on
economic aid recipient nations, as well as Taiwan’s growing self-sufficiency and success, would
result in Washington gradually winding down US economic aid to the authoritarian Chinese
Nationalist regime during the majority of Eisenhower’s second term.
The major internal variables driving this reform transformation and evolution included
key officials in the executive branch and influential members of the US Congress who expressed
divergent ideological, domestic political, or other pragmatic policy preferences justifying the
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rationale, purposes, goals, and uses of US economic aid for recipient nations during 1955-1956.
These divergent foreign aid policy debates over the rationale justifying US foreign economic aid
to developing nations such as Taiwan came to a head during the 1957-1958 period as evidenced
by an extensive series US congressional hearings and testimonies. These hearings, which
included expert witness testimonies by noted economic modernization and development theorists
and policy proponents such as Dr. Walt Rostow, largely influenced Washington to adopt a new
overarching liberal capitalist economic ideology justifying and rationalizing US foreign aid for
developing nations such as Taiwan.
Evidence in primary sources from this period in the form of authoritative primary source
documents of the US National Security Council, State Department, Agency for International
Development, Department of Commerce, and the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction
established that Washington expended considerable official economic investment, developmental
assistance, aid, and policy and management techniques to modernize Taiwan’s economy during
the period.587 By the summer of 1956, US State Department officials within the newly created
US International Cooperation Administration (ICA) began another internal initiative to “review
and overhaul from stem to stern” all aspects of the goals, policies, implementation of US foreign
economic aid programs.588 The Mutual Security Act of 1954 had provided the authority for
President Eisenhower to issue Executive Order 10610 on May 9, 1955, which replaced the
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Foreign Operations Administration with the ICA to oversee “all U.S. foreign assistance
programs, except for military assistance,….”589
The US Congress, with its passage of this Act and through related congressional hearings
that criticized the purposes, effectiveness, and results of US foreign aid policies, were all
instrumental in influencing and motivating the Eisenhower administration to create the ICA and
subsequent efforts to reform the goals and implementation of US foreign economic aid programs.
Similarly, the US Senate also adopted Senate Resolution 285 on July 20, 1956, which established
the Senate Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program to not only examine all aspects
and “ramifications” of the Mutual Security Program, but to also undertake “exhaustive studies”
of and make recommendations for reforming US foreign military and economic aid programs.590
Although this Senate committee’s report was not published until May 1957, a review of
the text contained in Section V reveals that one of the report’s four main recommendations listed
as objectives of US foreign aid policy would be: “To encourage the evolution of free political
and economic systems in other independent nations by assisting them, on a self-liquidating basis,
in their economic development…and to encourage the development of private enterprise within
recipient countries.”591 However, the report also noted that while “supporting” or “nonmilitary”
aid should be reduced, it stated: “the continuation of supporting aid, which goes in large part to
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peoples under critical threat of Communist aggression or subversion, is in the national
interest.”592
These two critical key statements, when combined and considered within their implied
and specified rhetorical context, illustrated the dilemma and contradictory nature of US
economic aid policies that subordinated capitalist-style development ideology as a greater
pragmatic imperative to counter the perceived existential threats posed by global Communist
expansionism. These contradictions were exemplified by the curious case and puzzle of US
economic aid policies intended to develop capitalist-style free markets and private enterprise in
Taiwan ruled by the Chinese Nationalist ROC government’s authoritarian, undemocratic, and
politically and economically unfree socialist style regime.
Likewise, during the summer of 1956, the Eisenhower administration began parallel
efforts by initiating a broader internal initiative to review “all aspects” of US foreign aid
programs for the purpose of reform and improvement. This review was based primarily on the
conclusions of Clarence B. Randall, the newly installed Chairman of the US Council on Foreign
Economic Policy (CFEP) who reportedly believed that ““…our foreign aid program was a
heterogenous combination of outmoded activities based in many instances on outmoded policies;
that we needed first to define explicitly what was the basic objective of our foreign economic
policy which he did not believe was “milk for every Hottentot” but rather military security.””593
Randall, who had been a prominent American private sector steel industry executive prior
to joining the Eisenhower administration, had allegedly “expressed horror” that the influential
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Republican politician Harold E. Stassen, (who had just stepped down as the Director of both the
US Foreign Operations Administration and the Mutual Security Agency during 1953-1955),
stated that: “we should deny our aid and economic assistance to those who do not accept our
political philosophy.”594 By this time during the fall of 1956 however, Randall had already
intended to lead a team of US government officials to visit several friendly allied nations in
Europe and Asia to ascertain “foreign economic problems” in those regions as part of the
Eisenhower administration’s efforts to reform the overall effectiveness of US economic aid
programs.
The purpose of Randall’s official visit to Taiwan a few months later as part of his trip
during late 1956 was likewise intended to conduct a thorough review of all US economic aid
programs that benefitted the Chinese Nationalist ROC government. This meant that he was able
to evaluate the curious case of US economic aid intended to develop private sector capitalism in
Taiwan, despite it being an authoritarian, anti-democratic, and anti-capitalistic nation
implementing a public-sector, government run socialist-style economic development model that
also prioritized maintaining a large military force supported by an expanding defense industrial
sector base.
In December 1956, Randall published his findings in what became known as the Randall
Report, which outlined his observations to reform the disaggregated nature of the purposes and
associated ways and means of US “economic and technical assistance” and the overall state of
US foreign economic aid programs in general.595 Randall’s report covering his field trip to Asia,
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which included a visit to meet ROC government officials in Taiwan during December 1956,
suggested that he specifically addressed Washington’s concern over the controversies about the
intended purposes of US aid to Taiwan by observing that it exhibited “a much larger rise
proportionately in industrial output, a modest but steady rise in living standards to levels rarely
found in Asia…Despite these gains, the economy is not able to support the huge military
establishment maintained there with United States support as defense against further aggression
by Communist China.”596
The Randall Report’s conclusions that Taiwan’s nascent economy could not support its
oversized military expenditures and that Chinese Nationalist-led ROC government was allegedly
diverting US economic aid for sustaining its disproportionally large military and defense needs,
was consistent with similar criticism from other senior American officials during their debates
over justifying more economic aid to Taiwan. The Report’s section on the economic conditions
for Asian nations such as Taiwan also identified common characteristics among them which
included “the governments are suffering from a lack of competent officials,” and that there was
“a growing nationalism which militates against the inflow of private investment and technical
and managerial talent…”597 The Report also identified reasons for why Asian nations such as
Taiwan exhibited an adverse “investment climate” for private enterprise by citing that because
they were “fully imbued with nationalism” that they viewed “private foreign investment” as a
“threat to their independence” and “a form of colonialism [that] they want to control the
development of their own resources.”598
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The Randall Report also expressed optimism that US economic aid, accompanied by
Washington’s efforts to change investment laws prohibiting private foreign investment, could
bring “a change in attitude toward foreign private capital investment” among these Asian
nations. However, the Report implicitly referred to US assisting Taiwan’s ROC statist-led and
anticapitalistic economic model by rather surprisingly implying that US economic aid could
support socialist systems of economic development among Asian nations by suggesting that
“…some accommodation to socialism is worth looking into provided that private enterprise is
given an opportunity…to demonstrate its superiority. The argument is that when the two systems
are permitted to work side-by-side, private enterprise will do the job so much better than
enthusiasm for socialism will wane.”599
Overall, the Randall Report captured a key aspect of US foreign economic aid policy
intended to promote capitalism in Taiwan by temporarily accepting an unspecified period of
transition for it to emerge away from a statist-led, socialist like economic system. The report
noted that such a transition would eventually lead to a more capitalist system by laying “the
foundations for private investment” and funding basic economic facilities and infrastructures
which “necessarily have to be set up by government sponsorship with government financing.”600
More broadly, by February 1957, Chairman Randall, under his authority as Chairman,
Council on Foreign Economic Policy (CFEP), assigned Forest D. Siefkin as Chairman of the
newly established CFEP’s Subcommittee on Soviet Economic Penetration. The purpose of this
new subcommittee was to ascertain how Washington could enhance US foreign economic aid
programs for promoting capitalist style private enterprise, investment, and industry among
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“underdeveloped” nations to counter Moscow’s communist inspired socialist economic aid and
outreach initiatives.
This new subcommittee’s first report in March 1957 summarized the threat to global US
economic interests from “Sino-Soviet Bloc Economic Activities in Underdeveloped Areas” that
during 1953-1956 represented a significant expanding “economic offensive” of trade, “easy
credits,” grants, and “technical assistance” combined as diplomatic tools to increase the Bloc’s
influence and “promote its political objectives—notably strengthening of neutralism, disruption
of defensive alliances, and reduction of Western influences.”601 The report characterized “Free
World economic activity” as relying on a system of “private commercial and investment” for
which the US government would take over 30 specific actions intended to:
…strengthen U.S. missions abroad…to advise on investment problems…provide
technical advice and assistance in private investment in underdeveloped
countries…create a climate favorable to the development of private enterprises…arrange
more two-way team visits to persuade top level government officials abroad of the
benefits and advantages of private investment for more rapid economic development.”602

Finally, the report recommended additional actions to reform nations like Taiwan that
exhibited state-led public sector dominated economic systems when it noted “Where fully private
enterprises in some sectors is not acceptable to underdeveloped countries, encourage them at
least to permit greater use of flexible forms of business organizations that will associate a
maximum of private capital with public funds in such a way as to permit, as soon as possible, the
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replacement of public ownership by private ownership.”603 A month later, Chairman Siefkin,
with CFEP Chairman Randall’s endorsement, sent all the CFEP and Soviet Economic
Penetration Subcommittee’s members another confidential memorandum emphasizing that they
should take more action in “bringing together the many measures which may be employed to
increase the participation of private enterprise in meeting the special problems created by
Communist economic activities in the underdeveloped areas of the free world.”604
By the spring of 1957, there were further motivations for Washington’s new foreign
economic policies that were influenced by another secret National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 1357: Communist China Through 1961. This NIE highlighted Beijing’s new economic aid
assistance initiatives during 1956 which included $320 million in credits to both North Vietnam
and North Korea, $40 million to Outer Mongolia, and $22.4 million and $12.6 million in aid
grants to Cambodia and Nepal respectively.605 This NIE also assessed that “Peiping will also
probably offer economic assistance to selected non-Communist countries and will propagandize
the “nonpolitical” nature of such assistance.”606
Nearly six months later, the CIA’s intelligence estimates of new Chinese Communist
economic aid initiatives in Asia, together with both the CFEP’s Randall Report and its
subcommittee’s Soviet Economic Penetration report, appear to have influenced the Eisenhower
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administration’s “analysis of the requirements and objectives of foreign economy policy” which
led to new and enhanced US economic security policies supplementing Washington’s overall
cold war strategies with the Foreign Economic Policy and the Trade Agreements Program on
September 6, 1957.607
This lengthy new policy document articulated the overall goals of Washington’s cold war
era foreign economic policies by noting that its first broad objective would be to “promote the
economic strength of the United States” through expanding foreign markets for trade imports and
exports to benefit the entire spectrum of private American business sectors.608 The second broad
objective, expressed as expanding the “economic strength of the rest of the free world,” linked
Washington’s promotion of “foreign economic growth” to US cold war security objectives
versus communist expansionism by justifying it as necessary for the internal domestic stability of
“friendly societies abroad” such as Taiwan.609
This objective further postulated that if “moderate leadership groups” in “less developed
countries” failed to “achieve reasonable economic progress” that they would be replaced by
either totalitarian or communist style government regimes.610 This objective’s rationale was
further buttressed by linking strong economic growth in foreign friendly nations to their capacity
to build up their militaries for deterring communist inspired external aggression or internal
subversion. Accordingly, these justifications can be reasonably interpreted as consistent with
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Washington’s cold war inspired logic underpinning the overall rationale for US economic aid to
Taiwan.
This new policy’s third overall broad objective was to “build and maintain cohesion in
the free world” by stressing the importance of bilateral and multilateral economic free trade and
growth within the cold war context of “the great power struggle between Communism and the
way of life represented by the democracies.”611 This objective also implied that Washington
would expand economic aid to foreign countries for the purpose of encouraging “the growth of
the idea of democratic and limited government and the basic values on which this rests.”612 The
second section of this document further articulated that US foreign economic aid goals would be
to curb “economic nationalism” by not only reducing “public and private barriers to trade and
payments,” but also providing “mutual assistance” as means to promote the “gradual and
reciprocal reduction of unjustifiable governmental and private barriers; [and] the promotion of
private investment…”613
Furthermore, the Eisenhower administration also buttressed and justified its cold war
global free trade economic policies by emphasizing the modern foundational doctrinal
precedence established by the US Congress during the Roosevelt administration era’s Trade
Agreements Act of 1934, which had been extended and remained in effect.614 The foundation of
this doctrine as expressed in the Act declared that the main overarching goal of US international
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trade policy was to reduce “unjustifiable government interference to allow international trade to
expand in response to market forces.”615
Overall, this third policy component’s goals that justified and purposed US foreign
economic aid based on the ideological components of promoting democratic values globally, and
by extension—capitalism and free trade, further illuminated the puzzle and contradiction in
Washington’s rationale underpinning US foreign policy towards an undemocratic and anticapitalistic Taiwan. As previously established, executive branch declassified archival materials
revealed that by 1957 it had been long apparent among many senior officials in Washington that
for nearly a decade the Chinese Nationalist controlled ROC government on Taiwan had reformed
neither its Socialist-like anti-capitalist economic system nor its authoritarian and repressive
regime.
These characteristics were ideologically incongruent and in practice antithetical to
American values and morals because of Taiwan’s oppressive internal repression of society,
illiberal and undemocratic Leninist-inspired socialist political system, and anti-capitalistic statist
economic model of development. However, Washington largely chose to ignore these
characteristics and maintained high levels of US economic aid to Taiwan because the Chinese
Nationalists led ROC government had not only an official US defense treaty ally since 1954, but
was instrumental in assisting Washington’s efforts in maintaining the US cold war strategy of
containment versus the existential threats posed by Soviet and Chinese Communist inspired
ideological, political, military, and economic expansionism.
By the late fall of 1957, the US Department of Defense, then managing the still relatively
new US-Taiwan Defense Treaty of 1954, expressed its concern “about the accelerating Sino-
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Soviet campaign of economic penetration in the Free World” in a confidential memorandum to
CFEP Chairman Randall by warning that continued “Sino-Soviet bloc success in orientating Free
World nations toward the bloc would weaken their participation in Free World mutual security
programs, thus causing the U.S. to shoulder a heavier military security burden.”616 This warning,
by oblique extension implied that Washington’s failure to adequately support its new defense
treaty ally Taiwan with US economic aid, would result in less participation by the Chinese
Nationalists in supporting Washington’s defense priorities for the overall US cold war
containment policy, thus straining or overburdening US military resources in the Far East.
Concurrently during the fall of 1957, the Eisenhower administration conducted a review
of US foreign policy towards Taiwan contained in the previous 1955 NSC 5503: US Policy
Toward Formosa and the Government of the Republic of China and replaced it with the new top
secret classified NSC 5723: US Policy Toward Taiwan and the Government of the Republic of
China. A review of the contents of this revised policy document reveals that Washington
essentially repeated near verbatim the previous mildly expressed economic reform language
from 1955 which remained “So far as feasible, employ U.S. assistance as a lever to this end,”
and to “encourage” conditions for reforming Taiwan’s authoritarian political and economic
system by linking such reforms to US aid.617
While NSC 5723 articulated the Eisenhower administration’s overall and economic
policy goals for Taiwan, it may have been influenced partially by what preceded it two months
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earlier with the US intelligence community’s estimate of the near term viability and “staying
power of the ROC” in the secret classified NIE 43-2-57: The Prospects for the Government of
the Republic of China. This updated NIE concluded that the Nationalist regime’s survival on the
island nation of Taiwan depended upon Washington maintaining a high degree of US security
assistance and economic aid.618
This NIE noted that while Taiwan’s economy “continues to gradually improve,” it
contrasted this somewhat pessimistically by noting that due to the threat of Communist China
that the ROC “cannot survive without US support.” This NIE concluded that if Chiang’s
Nationalist regime continued its high levels of military expenditures for maintaining its military
and political goals for “returning to the mainland,” (meaning mounting a large scale military
invasion and occupation of mainland China), that this “would increase the need for US aid to
prevent economic degeneration.”619 The NIE also noted that even if Taiwan was to “concentrate
on long-term economic development” and decrease its high level of military funding together
with abandoning its political goal of occupying mainland China by force, that US economic aid
would still “be required for the development of export industries.”620
One key result from the conclusions contained in NIE 43-2-57 is that it presented a policy
dilemma for Washington continuing to justify economic aid to Taiwan with the growing
realization that Chiang’s Nationalist regime was using and diverting US economic aid to support
Taiwan maintaining a large military force for the unrealistic and untenable goal of returning to
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reoccupy mainland China by force, instead of prudently developing Taiwan’s economy.621 This
realization was formally reflected a month later during September 1957 after NIE 43-2-57 was
published, when the NSC Planning Board apparently factored in this new assessment when it
reviewed both the 1956 Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid
Programs and deliberated over US policy updates to the 1955 NSC 5503 U.S. Policy Toward
Formosa and the Government of the Republic of China.
As a result, the NSC Planning Board formally recommend to the broader NSC principals
that as part of its proposed changes to NSC 5503 in Paragraph 17 that it should be amended to
read:
Show continuing U.S. friendship for the GRC and the Chinese people, while avoiding
any implication of an obligation to guarantee the former's return to power on the
mainland; however, make clear to the GRC that—except in the event of substantial
change in the world situation or of conditions on the mainland of China—our future
military and economic assistance programs will not be premised on the assumption of the
GRC’s return to power on the mainland.622
However, during the highly contentious 338th meeting of the NSC on October 2, 1957,
President Eisenhower took specific exception to the NSC Planning Board’s above proposed
italicized verbiage in the draft NSC 5503’s Paragraph 17 which indicated Washington’s more
forceful policy opposition to connecting a rationale for US aid as supporting Taiwan’s policy
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goals of forcefully returning to mainland China.623 The archival records of this meeting reveal
that following several rounds of intense discussions over this issue between the president,
Secretary Dulles, NSC Advisor Cutler, and other key officials, that the italicized verbiage was
ultimately not adopted.
This resulted in an updated new 1957 NSC 5723: US Policy Toward Taiwan and the
Government of the Republic of China series that replaced the previous 1955 NSC 5503 version,
yet retained similar US objectives for Taiwan to include “Development of a stronger Taiwan
economy,” “Except under circumstances approved by the President, do not agree to GRC
offensive actions against the mainland of Communist China,” as well as no changes to the
controversial clause: “Show continuing U.S. friendship for the GRC and the Chinese people,
while avoiding any implication of an obligation to guarantee the former's return to power on the
mainland.”624
Nevertheless, these and other official executive branch policy statements, intelligence
reports, and diplomatic cables describing the Soviet and Communist Chinese growing economic
power and influence in the region appear to have also influenced Washington justifying the
creation, expansion, and funding for various longer-term unilateral and multilateral economic
foreign economic aid programs that aided Taiwan’s economy. Such advocacy was prevalent
within the US State Department, particularly from Karl Rankin, the US Ambassador to Taiwan
during 1953-1957, who emphasized that the “missing ingredient” in our China policy” to
“sustain confidence in Taiwan” included economic matters such that “…the Chinese should be
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brought into long-range planning at the earliest possible stages. The passage of US legislation
making possible longer term appropriations and planning would be especially helpful in this
connection.”625
Overall during the broader 1950-1965 period, the programs that resulted in US economic
aid to Taiwan included subsequent US Congressional authorization for the Point Four Program,
the Mutual Security Program, the Economic Cooperation Administration, the Development Loan
Fund, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Export-Import Bank, Fund for Asian Economic
Development, and annual Congressional Foreign Assistance Acts.626
Another related development catalyzing economic aid to Taiwan within the US executive
branch involved the previously mentioned senior presidential advisor, Dr. Walt Rostow. Rostow,
who in 1947 had served as an official with the Economic Commission for Europe as part of the
Marshall Plan, became an economic and foreign policy advisor in the Eisenhower administration
while also a professor of economic history at MIT during 1950-1961. Rostow’s assumptions and
findings that economic development resulted from “non-rational” political and social forces
reversed and countered Marxist socio-economic theory that “rational” human desires and actions
to maximize profits were the main causal factors for uneven economic development thus causing
income disparities and economic grievances leading to class struggle and revolution in societies
as they evolve.627 In other words, Rostow’s research on the historical evolution of societies and
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stages of economic growth were based on his interpretation of evidence that their adaptation to
environmental conditions and economic choices resulting in spreading wealth for the whole of
society.
Rostow’s self-styled capitalistic societal modernization theories were contrary to Marxist
assumptions that human desire and greed in purely capitalist societies lead to wide-spread
income disparities, class struggle, and eventually resolution through societal revolution evolving
from capitalism to the socio-economic development stages of socialism and communism.
Rostow was also motivated by his desire to provide an alternative economic development theory
that rationalized extending American foreign economic aid in concert with his modernization
theories for developing nations to counter Moscow and Beijing’s Marxist-inspired ideological
theories of development that included implementing central economic planning with state-run
business enterprises at the expense of the private sector.
Rostow’s influence therefore can be illustrated by the US government claims of Taiwan’s
overall economic success being attributed to specific American policy choices of economic aid
and development. For example, in 1955, among Rostow’s many public interviews and comments
during the period with his book An American Policy in Asia published that the same year, was
his specific advocacy in a Washington Post article that “Formosa should be made more of a
symbol of Free China…” with a “vigorous American economic policy” that included loans and
grants of “an extra $2 billion a year for five years…” as a program of investment with “no tie
between economic and military pacts.”628 Rostow further justified his proposal for an increase in
US economic aid to Taiwan by linking it to “permit Free Asia to surpass Peking’s economic
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performance…” which “may very well determine the outcome of the ideological struggle for
Asia.”629
Another key historical American figure involved in advising the US government in
implementing US foreign aid for Taiwan’s economic modernization was Dr. Neil H. Jacoby,
formerly a professor of economics at the University of Chicago from 1938 to 1948, who was a
member of the Eisenhower administration’s Council of Economic Advisors from 1953 to 1955.
During this period, Jacoby provided policy input for US business management assistance to
Taiwan through his five-step application and implementation of US foreign aid with “scientific”
resource management techniques modeled from American business corporate practices.630
Jacoby’s five-step process of using resource management for evaluating US foreign aid to
Taiwan consisted of: 1) Fix goals; 2) Identify alternative programs; 3) Evaluate each alternative;
4) Select the optimal program; and 5) Control its execution.631
Influenced by Rostow and Jacoby’s earlier recommendations in its first-term, early into
President Eisenhower’s second term in 1957 many US government economic advisors, analysts,
and policy makers in the executive and legislative branches had concluded that the key
impediment and challenge for US economic aid intended to develop Taiwan’s private sector lay
in the authoritarian Chinese Nationalist-led ROC government’s socialist style structure of
managing Taiwan’s statist economy. As a result, Washington began to adjust and set new
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conditions for continued US economic aid to Taiwan for influencing the ROC government to
facilitate and incentivize private sector entrepreneurship.
These new conditions were part of a broader set of US economic aid reform policies
designed to encourage the transition of Taiwan’s economy away from its short-term inefficient
import substitution phase of its growth model to the next stage featuring export led economic
development to ensure longer term success in capitalist modernization. Washington also began
more earnest efforts to simultaneously encourage the Chinese Nationalists to reform their
authoritarian ROC government and repressive political system by increasing political pluralism
and transition to a liberal democratic state. Facing a significant overall decline in US
congressional support for justifying foreign aid budgets to support undemocratic authoritarian
regimes, the Eisenhower administration now intended US economic aid and assistance be
increasingly conditioned upon for Taiwan meeting Washington’s twin policy goals of democratic
political and capitalist economic reform in the future.
More broadly throughout the 1952-1961 period, Washington aspired to reform and
manage economic aid to Taiwan in the context of a “whole of government” approach within the
US national security establishment led by agencies such as the Mutual Security Agency, Foreign
Operations Administration, the Economic Cooperation Administration, and the International
Cooperation Administration. After 1961 the State Department’s Agency for International
Development (USAID) was created to consolidate and manage overall US economic aid
programs.
The Chinese Nationalist ROC government also established the Council on US Aid
(CUSA) and the Economic Stabilization Board (ESB) as Taiwan’s counterparts with US aid
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agencies to coordinate and manage incoming US economic assistance.632 Both CUSA and the
ESB were instrumental in influencing and facilitating US economic aid allocations, obligations,
and non-project capital equipment funding to go overwhelmingly into Taiwan’s public sectors
compared to its private sectors. During the 1951-1963 period, data for US aid that went into
Taiwan’s four main economic sectors, showed that it went primarily in the government
dominated state-enterprise sector category for infrastructure, followed by substantial amounts
going into the other three sectors of agriculture, human resources, and industry.633
Most tellingly however, was that there were significant amounts of US economic aid
funding that went overwhelmingly to Taiwan’s public sector compared to its private sector as a
result of the jointly US-ROC managed local currency funds generated from US non-project and
non-capital economic assistance. The Chinese Nationalist ROC government dominated stateenterprise sector categories for infrastructure and human resources received well over 90 percent
of investment from these sources during 1951-1965.634 Taiwan’s economic data also showed that
the first half of this period can be described as its “import substitution phase” within its
economic transition. During the early part of this period, US economic aid was purposely
diverted to expediently develop the ROC government’s dominated state enterprises in all four
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public sectors, particularly in infrastructure and industry which made up 56 percent of total
production for those sectors in 1952.635
Even as early as 1952, officials in Washington responsible for managing and overseeing
US economic aid to Taiwan would also have been aware of the Chinese Nationalist dominated
ROC government’s state directed dominance of public sector industries at the expense of the
private sector most widely exhibited by it implementing a series of three sequential Four-Year
Plans of “planned economic development” during 1953-1956, 1957-1960, and 1961-1964
respectively.636 It is especially noteworthy that these Chinese Nationalist Four-Year Plans for
Taiwan exhibited socialist inspired ideological and centralized economic planning through their
ROC government management and implementation. Therefore, the ROC’s Four-Year Plans
would have been recognized as similar to the anti-capitalist and centrally planned, state-directed
Soviet and Chinese Communist Five-Year Planning economic development models used by
Moscow and Beijing during the cold war era.
These ideological contradictions in economic systems and development philosophies can
be further compared and interpreted within a donor-recipient framework to show that Taiwan as
a client state became dependent upon annual US economic aid allocations for economic growth.
Of the roughly $1 billion in US economic aid intended to develop the island’s “capitalist” private
sector used by the ROC government to buttress Taiwan’s “socialist” economy for 10 years
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during 1953-1963, the result was that Taiwan became overdependent on the United States to
largely subsidize its public industrial sectors.637 A key feature of Taiwan’s near exclusive
dependency on US economic aid to support its “mixed public-private” economic model of
development during this period was that this aid represented 43% of gross investment and almost
90% of the total “external” foreign direct investment.638
This unbalanced dependency condition became increasingly untenable for US executive
branch officials to justify to the US Congress to authorize more aid for such purposes during
annual budget deliberations. As a result, Washington gradually adjusted its goals to more
forcefully compel the Chinese Nationalists to reform Taiwan’s inefficient and allegedly corrupt
government run large public sector industries by setting new conditions linked to capitalistic
development goals of US economic aid. As early as 1955, Washington identified the most
glaring examples of Taiwan’s inefficient and corrupt large public sector companies as the staterun enterprises known as the Taiwan Sugar Corporation and the Taiwan Power Company, both
established in 1946.
For example, as a 1955 formerly classified confidential US memorandum from Karl
Rankin, the US Ambassador to the ROC, to ROC Finance Minister Hsu reveals, Rankin extolled
the need for Taiwan to reform its government monopolized Power and Sugar Corporations by
stating:
At the very least, they should provide from current earnings enough to cover normal
depreciation charges and to contribute to the Government no less than similar private
enterprises would pay in taxes. Yet both companies have been operating at a loss of
running ever further into dept. Thus very important and legitimate sources of revenue
have been wasted…I do not feel that the United States is warranted in making further
Ibid., 152. According to Chang, Taiwan’s these industrial sectors included “mining, manufacturing,
electric power, transport, and communications.”
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capital investments in this [Power] Company, which already has absorbed some US$70
million in aid funds.639

During 1957-1958 US State Department officials became concerned that they were
inundated with repeated requests from the Chinese Nationalist ROC government for more
economic aid intended to be funneled into Taiwan’s largest state-run business enterprises that
were increasingly challenged by reductions in US congressional authorizations of funding the
Defense Support Fund, Development Loan Fund, and the PL 480 surplus agriculture commodity
exchange and funding programs. These three programs were the main conduits from which
Taiwan received large amounts of annual US economic aid. These tensions, when framed in the
context of “donor-recipient” challenges, were exacerbated by the case of Taiwan’s requests for
more aid when US economic foreign aid policies towards developing nations increasingly shifted
to making those nations experiencing economic success more self-supporting, thus reducing the
need for more US aid in an era of increasing US government budget deficits.
Another typical archival example illustrating this dilemma is from an official 1957
memorandum between senior US State Department officials who reported on their meeting in
Washington with former Taiwan Finance Minister C. K. Yen, then Chair of Taiwan’s joint USTaiwan Council on US Aid, and deputy Chair of Taiwan’s Economic Stabilization Board.640 In
this memorandum, Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State, Far East described his
reply to Yen’s requests for more aid in light of the declining ratio of US economic aid to
Taiwan’s national income, by first acknowledging that while the US Congress had “cut one
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billion dollars” from overall US aid programs, while expressing how “successful the aid program
had been in Taiwan” and that it “had never been intended that [US] aid should remain
indefinitely at a constant ration with national income.”641 However, despite his adroit explanation
for Washington’s declining foreign economic aid budgets in response to Yen’s requests for more
aid, Robertson nonetheless pointed out that four large Taiwan government-run projects—the
Shih-men Dam, the Tung-men Hydro project, the aluminum plant and the project of rubber tire
manufacture—were receiving priority considerations in Washington.”642
As Washington’s overall foreign economic aid reform policies gradually evolved during
1957-1958, there was an impetus to encourage a meaningful expansion of Taiwan’s private
sector entrepreneurship through imposing stricter conditions on the ROC government’s receipt of
US economic aid. These new policies meant that future US economic aid would be increasingly
tied to Taiwan’s progress towards emphasizing and expanding capital investment and
liberalization of financing and taxation for the private versus the public sector.643
In 1958 the USAID Mission to Taiwan created a new Office of Private Enterprise and a
Development Loan Fund to foster Taiwan’s private sector expansion and implement
Washington’s other key policy goals of linking economic aid to reforming Taiwan’s public and
private sectors. Overall, these measures would eventually result in meeting their intended goals
of achieving growth for Taiwan’s private sector by the late 1960s. A comparison of the economic
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data for gross domestic investment between the private sector and public sectors in Taiwan
shows that investment in the private sector rose significantly—but only well after 1960.644
As a result of emerging US Congressional reform preferences and pressure on the
Eisenhower administration to reduce budgets for US foreign aid programs, the State Department
increasingly emphasized to Taipei in diplomatic cables and bilateral meetings that Washington’s
future goals for economic aid to Taiwan were “intended to make the recipient country more selfsupporting so that aid could gradually be reduced.”645 On the other hand during 1957-1958, Walt
Rostow’s new economic modernization theories were gaining prominence as exemplified by his
advocacy in Washington for arguing that US economic aid should be further increased for
Taiwan because it would emerge as an example of a capitalistic development model triumphing
over Soviet and Chinese socialist style models.
Rostow justified his advocacy for more US economic aid to the Chinese Nationalists by
arguing that Taiwan was “already somewhere between stages 2) and 3)” and that with a larger
injection of external assistance it would become a “showcase” example and a “symbol of Free
China” as a successful capitalist development model of free enterprise to counter the
“Communist path of economic development.”646 As previously mentioned, new Soviet foreign
economic aid initiatives for the developing world that emerged during 1952-1956, prompted
Washington to augment its cold war psychological warfare efforts by publicizing Western
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capitalistic ideological economic successes resulting from US foreign economic aid to countries
such as Taiwan.
During the cold war Washington would go on to sponsor and expand a variety of
programs as part of a global publicity campaign that emphasized narratives and themes
publicizing the purported positive results of US exported capitalist economic modernization
development programs and aid to Taiwan and other developing countries. These efforts were part
of the “psychological warfare” components of the US cold war foreign policy highlighting
capitalist economic modernization techniques as a means to help “contain” and counter the
growing rivalry and global influence in developing nations posed by the export of seemingly
attractive alternative Soviet and Chinese Communist economic development models.647
Washington’s efforts to publicize the success of capitalism and its link to US foreign
economic aid as part of the global ideological and propaganda struggle of “economic warfare”
versus communism can be traced back to 1951 in the previously mentioned foundational US
containment strategy document NSC-68. The provisions in NSC-68 also led to the creation of the
Psychological Strategy Board in 1951 (subsequently re-named the Operations Coordinating
Board) and the NSC’s Office of Special Projects (subsequently re-named the Office of Policy
Coordination).648 In 1955 the NSC Operations Coordinating Board produced Progress Report on
NSC 162/2 (Formosa and Nationalist China) which provided the status on the progress of all US
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national security objectives for Taiwan previously specified in the 1953 NSC 146/2: United
States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the Chinese National
Government.649
The report described improving the economic and fiscal procedures of Taiwan that
resulted from an “economic advisory group of American financial and business experts” who
went to Taiwan in August 1954 to “study outstanding economic problems and to chart an
“economic blueprint” for the future.”650 The report also highlighted efforts by the US
Information Agency for influencing regional public opinion through publicity about US
economic aid initiatives to Taiwan. These efforts included using Chinese language magazines
and books published in Hong Kong and Taipei, and the US Voice of Asia radio programs that
broadcasted themes contrasting the “cruelty and oppression of the Chinese communist regime
with the progress being made by Free China” from radio stations in the Philippines and
Okinawa.651
Other evidence includes the 1955 NSC 5503: U.S. Policy Toward Formosa and the
Government of the Republic of China which committed the United States to: “…continue
programs in which Formosa serves as a base for psychological operations against the
mainland…[and] Attempt to convince other free world countries of the soundness of U.S. policy
toward the Republic of China and of the advisability of their adopting similar policies.”652 In
1956, the Joint United States-Free China Program to Organize Overseas Chinese against
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Communism was initiated as a bilateral program between the United States and Taiwan
cooperating to use US funded economic aid and psychological warfare means in a mutual effort
targeting film, media, education, and financial sectors to influence overseas Chinese throughout
Southeast Asia.
The key purposes of these efforts were to enhance public perceptions of “American
leadership” and “enhance the prestige of and support for the [GRC] versus the Chinese
Communists’ “infiltration and subversive activities” in the region with:
…financial and technical assistance for such proposals as the publication of anti Communist newspapers and periodicals, the establishment of an overseas Chinese book
company, the expansion of the Taiwan school program in overseas Chinese communities,
the establishment of a banking corporation to assist overseas Chinese economic
enterprises, and the promotion of properly oriented Chinese motion pictures.653

In a related development a year later in October 1957, Washington updated its goals for
US cold war containment related policy collaboration with Taiwan for promoting Western
capitalist economic ideology in Asia with the previously mentioned NSC 5723: US Policy
Toward Taiwan and the Government of the Republic of China. This top secret classified
document revealed that Washington’s objectives remained developing a “stronger Taiwan
economy,” with courses of action that included aiding Taiwan “to serve as the focal point of the
free Chinese alternative to Communism” and “Consistent with the foregoing objectives and
courses of action, continue programs in which Taiwan serves as a base for psychological
operations against the mainland.”654
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Two months later, the 1957 NIE 13-2-57: Communist China’s Role in Non-Communist
Asia reiterated previous US intelligence assessments that Beijing was promoting its economic
development model as an alternative to Western capitalist modernization ideals by stating that it
“will continue to pose as the champion of peace and economic development,” and “continue to
concentrate on economic inducements, the expansion of a broad range of official and unofficial
contacts, and political subversion.”655 These factors appear to have spurred Washington’s efforts
to continue publicity about US economic aid embedded in other programs funded and managed
by the US Information Agency and the Economic Cooperation Administration in cooperation
with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Voice of America, the US Department of State, US
Department of Commerce, private media organizations, and American businesses and labor
organizations.656
Overall, Washington’s intended foreign economic aid reforms for Taiwan during the
1955-1956 and 1957-1958 periods would be stalled by the intense severity of renewed, but brief
cold war era Chinese Communist initiated limited offensive military actions during 1954-1955
and 1958 versus ROC military personnel and installations on Chinese Nationalist-held islands,
located just a few miles offshore of China’s mainland.657 During these two periods of hostilities,
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the aforementioned 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the ROC
obligated Washington to defend not only the main island of Taiwan, but several of the Chinese
Nationalist held offshore islands.658 Key American officials were not only concerned about the
survival of Taiwan as a nation state and the potential for these crises escalating towards the use
of US nuclear weapons, but were also unsure as to how long and intense Beijing’s renewed
military aggression versus Chinese Nationalist forces in the Taiwan Strait would last.659
Nevertheless, Washington officials judged that these two crisis periods of renewed
hostilities portended a direct threat to the tens of thousands of Chinese Nationalist military forces
ensconced on the smaller offshore island groups of Quemoy (Jinmen), Matsu (Masu), Yijiang,
and the Dachens (Tachens) close to mainland China.660 Further, these crises could have evolved
into an existential military threat to the survival of the Chinese Nationalist regime located just 90
miles away across the Strait on the main island of Taiwan.661 As a result of these crises,
Washington would briefly increase US economic aid to Taiwan while simultaneously delaying
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the imposition of meaningful capitalistic reforms intended to reduce Taipei’s government-run
public sector or increase private sector free enterprise.662
As explained earlier, by the late-1950’s many members in the US Congress favored
reducing economic aid to Taiwan because they could not continue to justify large foreign aid
budget expenditures based on the inherent ideological contradictions for developing capitalism in
a socialist style statist economic system. Other congressional members opposed continuing US
economic aid to Taiwan because the Chinese Nationalists did not demonstrate sufficient progress
and results in reforming their authoritarian and unfree statist economic development model. Still,
another reason justifying reducing US economic aid to Taiwan emerged during 1956-1957 as
new economic data showed that Taiwan was exhibiting nascent and emerging overall favorable
economic growth patterns that appeared would be sustained into the foreseeable future.663
Authoritative US economic aid statistics to the Chinese Nationalists during fiscal years
1951-1967 show that at the peak of the Korean War, US aid arrivals to Taiwan were $91.2
million in 1952, but declined during each of the next two years totaling $86.1 million in 1953
and still lower at $75.6 million in 1954.664 This trend was reversed however in 1955 when
Congress authorized the second highest annual amount during the 16 year period at $132 million
in obligations and $94.5 million in arrivals due mainly to the provisions and influence of
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Washington and Taipei signing the US-ROC Security Treaty of 1954 in 1955, as well as the
security threats emerging during the 1954-1955 Taiwan Strait crisis.665
While US economic aid obligations and arrivals remained generally steady at just over
$100 million annually during 1955-1957, there was a noticeable $25.2 million decrease in aid
obligations from $106.9 million in 1957 to $81.7 million in 1958 largely due to Congressional
preferences to cut foreign that was not being used by recipients for its intended purposes, as well
as domestic economic concerns over lower US economic growth.666 The 1958 Taiwan Strait
Crisis and an increase in US Congressional support for the Chinese Nationalists resulted in a
significant increase in aid obligations totaling $124.5 for fiscal year 1959, but steadily declined
annually with the exception of a final burst of $143.5 million in 1964 intended to “close out” the
last year of statutory authorized US economic aid to Taiwan with a deadline for it ending in
1965.667
The precursors to ending aid by 1965 emerged during the fall of 1959 when US economic
aid intended to develop capitalism for Taiwan’s socialist style and inefficient industrial public
sector government run economy could no longer be reasonably justified unless the Chinese
Nationalists implemented meaningful reform and reduced military expenditures and defense
strategy of recovering mainland China.668 Years of increasing pressure from the US Congress to
meaningfully reform Taiwan’s statist public sector economy reached a culminating point during
1959-1960 when US State Department and USAID officials established the “Nineteen-Point
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Project on Economic and Financial Improvement” (or Nineteen Points Program) for the ROC
government to implement.669 The Nineteen Points Program was established under the framework
of Washington’s “Accelerated Development Program Taiwan” following the document’s formal
presentation to the Chinese Nationalists on January 14, 1960, and subsequent approval by the
ROC government’s Central Standing Committee on March 23rd to incorporate it into Taiwan’s
upcoming statist Four-Year Economic Plan (1961-1964).670
The establishment of the Nineteen Points Program resulted from a series of high level
visits and diplomatic exchanges following ICA Deputy Director Leonard J. Saccio’s visit from
Washington to Taipei during 3-4 December 1959 and Director of the ICA Mission in Taipei
Wesley C. Harald’s initial “eight-point” reform proposals and consultation with the ROC
Economic and Finance Ministers along with their CUSA counterparts later that month.671 The
Nineteen Points Program entailed a detailed series of intended capitalist style reform measures
and conditions that the ROC government would be required to fulfill if Taiwan was to continue
receiving US economic aid. Despite the Program’s newly imposed conditions, it also marked a
shift in Washington’s economic aid policy towards Taiwan as a means of providing incentives
and rewards for inducing the ROC government to reform its economy and transition away from
socialist style public sector dominant industrial development towards expanding capitalist style
private sector free enterprise.672
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Washington’s overall strategic purpose for imposing the Nineteen Points Program on
Taiwan was to ““build attractive “showcase” of achievements free society,”” as a model
demonstrating the superiority of capitalist economic development over Soviet and Chinese
inspired socialist style modernization systems. The Program’s detailed objectives included
reforming the ROC government’s fiscal policies and other measures to “provide jobs rapidly
growing population,” and minimizing Taiwan’s oversized and unnecessary military defense
expenditures that had been under increasing scrutiny by Washington as wasteful spending, thus
prolonging Taipei’s reliance on continued US aid.673 It also required that the ROC “Government
divest itself of enterprises which compete with or could be better operated by private enterprise”
to further “maximize sound economic growth next 4-5 years attaining condition where future
growth would be self-generating, thus eliminating need foreign aid except military items and
surplus agriculture products.”674
By early 1960, Eisenhower administration officials continued to publicly justify
economic aid to Taiwan based on “the amazing economic growth of Communist China [which]
presented a challenge that must be met,” while also pointing out that “Communist China’s
productive capacity was now increasing 20 per cent a year.”675 Thus the PRC’s purported
economic developments also influenced President Eisenhower to remain committed to his
administration’s global publicity efforts for extolling the narrative that the ROC on Taiwan
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continue to ““serve as a “model” for other areas.”676 Other Eisenhower administration officials
stated that: ““What is necessary…is to concentrate aid on two or three nations which have a
chance to make an “economic breakthrough.” These nations would then provide a show-window
for economic development under freedom to offset that of Communist China under
regimentation.””677
President Eisenhower was also influenced to support US economic aid to the Chinese
Nationalists by the US State Department’s continued endorsement of Taiwan making
“remarkable progress” in strengthening “its financial and economic affairs…especially its
industries,” and further recommending that Washington create a new “incentive fund for
development of new industries, to be matched by funds from Taiwanese private enterprise.”678
While Eisenhower officials publicly commented that it was “considering more help for Taiwan”
it would be “conditioned upon the willingness of the Chiang Kai-shek Government to adopt
certain measures.”679
However, over the course of the next several months during their internal deliberations
over the 1961 and 1962 budget proposals for foreign economic aid in the forms of US
International Cooperation Administration and Development Loan Fund monies for Taiwan,
Eisenhower administration officials became increasingly concerned that the US Congress would
refuse to appropriate those funds “if Taiwan fails to fulfill its economic policy commitments”
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towards reforming its socialist economic model by reducing its statist government run public
sector industries in favor of increasing capitalist style private sectors and free enterprises.680
After President Eisenhower left office in early 1961, the subsequent Kennedy and
Johnson administrations’ initiatives to reform the US containment strategy’s economic aid goals
and policies to countries such as Taiwan were both significantly influenced by ongoing
Congressional criticisms over the purposes, justifications, effectiveness, and results of US
foreign economic aid programs. The ideological underpinnings and intended uses of US
economic aid to Taiwan within these two single-term presidential administrations during 19611965 were also similarly influenced by senior presidential advisor Walt Rostow’s evolving
capitalist economic modernization concepts. Early into his administration on May 25, 1961,
President Kennedy called on Congress to authorize a new “Act for International Development”
that would continue and expand economic aid programs under the “freedom doctrine” to the
“whole southern half of the globe—Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East…”681
Also during the early Kennedy administration in 1961, both houses of the US Congress
resumed their intense scrutiny and examination of the goals, efficiency, and justifications for US
foreign economic aid programs through a series of high-profile hearings and testimonies by key
government officials. The US Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations, chaired by Senator J.W.
Fulbright since 1959, presided over several key hearings between May 31 to June 27, 1961, that
focused on “international development and security” issues for the Far East, to include the topic
of US economic aid to Taiwan.682
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One significant hearing that addressed the status and efficacy of continuing US economic
aid to Taiwan occurred on June 13th involving Henry R. Labouisse and Frank M. Coffin, two
Chairmen from President Kennedy’s Task Force on Foreign Economic Assistance, who at
various points opined that in the case of Taiwan—“in general terms there has been very real
success” and “…will have been helped sufficiently so that they can undertake the major part of
the chore themselves within not too long a time.”683 Overall, these two expert witness
testimonies buttressed Washington’s contention that US economic aid to Taiwan had achieved
successful results and that it could soon be significantly reduced or eliminated altogether.
Another key witness during the hearing that day was Walter P. McConaughy, the
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, who not only submitted his lengthy 18-page
prepared testimony for the committee’s official record, but answered several key questions posed
by several senators about the purposes and reasons justifying whether to continue US economic
aid to Taiwan. First, McConaughy notably justified the purposes of US economic aid to Taiwan
based on the threat from “Communist China” because it was the “wellspring of our problems in
the Far East and it is our responsibility first to help protect the friendly people in the 13
countries, many newly emerged into sovereign status, from the nearby and threatening
enemy.”684 Second, he further justified the purposes for US economic aid to countries in the
region based on the need to “help their governments meet the rising tide of expectations of
people...” and that their “relatively modest demands for a better life will be met, either by the
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free world or by the competitors to the social system and democratic institutions which we
espouse.”685
Additional related elements of McConaughy’s testimony were particularly noteworthy
because they reflected Washington’s cold war inspired policy for the strong ideological
justifications of US economic aid to Taiwan. He stated that the Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan
were “a staunch ally in the task of maintaining the integrity of free Asia” and that Taiwan “be
kept out of Communist hands, not only because of its strategic position, but because of “free
China” it exerts a psychological influence upon the Chinese under Communist rule and on the
whole of southeast Asia where some 12 millions of Chinese reside.”686
Further, McConaughy quoted Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson’s speech delivered
during his state visit to Taipei the previous month in May 1961 in which he elevated Taiwan as
an economic model to be emulated by other developing nations in the region by stating that the
[ROC] “is especially favored in its human resources for economic development” and that “the
political, social, agricultural, and economic progress in Taiwan” was the result of “American
aid,” and is “an achievement worthy of note throughout all Asia and the world.”687 And so,
McConaughy’s testimony echoed and reaffirmed the themes justifying US economic aid
intended to develop capitalistic private sector development and eventually true democratic
political institutions in authoritarian Taiwan to counter, both ideologically and in practice, the
threats posed by Soviet and Communist China’s competing political, military, and socialist
economic development systems.
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However, as consistent with other similar previous congressional hearings during the
Eisenhower and Truman administrations, these Senate committee members repeatedly quizzed
their witnesses over issues related to overall ideological contradictions inherent to US economic
aid to Taiwan. These contradictions centered on whether US economic aid to Taiwan had
achieved their intended effects in reforming and reducing Taiwan’s predominately statist,
government run public sector economy in favor of a more capitalist based free market system
that elevated the role of the private sector, thus reflecting US economic ideology linked to
democratic political values. As these and other related congressional hearing transcripts revealed,
beginning in 1961 during the early Kennedy administration, key democratic congressional
members increasingly raised issues related to contradictions in US military and economic aid
going to support “military dictatorships” in Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, and now Korea.”688
During this period however, Taiwan’s ROC government had yet to be significantly
publicly criticized or singled out as a military dictatorship in congressional hearings due to
bipartisan support for the authoritarian Chinese Nationalist regime’s anti-communist usefulness
as an ally in Washington’s cold war containment strategy versus Soviet and Chinese Communist
expansionism. This seemingly ideological contradictory circumstance prevailed during the
period despite the authoritarian Chinese Nationalist ROC government maintaining its strict
martial law policies, imposed upon all of Taiwan’s citizens since 1949 to limit free speech, other
political parties, and many fundamental human rights. These conditions in Taiwan were
antithetical to even basic guaranteed American democratic-inspired ideological political values.
However, as these series of Senate inquiries reveal, Chairman Fulbright would emphasize
and question witnesses over whether it was morally, ethically, and ideologically defensible that
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US economic and military aid should continue to go to “military dictatorships.” During one early
exchange during the June 13th hearings for example, after fellow Democratic Senator James W.
Symington mentioned that “We have the government overthrown in South Korea, now run by a
military junta,” Chairman Fulbright retorted that: “I am seeking justification. We have to have it
justified.”689 During the next day’s hearings on June 14th, Senator Symington made similar
comparisons by stating that he did not “…see the future bright in South Korea. I mentioned some
of the things which in my opinion have hurt our prestige more than a military junta government
now established there. We have the same situation to a large extent in Taiwan, from the
standpoint of reality.”690
Significantly, the hearing transcripts also reveal that Taiwan was the next undemocratic
US aid recipient Asian nation immediately following South Korea as the Committee’s subject of
inquiry. Similarly, the purpose of the Senate’s line of questioning for Taiwan sought more clarity
for how Washington justified US economic and military aid to friendly, but authoritarian
regimes. Chairman Fulbright further queried Assistant Secretary McConaughy about how
Washington could continue justifying US economic and military aid to these two antiCommunist nations beyond 1961, particularly Taiwan which had received $3.894 million in
combined US military and economic aid assistance for the 15-year period during 1946-1960.691
McConaughy’s main justification was that both nations had been targets of Chinese
Communist military aggression with assistance from the Soviet Union since at least 1950.
Further he stated that both nations remained under those threats and therefore there was a
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“military justification…on a strategic basis” and “we have an obligation to assist the people of
the area who are willing to help themselves and to fight for themselves, too. I would hate to see
23 million go under communism. I think it would be setback which would be very hard for us to
recover from in the Far East.”692
Nevertheless, when Fulbright asked McConaughy whether this justification was “good
business, and we should continue this program on the same basis?,” he replied that he thought
“we should try to reduce the amount that it costs us, and we are working in that direction.”693
These and related congressional hearings reveal evidence that the US legislative branch was
becoming increasingly skeptical that Washington could continue to rationalize to the American
public that US government foreign aid expenditures should support authoritarian regimes. Up
until this period, Washington consistently emphasized justifying the dual threats of Soviet and
Chinese Communist expansionism posed upon US allies as the underpinning logic for US
economic aid to friendly anti-Communist governments such as the ROC on Taiwan.
Chairman Fulbright’s line of questioning showed that he was increasingly concerned with
the ideological contradiction of US economic aid going to develop capitalism in undemocratic
authoritarian regimes such as Taiwan when he stated that:
…what I am trying to get at is whether or not we have applied our money according to
sensible principles. If we have, we will continue. If we have not, it is time to change
it…What is so disillusioning about it is such places as Korea where you now have a
setback in the creation of a local government. They are right back with a dictatorship that
is hardly distinguishable from the other dictators. There is no free government there,
obviously. Have we done any good there? All I am trying to suggest is that we have not
applied our resources in an intelligent manner.694
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Another focus of Congressional foreign aid hearings during 1961 would soon take
precedence in determining how successful Washington’s overall aid programs were having on
making Taiwan economically viable and independent. The degree that Washington judged
Taiwan was becoming economically successful, (thus precluding the need for future US
assistance), would also be a causal factor for gradually reducing US economic aid to Taiwan
during the Kennedy administration and ultimately ending it in 1965 during the Johnson
administration. When Chairman Fulbright quizzed Henry R. Labouisse, the Chairman of
President Kennedy’s Task Force on Foreign Economic Assistance, over the political and
economic results from the “nearly $4 billion” in US economic and military aid that went to
Taiwan’s eight million people since 1946, Labouisse replied:
…if you look at it separately, you do see a case of success in the expenditure of funds.
They many have spent too much money, and there may have been some waste but,
generally speaking, there has been a success…We feel as of the year facing us, 1962,
there will be no need for supporting assistance type of grant aid to Taiwan. We believe
that its development is beginning to take hold, and that Taiwan, before too long can be
completely self-sustaining.695

In the next exchange, Fulbright posed to Labouisse the key question related to the
contradiction and puzzle of US aid going to authoritarian Taiwan when he asked: “Do you
consider it [Taiwan] to be a freely democratic country in the image of the American system?”
When Labouisse deflected directly criticizing Taiwan’s then still repressive authoritarian regime
by answering the question by stating: “No, I do not think we can make the world over in the
image of the American system;” Fulbright retorted: “That is what we are trying to do…We talk a
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lot about it, don’t we?... I am just trying to develop what I can say on this floor, as to why we
advise the American people to continue to put this kind of money out.”696
Labouisse then gave an answer representing the crux of the ideological contradiction in
the intended purposes of US aid when he stated: “No, I think this would be a great mistake. If we
tried to do this, it would be one of our great failures. I believe in free government and democratic
government, and I am opposed to dictators. This is different from believing that we should try to
make the world over in our own image.”697 This part of the testimony reveals that Taiwan was
viewed by many officials in Washington as being a credible US aid recipient nation because its
Chinese Nationalist-led ROC government was largely characterized as a tolerable dictatorship or
a form of an acceptable authoritarian regime.
Another related causal factor influencing US economic aid to authoritarian Taiwan
resulted from American private sector firms pressuring the US Congress and executive branch
officials because they were either profiting from US government contracts managing US
economic assistance programs or had foreign direct investment interests in Taiwan’s American
subsidized government run public industrial and military defense sectors. During the hearings on
June 7, 1961, the Senate committee members put witnesses under intense scrutiny for this issue
by questioning them over the profits US private firms made by requiring them to provide a
detailed accounting and example of a typical contract between the ICA and a private American
firm fulfilling a US foreign economic aid “cost-plus-a-fixed fee” for Afghanistan.698
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This example illustrated the Senate committee’s concern and efforts to reform potential
corruption, undue influence, or waste, fraud, and abuse in US economic aid program contracts
with American firms managing operations in foreign recipient nations such as Taiwan. However,
the overall direct benefit of US economic aid to Taiwan for US businesses can be argued as
negligible during the period except primarily for one American firm—the New York-based J.G.
White Engineering Company. As early as 1948, J.G. White gained enormous profits from US
ECA and subsequent USAID administered US economic aid to the Chinese Nationalists as the
main no-bid single source contractor developing Taiwan’s industrial, infrastructure, energy
production and utilities, and manufacturing sectors during the period.699 After 1961 the US
Congress specified in US economic aid funding legislation overseen by the USAID that funds to
finance contracts made between the ROC Government and J.G. White be such that the company
could hire staff such as engineering advisors and industrial operations supervisors to study, plan,
build, and manage large scale industrial and infrastructure projects mainly for the public
sector.700
Nevertheless, later that summer soon after these Senate hearings, the Kennedy
administration publicly reaffirmed the high level status and importance of the US-ROC
diplomatic relationship by hosting a 16-member senior Taiwanese state delegation that included
Vice President and Prime Minister Chen Cheng, along with K.T. Li, Secretary General of the
Council for United States Aid for a 10-day official state visit to Washington during July 30 –
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August 9, 1961.701 This significant state-to-state diplomatic event, which included several
bilateral meetings among leading US executive and legislative branch officials with their Taiwan
counterparts, resulted in the two countries issuing the ROC-US Joint Communique on August
11, 1961 in which both leaders “discussed United States assistance for the continued economic
growth of free China,” and “to provide substantial assistance to the Republic of China in support
of its economic development program…”702
However, despite this lavish public event reaffirming the strength of US-ROC relations
and Washington’s commitment to the military defense and economic development of Taiwan,
the US Congress’ intended reform measures for US foreign economic aid policies would soon
result in ending economic aid to the Chinese Nationalists within four years by 1965. Just one
month after hosting the Chinese Nationalists in Washington, On September 4, 1961, the US
Congress, in reaction to the president’s new aid initiatives and in concert with its own foreign aid
reform agenda, enacted the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
One of the new Act’s main provisions was to infuse US foreign economic aid programs
with more firm conditions tied to aid to develop “free market systems” based on the principle of
“private ownership of property” in “open and competitive markets.”703 The US Congress listed
the term “private sector” 31 times in this 285-page bill (as amended) while linking it to specific
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measures intended to expand free enterprise finance and entrepreneurship as part of
Washington’s new US economic foreign aid conditions on recipient nations.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 specified that the role of the Secretary of State in
overseeing “economic and financial technical assistance to foreign governments and foreign
central banks” include promoting “transparent and market-oriented processes and sustainable
private sector growth” and encouraging “private sector development,…and reducing “the role of
central governments in areas more appropriate for the private sector.”704 Furthermore, by the
next month on October 23, 1961, the US Congress’ bipartisan Subcommittee on Foreign
Economic Policy of the Joint Economic Committee released its long waited and highly
anticipated report entitled: “A New Look at Foreign Economic Policy.”705 The US Congress’
“New Look” report reiterated that US foreign economic aid was justified by the cold war
challenge ““in which the Soviet Union aims to divide the free industrial nations and at the same
time win the underdeveloped countries of the world to communism…The nations of the free
world must work together, as the Common Market “six” are doing already””706
Just two weeks later on November 3, 1961, President Kennedy, in response to pressure
from the US Congress to reform US foreign economic aid policies and the authorities granted to
him by the Act, signed Executive Order 10973 which created the US Agency for International
Development, or USAID. The newly formed USAID absorbed or consolidated the functions of
the previous US economic aid programs under the Mutual Security Agency, Foreign Operations
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Administration, and the International Cooperation Administration during 1952-1961.707 Then, on
March 12, 1962, President Kennedy released his “Foreign Aid Message to the US Congress”
detailing his administration’s “new aid program” that outlined several economic aid policy
reform measures for: “strengthening the political and economic independence of developing
countries – which means strengthening their capacity both to master the inherent stress of rapid
change and to repel Communist efforts to exploit such stress from within or without.”708
The major themes for aid reform in Kennedy’s Message included stressing the need for
stable, longer-term aid to “emerging economies,” and the ideological justifications based on
opposing communism and linking economic aid to promoting democracy by demonstrating “the
advances in human well-being which flow from economic development joined with political
liberty.”709 However, the Kennedy administration’s archives also reveal that he and his senior
advisors recognized the need to openly explain “the purpose of the whole spectrum of aid
activities and relate them to the broader purposes of our foreign policy, and to articulate this
relation in a meaningful way,…” to Congress “with an understandable rationale for aid
expenditures.”710
By late 1962, Fowler Hamilton, who had resigned as the US AID Administrator in
November 1962, advised President Kennedy that the president establish an official advisory
group of private citizens to study US foreign economic assistance programs and make
recommendations for improvement and reform. Acting upon Hamilton’s advice, on December
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10, 1962, President Kennedy created the ‘Committee To Strengthen the Security of the Free
World” comprised of 10 senior officials with General Lucius D. Clay as its chairman. Four
months later, on March 20, 1963, the landmark “Clay Committee report” published its findings
that had analyzed and recommended steps to improve the effectiveness of US foreign economic
aid programs.711 The report initially stated that the main justification for US foreign aid since the
end of World War Two had been to “strengthen the free world” with a “military-economic
program designed to increase the ability of nations bordering the Communist bloc to resist
Russian or Chinese imperialism.”712
However, this Committee’s report’s most impactful criticisms of the practical and
ideological contradictions inherent to the intended purposes compared to the actual results of US
foreign economic aid programs centered on recipient nations such as Taiwan using aid to
subsidize large government-run industrial public sectors at the expense of their free-enterprise
private sectors. The report alluded to the economic related ideological contradictions in US
economic aid programs by its observation that: “there have been too many instances in which
foreign economic aid has been given without regard to…the historic form, character, and interest
of our own economic system.”713 The report’s most important related aid policy reform
recommendations would accurately, yet implicitly describe the contradictions of US foreign
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economic aid continuing to support not only Taiwan’s perennially criticized overly large military
defense expenditures, but also its inefficient socialist style ROC government economic system
that by the early 1960s had failed to reduce its large fiscal budget deficits.714
While the Clay Committee Report did not specifically mention or name Taiwan, it did
recommend “withholding of funds” if “unwillingness is the source of the problem” for US aid
recipient nations whose governments did not meet Washington’s advice to trim unnecessary
defense expenditures and capitalistic oriented reform measures to improve their economies. In a
seemingly implicit reference underscoring Washington’s perennial criticism of US economic aid
being used to support Taiwan’s oversized military budget, the Report stated:
…in several of these countries, indigenous forces are larger than required for their
immediate mission of defense…Moreover, the amount of economic support for these
military programs could be further reduced in at least one instance if long delayed
internal financial reforms were undertaken…significant reductions of military and
economic assistance are in order.715

Both observations credibly resembled the case of Taiwan. Yet, it was the latter
observation and associated recommendation that typified the case of the Chinese Nationalists’
“unwillingness” and resistance to comply with Washington’s efforts to impose more capitalistic
conditions that would significantly reform Taiwan’s ROC government run public sector
economy in favor of meaningfully expanding its private sector. Just prior to the public release of
the Clay Committee Report in March 1963, the Clay Committee had held a crucial two-week
session in Washington during January and February in which it recommended significant cuts in
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US economic aid to several recipient nations, to include specifically mentioning the case of
Taiwan.716
Largely as a result, both the US Congress and executive branch officials were further
inclined to end US economic aid to Taiwan. Accordingly, the Clay Committee Report’s
recommendations further buttressed the argument for this case by stating:
We believe the U.S. should not aid a foreign government in projects establishing
government-owned industrial and commercial enterprises which complete with existing
private endeavors. While we realize that in aiding foreign countries we cannot insist upon
the establishment of our own economic system,…we should not extend aid which is
inconsistent with our beliefs, democratic tradition, and knowledge of economic
organization and consequences. Moreover, the observation of countless instances of
politically-operated, heavily subsidized and carefully protected inefficient state
enterprises in less developed countries makes us gravely doubt the value of such
undertakings in the economic lives of these nations.717

Another senior official that soon reemerged to influence US aid policies during the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations was Walt W. Rostow, who as previously mentioned had
advised the Eisenhower administration on an ad hoc basis, but who by then had been elevated as
the US State Department’s Director of Policy Planning during 1961-1966. In this role Rostow
oversaw the policy goals, implementation, and evaluation of a wide variety of US foreign
economic aid programs. As a result, Rostow was in a key position of influence and authority to
shape congressionally favored reforms and enhancement of US economic aid and modernization
assistance programs to non-Communist developing countries for emulation and implementation
together with traditional US capitalist principles and practices.718
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In 1960, just prior to joining the Kennedy administration, Rostow had published his
widely influential book The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto719 that
applied capitalist economic ideological concepts to outline and form a new interpretation for
global economic history as occurring in five historical stages. This new paradigm would serve as
a novel model for influencing US economic aid reform policies intended to achieve sustainable
modern economic growth in developing nations such as Taiwan.
Rostow’s five stages included: 1) the “traditional society” with a limited economic
production structure and capabilities, 2) a period when “preconditions for take-off” are
developed, 3) the “take-off” in which constraints to economic growth are lifted for expansion, 4)
the “drive to maturity” involving large capital investment for 40 years, and 5) “the age of mass
consumption.”720 Rostow’s economic modernization concepts in this book and in his other
widely published reports and articles gained favorable prominence and influence among US
government officials and policymakers during the period.721 As a result of Rostow’s influential
concepts gaining favor among Washington foreign aid policy circles, the US Congress and
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executive branch officials reformed, reinvigorated, and repurposed stricter conditions and new
goals for US economic aid going to the Chinese Nationalists that were increasingly tied to
encourage more substantial private sector capitalist economic growth in Taiwan.722
As previously described, during 1959-1965 the USAID mandated through its new
Nineteen Points Program that the Chinese Nationalist government implement significant reforms
to encourage private foreign investment and boost the private sector’s involvement within its
overall export led economic growth model. Washington’s imposition of its Nineteen Points
Program upon the Chinese Nationalists to reduce US government economic aid and loans
subsidizing Taiwan’s statist public sector dominated manufacturing and industry resulted in a
new source of external capitalist private sector funding from American private direct investment
sources, which increased from $2 million in 1959 to $50 million by 1965.723
These developments also resulted in incentivizing Taiwan to transition into the next stage
of an “export-driven” industrial and manufacturing economy that was consistent with Rostow’s
economic modernization transition from stage 3) the “take-off” in which constraints to economic
growth are lifted for expansion to stage 4) the “drive to maturity” involving large capital
investment.724 Between 1952-1960 Taiwan’s GNP grew by 6.2 percent with exports being 16.6
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percent of GNP while between 1960-1966 Taiwan’s GNP grew by 9.3 percent with exports
being 31.5 percent of GNP.725
Based on Taiwan’s positive economic growth and projections that it would be sustained
during and after the early 1960’s, several senior Kennedy and Johnson administration officials
recommended that US economic aid to Taiwan be ended. During 1963-1964 for example, David
E. Bell, the USAID Administrator, not only made numerous public statements that US economic
aid to Taiwan would end, but also had sent a secret classified memorandum to Secretary of State
Dean Rusk recommending for “Free China” [Taiwan] that “no new economic assistance
commitments after June 30, 1964…[and] …plan to withdraw virtually all A.I.D. mission staffs
from these countries by June 30, 1965.”726
Except for continuing military aid, these developments resulted in Washington ending US
economic aid Taiwan in the form of grants, loans, capital investment, and other commodity
subsidies. These types of US economic aid for Taiwan were last formally authorized and
obligated by the US Congress in fiscal year 1965 and finally “drawn down” through “residual
payouts” by fiscal years 1966-1967.727 Because the Chinese Nationalist ROC government had
received prior signals from Washington that US economic aid would likely end during the mid1960’s, its Third Four-Year Plan during 1961-1964 indicated that Taiwan would finally reduce
its exclusive dependency on US economic aid as the main external investment source when it
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expected to diversify these sources of funding from domestic banks, World Bank and other
multilateral lending institutions, and overseas Chinese and other private foreign investors.728
Overall during the early part of the period, Washington’s greater overriding
existentialities of the US cold war strategy of containment versus hostile Communist
expansionism appeared to preclude the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan from being labeled as an
unacceptable dictatorship because it was a vital friendly anti-Communist regime supporting US
cold war security interests.729 Later during the period however, the ideological contradictions
inherent with US economic aid intended to develop a showcase capitalist development model in
Taiwan became untenable because the Chinese Nationalists still preferred to maintain a socialist
style public sector economic model dominated by the ROC government.
These impediments and ideological contradictions necessitated that Washington require
and ensure that the intended economic reform measures under the Nineteen Points Program for
Taiwan were implemented, otherwise the Chinese Nationalists would risk losing continued US
aid support and financing. Nevertheless, by the early 1960s evidence that Taiwan’s overall
economic recovery would be maintained, along with increased social stability, and the rise in per
capita GDP and living standards would be the main reasons that Washington justified publicly
for ending US economic aid to the Chinese Nationalists.730
Furthermore, three other key factors contributed to Washington’s decision to end US
economic aid to Taiwan in the 1960s. First, mounting virulent bipartisan opposition in the US
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Congress and criticism over several negative aspects linked to growing American public opinion
against supporting overall US foreign economic aid programs had emerged by the early 1960s.731
One key source of evidence that best illustrated this dilemma was exemplified by the transcript
of President Johnson’s phone conversation with Under Secretary of State George W. Ball on
May 13, 1964 during contentious deliberations in the US Congress over the upcoming US
foreign aid legislation for fiscal year 1965 in which Johnson expressed his alarm that:
I hear some bad rumblings on IDA [International Development Assistance]. I thing they
are going to get that bill murdered like Freeman did. You had better get hold of Sec.
Treas. or whoever is acting and get your people up there and start knocking on
doors…Any AID [US Agency for International Aid] agents that you should have that
have contacts on the Hill…We haven’t got a chance to pass foreign aid…The
Republicans are going to…take 500 million off the economics…On this foreign aid it is
just frightening. That is the sentiment of the country…the persons interviewed were
asked…do you think the U.S. is not getting its money’s worth out of foreign aid. Two out
of every three of 65 replied no. One in ten said yes…Another reason the U.S. does not get
its money’s worth, countries turn their backs on us after we have helped them, we get
nothing in return. Aid is misused. We should help our people first. Countries don’t’ pay
back the money. You can’t buy friendship.732
Second, there was a decline in the policy influences of Walt Rostow’s economic
modernization prescriptive theories justifying US foreign economic aid programs because of the
growing perception that they could not adequately explain, diagnose, and solve the multitude of
problems exhibited among the diverse and disparate social conditions found in the majority of
US aid recipient nations. By late 1963, the US Congress and President Johnson became
increasingly reluctant to support further funding for President Kennedy’s Rostovian-theory
inspired, but failed $20 billion Alliance for Progress foreign economic aid program for Latin
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America.733 Third, by 1964 Washington’s budget priorities in the US Congress and under the
Johnson administration increasingly focused on funding the new and expansive “Great Society”
or “War on Poverty” domestic social spending programs, as well as simultaneously the twin
budgetary competing goal for the growing US military involvement in Vietnam.734
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Chapter Five: Conclusions and Findings
Overall, during the 1950-1965 period, the total of $1.4 billion in US economic aid and
assistance to Taiwan, which averaged approximately $100 million in annual US Congressional
funding authorizations, was among the highest comparative amount for foreign aid expenditures
to any single nation.735 This funding accounted for a high of ten percent of Taiwan’s GNP in
1951 to a low of two percent by 1965. All told, US economic aid represented 6.4 percent of
Taiwan’s GNP, 34 percent of its gross investment, and 91 percent of its net import surplus of
goods and services.736 During the early part of this period, the Chinese Nationalist ROC
Government’s officially stated “economic ideology” was that of a “mixed” or “planned free”
economy of public and private enterprise.737 The distribution and composition between these two
sectors were determined by the authoritarian nature of the ruling Chinese Nationalist politicians
whose parochial elite interests overwhelmingly favored the public sector through the financing
and control of “state enterprises.”738
These characteristics constituted a major part of the dilemma and challenges inherent to
Washington’s economic aid policies towards Taiwan. Internal foreign economic aid policy
debates within US government archives reveal that Washington recognized that eventually the
United States would have to adjust its goals and conditions for aid to avoid the apparent
ideological contradictions of purposing it for capitalist style development in recipient nations
such as Taiwan exhibiting statist socialist-style command economies. If Washington was to fully
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carry out its intended economic development goals as key features of the US cold war
containment strategy, it would have to attract other developing nations to adopt capitalism.
Washington would have to by necessity and ideological legitimacy, maintain and demonstrate
the superiority of capitalistic economic development versus the growing challenges from the
global expansion of Communist bloc style socialist-inspired economic modernization outreach
efforts in the developing world.
As a result, Washington would gradually repurpose its goals and set conditions on
Taiwan if the Chinese Nationalist-led ROC government wanted more US economic aid. These
conditions would be intended to eventually reform Taiwan’s statist command economy, which
had already by the early part of this period featured characteristics of a socialist-like a public
sector government planning and management system. Therefore, US economic aid goals and
conditions would be gradually modified for incentivizing Taiwan to adopt features consistent
with a more capitalist-like economic development system that emphasized development of its
private sector and free enterprise.
Washington’s senior policy makers also recognized that the United States could not be
perceived as hypocritical and disingenuous by tolerating Taiwan’s socialist command economy
to continue its trajectory intact as a seemingly fictional example of a pseudo-capitalist
development success story for the “Free World” to emulate. Thus, Washington’s aid reform
goals for Taiwan’s economic development were influenced by the desire to avoid the outward
appearance of the ideological contradiction inherent with pretending Taiwan was a successful
architype in adopting a capitalist-style economic modernization model. These goals were also
made more imperative by the expansion of competing Communist bloc socialist style economic
modernization ideologies and principles.
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As first established in Chapter Two, the critical World War Two period during 19431945 was when Washington justified giving massive amounts of military and economic aid to
China, then led by the Chinese Nationalist ROC government, because it was a wartime ally
against Japanese military aggression in East Asia. During and immediately after this period,
Washington had received substantial evidence of emerging Chinese Nationalist statist and
authoritarian style economic plans and policies that were antithetical to American notions of
capitalist style economic ideology and development all through both the last three years of the
Roosevelt administration in the later World War Two era during 1943-1945 and the early
Truman administration during 1945-1949. US diplomatic archives revealed that American
officials became increasingly aware of the authoritarian Chinese Nationalist regime’s repressive
political leadership and emerging corrupt statist and socialist-style economic system.
Consequently, the US State Department repeatedly and doggedly attempted to query their
Chinese interlocuters to better understand the Chinese Nationalist’s emerging post-war economic
plans that favored statist public sector dominated industries at the expense of the private sector
and free enterprise in Taiwan. This chapter established that several senior American officials
were aware of the Chinese Nationalist ROC government’s emerging intentions to implement
plans for controlling virtually all of China’s post-war industrial and trade sectors. This awareness
led to controversial debates in the US Congress and impacted Washington’s policies of providing
only ad hoc annual economic aid to the Chinese Nationalists on mainland China during 19431949.
This chapter also explained how the events of the renewed Chinese civil war period
between the Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists negatively impacted Washington’s
support for more US economic aid to Taiwan, or “Formosa” as it was also referred to at the time.
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This lack of support resulted mostly from controversies surrounding Washington’s growing
awareness of the corrupt Chinese Nationalists’ implementing authoritarian undemocratic
political and socialist-style statist economic systems in Taiwan. A series of authoritative ROC
government archived documents reveal the Chinese Nationalists’ plans and policies to
implement state control over all of Taiwan’s national economic matters and restrict private sector
capitalist activities. These causal factors help explain why the United States was set to abandon
and limit economic aid to Taiwan during 1948-1949, then intended to eliminate it with a specific
end date in mid-1950.
Chapter Three’s appraisal of the last three years of President Truman’s second term
during 1949-1952 argued that a seemingly seminal historical transition in US economic aid
policy towards Taiwan occurred due to major new internal and external causal variables
associated with the onset of this early cold war period. This policy transition can be traced back
to early 1949 with the Truman administration’s classified NSC 37 series of documents known as
The [Current] Position of the United States With Respect to Formosa recommended resuming
economic, but not military aid to Taiwan.
Other later and formerly classified archival evidence revealed that Washington reversed
course and supported Taiwan with extensive amounts of economic aid and defense security
assistance due to consensus among key US executive and legislative branch leaders over the
existential threats posed by Soviet and Chinese Communist expansionism and the outbreak of the
Korean War in 1950. The key primary sources introducing US foreign economic aid to countries
such as Taiwan as part of Washington’s early cold war era containment strategy included
President Truman’s 1949 Point Four program, the Mutual Security Act of 1951, and the 1950
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National Security Council Paper NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National
Security.
Chapter Three’s appraisal of President Eisenhower’s first term during 1953-1956
established that this was the most significant period for Washington initially expanding upon the
economic aid components of the US cold war containment strategy. This chapter presented
evidence of the Eisenhower administration’s evolving rationales for foreign economic aid and
emerging capitalist modernization theories of development that became linked to the broader
cold war security, military, ideological, psychological sub-strategies resulting in justifying
consistent annual US economic aid to Taiwan. During this period, US leaders favored giving
economic aid to nations such as Taiwan due to their perceptions of global competition from
alternative economic modernization models exported by the Soviet Union and Communist
China.
This chapter also evaluated the overall impetus for Washington initially debating and
recommending new measures for overhauling existing US foreign economic aid policies by
imposing stricter conditions on recipient nations such as Taiwan during the end of President
Eisenhower’s first term. As the 1956 Randall Report revealed, both executive branch officials
and the US Congress criticized and sought to reform US foreign economic aid goals and
dispensation due to perceptions that it was not effectively or efficiently achieving its intended
purposes of adequately advancing capitalism in developing nations such as Taiwan.
Chapter Four established that by the late 1950s into the early 1960s, US Congressional
support for annually appropriating large amounts of US economic aid to the Chinese Nationalist
ROC government significantly waned due to the inherent ideological contradictions in giving aid
intended to develop capitalism and private enterprise for Taiwan’s socialist-style statist and
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public sector preferred industrial model of development. By the beginning of President
Eisenhower’s second term, Washington was nearing bipartisan consensus on a policies wind
down and end US economic aid to Taiwan justified mainly because the Chinese Nationalists
were not adequately reforming their economic system sufficiently towards a capitalist model, yet
simultaneously were exhibiting signs of purported economic success. US economic aid to
Taiwan continued downward along this trajectory during the next four years for similar reasons
identified in the 1963 Clay Committee Report under the Democratic administrations of President
Kennedy during 1961-1963 and the first three years of President Johnson during 1963-1965.739
In response to Congressional criticism and their own initiatives in reforming US foreign
aid programs, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson both favored continuing policies adjusting and
phasing out US economic aid to Taiwan.740 During this period, the foreign economic
modernization and development ideas and concepts of the previously mentioned Walt Rostow, a
senior economic policy advisor to both presidents, gained widespread acceptance throughout the
US government. During all three of the administrations of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and
Johnson, both Rostow and Neil Jacoby’s policy influences as senior executive branch advisors
with their new concepts for economic modernization and aid were linked to Washington’s
foreign policy goal of developing Taiwan’s private sector and entrepreneurial capacity.
These new policy reform measures were intended to achieve quicker and more efficient
results of US aid intended to pluralize Taiwan’s economy away from its statist led economic
model towards capitalistic private sector and free enterprise expansion for sustainable and long-
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term modernization growth. These measures would also, according to the rationale at the time,
create a Taiwanese middle class with a vested interest in further economic expansion and
eventually transform Taiwan into a liberal democratic, capitalist-leaning government with a more
favorable economic ideology supporting free enterprise. By the early 1960s, Rostow’s concepts
were also adapted to declare Taiwan a success story, thus justifying Washington’s policy
changes for ending US economic aid to Taiwan.
The US cold war containment strategy included capitalist-based private sector and
democratic governmental promotional goals to counter the appeal of the competing Communist
socio-economic modernization development models in the developing world. Washington
considered Taiwan to be a “showcase” of how US economic aid and management techniques
would enable Taiwan to transition from a state-led, authoritarian model of economic
development to a more inclusive private sector dominant economic construct which would
eventually lead to a democratic and prosperous country like other Western-leaning capitalist or
friendly developing countries.741
In 1965 when US economic aid to Taiwan ended, the Johnson administration, partially to
deflect Congressional criticism and as an economic theme of the US cold war psychological
warfare strategy, embarked on a public relations campaign to showcase Taiwan as a triumph for
how fifteen years of US aid and an accompanying capitalist development model created an
economic success story worthy of emulation by other foreign countries.742 A significant related
development occurred during 1964-1965, when Dr. Neil H. Jacoby, then Dean of the Graduate
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School of Business Administration at the University of California, Los Angeles was
commissioned by USAID to “get across the secret of Taiwan’s success to other developing
countries” through an “independent study” that would be “an objective evaluation of both the
effective and ineffective measures employed by the Chinese and ourselves in the generally
successful economic development effort on Taiwan.”743
The USAID directed Jacoby to form an “independent” Taiwan Aid Evaluation Team
which applied his five-step analytical process to produce his seminal report that evaluated
Washington’s economic objectives and results for the $1.4 billion in US economic aid given to
Taiwan during the period 1951-1965.744 Jacoby applied his “Five-step” model to analyze the
results of US economic aid for developing Taiwan’s overall economy using two concurrent and
overarching economic development aid evaluation frameworks. The first framework examined
and compared economic growth using a four-sector construct for the agriculture, industry,
infrastructure, and human resources sectors and the second compared the private and public
sectors.745 The report’s methods of evaluation consisted of collecting and interpreting economic
data of the relationships between causal and dependent variables of US economic aid for
Taiwan’s development using the above described four- and two-sector constructs.746
The report also applied macroeconomic comparisons of Taiwanese output to capital
ratios and constructed a hypothetical “no-aid” growth model for the sector constructs to reach its
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conclusions that US economic aid was responsible for significantly expanding Taiwan’s GNP.747
For example, overall, Taiwan had an annual GNP annual growth rate of over 7 percent which
resulted in USAID claiming that US economic aid “was more productive than in comparable
Asian countries…” resulting in a cumulative GNP increase of 173 percent during the 15-year
period, rising from $879 million in 1951 to $2.4 billion in 1965—the largest growth rate in Asia
except for Japan.748 While the report evaluated all aspects of the efficacy of US economic goals
and results of administration, management, and multi-sector development of Taiwan’s economy,
the private sector stands out as a key area of inquiry because it was a key rationale for Congress
authorizing US economic aid during this 15-year period.
This 1966 USAID report also reveals several statements portraying both positive and
negative results of the effects of US economic aid for improving Taiwan’s private sector in 7 of
19 findings related to US influence on Taiwanese economic policies.749 Positive or supportive
findings include the “two major thrusts of AID influence were to elevate development as a
Chinese national goal and to foster private enterprise….Many GRC measures to improve the
investment climate and to energize the private sector were either sponsored or strongly supported
by AID.”750 In contrast, more negative or less-successful examples include: “Initially the GRC
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was not strongly predisposed to development of the private sector…AID emphasis on private
enterprise came during the latter part of the aid period, after the environment and Chinese
attitudes were favorable…[and] AID failed to induce the GRC to transfer most government
enterprises,…to private ownership and competitive markets.”751
Analysis of the data for US economic aid assistance funding compared to the intended
results for Taiwan’s public and private sectors during the 15-year period reveals that industrial
production in the private sector did indeed rise from 45 percent to 62 percent over the public
sector.752 However, it appears that due to the emergence of ongoing US Congressional scrutiny
and criticism during 1957-1960 that US economic aid assistance had not adequately benefited
Taiwan’s private sector sufficiently enough (among other deficiencies) as a primary goal stated
in US aid policy documents. As a result, Washington adopted the “19 Point Program of
Economic and Financial Reform of 1960” to strengthen USAID efforts to influence Taiwan’s
economic reform policies for its private sector.753 A related example contained in a 1962 US
Department of Commerce sponsored trade brochure promoting business investment in Taiwan
stated:
The United States and Chinese Governments have favorable attitudes toward U.S. private
capital investment in Taiwan…They envision a synthesis of free enterprise and welfare
socialism in which the private sector is to play an expanding role in an economy guided
by the state…The free economy of the private sector should be integrated with the
planned economy of the state, with a clear demarcation in type between public and
private enterprise…754
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The contradiction between the purpose of US economic aid intended to develop capitalist
free enterprise and private sector growth in Taiwan is apparent when contrasted with this
brochure’s other statements that the authoritarian ROC government still held on to managing
several public sector businesses by “reserving the right” as it determined to allow the private
sector involvement in the economy:
…nationwide and monopolistic enterprises or those which cannot be easily undertaken by
the private sector, such as steel industry, nationwide railroad, large-scale public utilities,
should be operated by the state…The Government reserves the right to operate three
types of industries—nationwide undertakings, monopolistic concerns, and those which
cannot be easily undertaken by the private sector.755

This contradiction was publicly debated among influential American political leaders, US
Congressional staff, and academics who criticized the contradiction between Washington’s
official stated goals, publicity, and progress reports and the actual marginal results of US
economic aid in developing Taiwan’s private sector entrepreneurship.756 For example, on one
hand, Jacoby’s 1966 book on US aid to Taiwan stated: “By far the most important consequence
of U.S. influence was the creation in Taiwan of a booming private enterprise system,”757 while
on the other hand this statement contradicted Jacoby’s own authored official US State
Department USAID report which stated: “ Four-fifths of U.S. capital assistance was invested in
the public sector and on one-fifth in the private sector during 1951-1963 as a whole.”758
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These and other contradictions show that Washington deliberately, albeit logically
consistent from a pragmatic cold war economic ideological perspective within the US
containment strategy, tried to dampen criticism from the US Congress and others while publicly
touting Taiwan’s economic “success” of its private sector due to US economic aid. This despite
it going primarily to the ROC government’s owned public sector and state enterprises.759
This issue can also be interpreted as one of nuance and “perception management” to
influence elite and broader public opinion such that US economic aid created the conditions for
the eventual flourishing of Taiwan’s private sector entrepreneurship that occurred after the
period. For example, the 1966 USAID Report essentially made this point by stating: “U.S. aid
brought the private sector of Taiwan’s economy to pre-eminence indirectly—by providing
infrastructure and inducing the GRC to create a favorable climate for private investment.”760
However, Nick Cullather argues that US economic aid actually resulted in reinforcing and
expanding Taiwan’s public sector at the expense of the private sector by directing US
government capital investment to stabilize state owned enterprises, collaborating with the
Taiwanese government in central planning of the economy and “co-opting groups—mainly the
military—that opposed or disrupted change.”761
In conclusion, this dissertation identified internal and external historical factors that led
the United States to disburse significant amounts of economic development assistance and aid to
Taiwan during the cold war period from 1950 to 1965. The Cold war dynamics of containment
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and US policy responses were the main influences that justified US economic assistance and aid
to Taiwan during the period.
Evidence indicated that the strategic influence of Rostow’s “New Approach” to US
foreign economic policy during the early cold war and his modern economic theories and
concepts also influenced Washington to make economic developmental aid and assistance to
developing countries such as Taiwan a keystone of cold war containment strategy during the
period. The economic modernization theories and influence of Rostow and Jacoby were the
likely individual elite primary drivers for policies adopted by US presidents to influence the
Congress and the American public that significant sums of the US federal budget for foreign aid
be spent on Washington’s aspirational goals of converting and developing Taiwan’s statist
economy to be more like the capitalist model of the US economy.
However, since Taiwan was unique as the “Free China” opposing Communist China
during this period, Washington initially accepted Taiwan’s authoritarian state owned and
managed public sector state enterprise system and gave it aid at the expense of private sector
entrepreneurship.762 This policy went against American style capitalistic development principles
for developing nations of opposing import substitution initially for economic aid to Taiwan’s
development and supporting its public sector (including “mixed” public-private sector
enterprises) to stabilize its economy.763
These drivers along with the implementation of US economic aid and modernization
principles did not appreciably benefit Taiwan’s private sector entrepreneurship in comparison to
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the ROC government’s dominated public sector during 1951-1965. However, it was only after
the period that US economic aid did result in creating the conditions for transitioning Taiwan’s
economy away from its public sector dominated economy and import substitution policies and
creating a thriving private sector entrepreneurship in export-oriented manufacturing and
attracting external capital investment.764
It was not until the late 1960’s that Taiwanese and American private businesses began to
profit from the effects of US economic aid that emerged when Taiwan’s economy gradually
transitioned from Rostow’s stage 4) to 5) with greatly expanded industrial, manufacturing,
electronics, agriculture, and consumer sectors. From the late 1960’s to the present, the American
private business sector benefitted significantly with Taiwan being the United States’ top 15
ranked trading nation partners for imports and exports during the last 40 years—a staggering
statistic given Taiwan’s small size and population. For example, in 2018 Taiwan was the United
States’ 11th-ranked merchandise trading partner valued at $77 billion; 15th largest export market
at $31 billion; 13th largest import market at $46 billion; with US agriculture exports totaling $3.9
billion.765
The economic related ideological contradictions that emerged during the period emanated
from the contrast between the purposes of US economic aid that were intended to develop free
market capitalism, private enterprise, and democracy in an authoritarian, undemocratic, and
quasi-socialist statist economy dominated by the single-party rule of the Chinese Nationalists on
Taiwan. These and other economic reports and findings suggest that contrary to official US
government pronouncements, it is largely a myth that US economic modernization techniques,
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assistance, and aid resulted in creating a viable private sector in Taiwan during the period.766
However, whether US economic aid resulted in creating an actual liberal capitalistic-ideology
based economic model in Taiwan were mostly accurate or not can be interpreted as largely
irrelevant given the imperatives of Washington’s global cold war strategy of containment’s
economic necessities to showcase success.
The main external causal factors for Washington perpetuating this myth resulted from the
outbreak of the Korean War and American elite perceptions and reactions to countering the
threats posed by the international existentialities of new Soviet and Chinese Communist
economic modernization development methods for the developing world that Moscow and
Beijing had announced and implemented during 1952-1956.767 These developments during the
early cold war period caused Washington to prolong a psychological warfare narrative that
declared Taiwan a “victory” for capitalistic economic ideology within the broader US global
containment strategy versus Soviet and Chinese Communist expansionism.768
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